scholarly journals Modest Sociality: Continuities and Discontinuities

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Pacherie
Keyword(s):  
Small Scale ◽  
Individual Agency ◽  
Planning Agency ◽  
Intentional Agency ◽  
Individual Planning ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Central Claim

AbstractA central claim in Michael Bratman’s account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirely continuous with structures at work in individual planning agency. My main point will be that he may be wrong in assuming that the basic cognitive infrastructure sufficient to support individual agency doesn’t have to be supplemented in significant ways to support shared agency.

Bratman on shared intention

SATS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181
Author(s):  
Christian Kietzmann
Keyword(s):  
Human Agency ◽  
Shared Intention ◽  
Individual Agency ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Single Person ◽  
Analytic Strategy ◽  
Individual Planning ◽  
Main Components ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Central Claim

AbstractIn work that spans almost four decades, Michael Bratman has developed a rich account of human agency. At the centre of this account lies an understanding of intentions as individual planning states. A significant strand in this enterprise has been his work on shared agency, culminating in his 2014 monograph, which aims to extend his account of individual agency to cover cases of what he calls “modest sociality”, i.e. simple cases of acting together. Central to this endeavour is Bratman’s analysis of shared intention, which for him is not asui generisphenomenon, but can be understood in terms of his concept of individual agency, as the main components of his account of shared intention are already available in his account of the intentions of a single person.In this paper, I want to critically examine Bratman’s approach to shared intention. I will proceed as follows: In Section 1, I will describe the analytic strategy that guides Bratman’s analysis. Section 2 will introduce his central claim that the fulfilment of a list of conditions suffices for a shared intention to be present. In Sections 3 to 5, I will discuss and criticise some of these conditions. In Section 6, I will draw some positive conclusions from my critical arguments.

Shared Intention, Organized Institutions

2021 ◽  
pp. 54-80
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Human Action ◽  
Planning Theory ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Shared Intention ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Planning Agency ◽  
Intentional Agency ◽  
Rules Of Procedure

This chapter begins with the use of the planning theory of individual temporally extended human action in a construction of shared intention. It then develops a series of further constructions that build on each other: of Hart-type, criticism/demand-involving social rules; of authority-augmented social rules of procedure involved in the rule-guided infrastructure of an organized institution; of institutional intentions as outputs of social rules of procedure (where these intentions require neither corresponding shared intention nor a dense, holistic institutional subject); and of institutional intentional agency. These constructions articulate inter-related roles of our capacity for planning agency in important forms of human practical organization: temporally extended, small-scale social, and institutional.

Wessex in Context

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niall Sharples
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Daily Basis ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Internal Dynamic ◽  
Archaeological Record ◽  
Human Relationships ◽  
Architectural Form ◽  
Individual Agency ◽  
The People ◽  
The Individual

In this book I have attempted to create a new agenda for the study of Britain in the last millennium BC. The book consciously sets out, in its structure and content, to direct attention away from the nature of the archaeological record towards the nature of past human societies. This does not mean I am not interested in the archaeological record, and readers will have noted there is a considerable amount of detail in the text, perhaps too much for some people; but the data has to be examined in relation to the people who lived in a particular place at a particular time: ‘the archaeologist is digging up, not things, but people’ (Wheeler 1954b: v). The objective has been to outline the overall constraints of place and time (Chapter 2) and to see how these created a distinctive archaeological record that differed not only from other areas of Britain, but which varied significantly within the region. I examine how people created communities (Chapter 3) and explore how the mechanisms used to organize human relationships, within that society, changed through time. These changes were partly brought about through events outside their control, but always in a way that was affected by their own particular circumstances. I consider how the most ubiquitous architectural form in later prehistory, the house, was used to structure social relationships on a daily basis in relation to the family, and how this provided a template for thinking about the world (Chapter 4). The analysis concludes with an examination of how these societies considered individual freedom and connectedness, and how the complex variability of individual agency provides an internal dynamic to social change that was influenced by external events, but not led by them (Chapter 5). When I originally conceived of this book the structure was reversed: I started with the individual and worked up to the organization of the larger landscapes. At first sight this may sound a more sensible way of presenting the evidence, moving from small-scale structures to large-scale processes, but during the writing of the book I found this did not seem to work.

scholarly journals Practical Intersubjectivity and Normative Guidance: Bratman on Shared Agency

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-48
Author(s):  
Abraham Sesshu Roth
Keyword(s):  
Power Sharing ◽  
Interpersonal Coordination ◽  
Shared Intention ◽  
Interesting Issue ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Individual Planning ◽  
Shared Agency

AbstractIn an important new book on shared agency, Michael Bratman develops an account of the normative demand for the coordination of intentions amongst participants in shared agency. Bratman seeks to understand this form of normative guidance in terms of that associated with individual planning intentions. I give reasons to resist his form of reductionism. In addition, I note how Bratman’s discussion raises the interesting issue of the function or purpose of shared intention and of shared agency more generally. According to Bratman, the function of shared intention is to promote interpersonal coordination of intention and action. I suggest that power sharing amongst participants must also be included as a function of shared intention.

scholarly journals Profile, Level of Vulnerability and Spatial Pattern of Deforestation in Sulawesi Period of 1990 to 2018

Forests ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syamsu Rijal ◽  
Roland A. Barkey ◽  
Nasri ◽  
Munajat Nursaputra
Keyword(s):  
Land Cover ◽  
Forest Cover ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Distribution Patterns ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Landsat 8 ◽  
Agricultural Activities ◽  
Planning Agency ◽  
Low Rate ◽  
Observation Period

Deforestation is an event of loss of forest cover to another cover. Sulawesi forests have the potential to be deforested as with Sumatra and Kalimantan. This study aims to provide information on deforestation events in Sulawesi from 1990 to 2018. The data used in this study are (1) land cover in 1990, 2000, 2010; (2) Landsat 8 imagery in 2018; (3) administrative map of BIG in 2018. The methods used are (1) image classification with on-screen digitation techniques following the PPIK land cover classification guidelines, Forestry Planning Agency (2008) using ArcGIS Desktop 10.6 from ESRI; (2) overlapping maps; (3) analysis of deforestation; (4) analysis of deforestation profiles, (5) vulnerability analysis; and (6) analysis of distribution patterns of deforestation. The results showed that the profile of deforestation occurring on Sulawesi Island in the 1990–2018 observation period was dominated by profile 3-1-1 (the proportion of large forest area, the highest incidence of deforestation early stage at the beginning, at a low rate) in 13 districts. The level of vulnerability to deforestation is a non-vulnerable category (37 districts) which is directed to become a priority in handling deforestation in Sulawesi. Spatial patterns of the deforestation that occurred randomly and were scattered are dominated by shrubs, dryland agricultural activities, and small-scale plantations.

scholarly journals Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity. A comment on Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Petersson
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Planning Theory ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Central Claim

AbstractMichael Bratman’s work is established as one of the most important philosophical approaches to group agency so far, and Shared Agency, A Planning Theory of Acting Together confirms that impression. In this paper I attempt to challenge the book’s central claim that considerations of theoretical simplicity will favor Bratman’s theory of collective action over its main rivals. I do that, firstly, by questioning whether there must be a fundamental difference in kind between Searle style we-intentions and I-intentions within that type of framework. If not, Searle’s type of theory need not be less qualitatively parsimonious than Bratman’s. This hangs on how we understand the notions of modes and contents of intentional states, and the relations between modes, contents, and categorizations of such states. Secondly, by questioning whether Bratman’s theory steers clear of debunking or dismissing collectivity. Elsewhere I have claimed that the manoeuvres Bratman suggested to avoid circularity in his conceptual analysis (in 1992 and 1997) undermine the strength of his resulting notion of collective action. Bratman responds in detail to this objection in his new book and I return to the issue towards the end of the paper.

Reasons to strike first

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Buckner ◽  
Luke Glowacki
Keyword(s):  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Small Scale

Abstract De Dreu and Gross predict that attackers will have more difficulty winning conflicts than defenders. As their analysis is presumed to capture the dynamics of decentralized conflict, we consider how their framework compares with ethnographic evidence from small-scale societies, as well as chimpanzee patterns of intergroup conflict. In these contexts, attackers have significantly more success in conflict than predicted by De Dreu and Gross's model. We discuss the possible reasons for this disparity.

Exploring Coronal Structures with SOHO

2000 ◽  
Vol 179 ◽  
pp. 403-406
Author(s):  
M. Karovska ◽  
B. Wood ◽  
J. Chen ◽  
J. Cook ◽  
R. Howard
Keyword(s):  
Solar Corona ◽  
Image Enhancement ◽  
Coronal Mass Ejections ◽  
Dynamical Evolution ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Low Contrast ◽  
Contrast Structures ◽  
Scale Structures ◽  
Small Scale Structures ◽  
Coronal Structures

AbstractWe applied advanced image enhancement techniques to explore in detail the characteristics of the small-scale structures and/or the low contrast structures in several Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs) observed by SOHO. We highlight here the results from our studies of the morphology and dynamical evolution of CME structures in the solar corona using two instruments on board SOHO: LASCO and EIT.

Scanning tunneling microscopy and atomic force microscopy: New tools for biology

1989 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 778-779
Author(s):  
CE Bracker ◽  
P. K. Hansma
Keyword(s):  
Physical Property ◽  
Scanning Probe ◽  
Scanning Tunneling ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Tunneling Microscopy ◽  
Force Microscopy ◽  
New Family ◽  
Small Probe ◽  
Atomic Force ◽  
Transmission Electron

A new family of scanning probe microscopes has emerged that is opening new horizons for investigating the fine structure of matter. The earliest and best known of these instruments is the scanning tunneling microscope (STM). First published in 1982, the STM earned the 1986 Nobel Prize in Physics for two of its inventors, G. Binnig and H. Rohrer. They shared the prize with E. Ruska for his work that had led to the development of the transmission electron microscope half a century earlier. It seems appropriate that the award embodied this particular blend of the old and the new because it demonstrated to the world a long overdue respect for the enormous contributions electron microscopy has made to the understanding of matter, and at the same time it signalled the dawn of a new age in microscopy. What we are seeing is a revolution in microscopy and a redefinition of the concept of a microscope.Several kinds of scanning probe microscopes now exist, and the number is increasing. What they share in common is a small probe that is scanned over the surface of a specimen and measures a physical property on a very small scale, at or near the surface. Scanning probes can measure temperature, magnetic fields, tunneling currents, voltage, force, and ion currents, among others.

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