Democratic Erosion, Populist Constitutionalism, and the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments Doctrine

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-48
Author(s):  
Yaniv Roznai ◽  
Tamar Hostovsky Brandes

AbstractThe world is experiencing a crisis of constitutional democracies. Populist leaders are abusing constitutional mechanisms, such as formal procedures of constitutional change, in order to erode the democratic order. The changes are, very often, gradual, incremental, and subtle. Each constitutional change, on its own, may not necessarily amount to a serious violation of essential democratic values. Yet, when examined in the context of an ongoing process, such constitutional changes may prove to be part of the incremental, gradual process of democratic erosion in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This Article explores how courts can respond to such constitutional changes. We argue the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine should be adapted to respond to existing constitutional practices that utilize incremental and subtle amendments to dismantle the democratic order. We suggest that an aggregated judicial review should be developed. We must also rethink the automatic immunity – the result of two hundred years of revolutionary constitutional theory – provided to complete constitutional replacement from constitutional restrictions and scrutiny. Finally, as opposed to the instinct to require judicial self-restraint with respect to constitutional changes that concern the judiciary itself, we suggest that this is perhaps the type of changes that require strictest scrutiny.

Author(s):  
Richard Albert

Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions is both a roadmap for navigating the intellectual universe of constitutional amendment and a blueprint for building and improving the rules of constitutional change. Drawing from dozens of constitutions in every region of the world, this book blends theory with practice to answer two all-important questions: What is an amendment and how should constitutional designers structure the procedures of constitutional change? The first matters now more than ever. Reformers are exploiting the rules of constitutional amendment, testing the limits of legal constraint, undermining the norms of democratic government, and flouting the constitution as written to create entirely new constitutions that masquerade as ordinary amendments. The second question is central to the performance and endurance of constitutions. Constitutional designers today have virtually no resources to guide them in constructing the rules of amendment, and scholars do not have a clear portrait of the significance of amendment rules in the project of constitutionalism. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions shows that no part of a constitution is more important than the procedures we use change it. Amendment rules open a window into the soul of a constitution, exposing its deepest vulnerabilities and revealing its greatest strengths. The codification of amendment rules often at the end of the text proves that last is not always least.


Author(s):  
Richard Albert

What is an amendment? This chapter shows why this question is central to the study of constitutional change. Some constitutional changes are identified as amendments but in reality may be more. Whether a constitutional change is an amendment entails implications for how the change must be made, whether a court can and should evaluate its constitutionality, and what the change requires for legitimation. This chapter returns to the origins of formal amendment—to the Articles of Confederation, America’s first constitution, which codified the very first amendment rule in a national constitution—to uncover the foundations of amendment practice and what makes an amendment different from other constitutional changes. This chapter moreover raises a question about an increasingly common phenomenon that straddles the border of legality and legitimacy: the violation of amendment rules. This chapter explains that the Indian basic structure doctrine and Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments are, at bottom, variations on the same theme we see all over the world: changes to amendment rules that occur in defiance of the rules of formal amendment. Many examples follow to illustrate this point. The chapter closes by describing and situating the importance of the chapters to follow in this book. This chapter considers constitutions from around the globe.


2020 ◽  
Vol V (I) ◽  
pp. 46-54
Author(s):  
Husnul Amin ◽  
Shafiq Qurban ◽  
Maryam Siddiqa

This research concerns the constitutional development in Pakistan with a specific reference to 21st Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. It is widely perceived among scholarly and semi-scholarly circles that the tendency of militarys direct intervention in politics; toppling democratically elected government has been declined for the last many decades across the world. According to the new trends, military interferes in the state affairs through indirect means. One of the indirect means includes abusive constitutionalism that involves constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement as mechanisms for constitutional change. The paper explores whether 21st Amendment to Constitution of Pakistan was an abusive constitutionalism that really empowered military to get a strong hold on key policy making areas of national interest during the democratic rule. The research concludes that the 21st Amendment was an abusive constitutionalism as it curtailed civil liberties and fundamental rights of the citizens and hence undermined democracy in Pakistan.


Author(s):  
Cristina Bucur ◽  
Bjørn Erik Rasch

This chapter focuses on the link between amendment institutions and formal constitutional changes. The authors’ survey of the extensive literature on constitutional amendment procedures and their consequences for constitutional adjustment highlights the lack of agreement about key mechanisms of constitutional change. Despite the increase in the availability of data on constitutions and the continuing sophistication of research methods and measures, there is still no consensus on the extent to which amendment procedures influence the pace of formal constitutional change. The authors argue that amendment institutions provide only a partial explanation of constitutional change, which also needs to take into account a number of additional political, economic, and social factors.


Author(s):  
Richard Albert

Virtually all constitutions codify amendment rules. But why? What are the uses and purposes of constitutional amendment rules? Amendment rules of course create a legal process for reformers to alter the constitution. But amendment rules serve important purposes even if the constitution is never amended at all because they have essential uses beyond the obvious one of textual alteration. Amendment rules have three categories of uses: formal, functional, and symbolic. Their formal uses include repairing imperfections, distinguishing constitutional from ordinary law, entrenching rules against easy repeal or revision, and establishing a predictable procedure for constitutional change. Their functional uses include checking the court, promoting democracy, heightening public awareness, pacifying change, and managing difference. Symbolically, amendment rules can be used to express constitutional values. This chapter explains all of these many uses of amendment rules and illustrates each of them with examples drawn from constitutions around the world. This chapter also interrogates the symbolic uses of amendment rules: How can we know whether the values expressed in constitutional amendment rules reflect authentic political commitments? This chapter explains with reference to the German Basic Law that it is possible to evaluate the authenticity of the values in amendment rules by investigating the design of amendment rules and their subsequent interpretation. This chapter considers constitutions from Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central African Republic, Chad, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Germany, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Saint Lucia, South Africa, Spain, the Russian Federation, the Soviet Union, Ukraine, the United States, and Yugoslavia.


Author(s):  
K.T. Thomas

This essay discusses the lack of any discernible attempt by the bench in the NJAC Case to read down the provisions of the 99th Amendment to the Constitution of India. This essay argues that neither the overwhelming majority with which the Amendment was passed in Parliament, nor the Court’s own precedent, where it has inclined towards reading down amendments came to the aid of the 99th Amendment. This essay also argues how the mere apprehension of abuse of power by the eminent persons or the Law Minister ought not to have been deemed sufficient to invalidate a constitutional amendment. In parting, the author provides some thoughts and recommendations, to both legislators and courts on how to ensure that future constitutional amendments do not meet the fate of the 99th Amendment, and receive the respect they deserve.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (7) ◽  
pp. 57
Author(s):  
Luz Balaj

Constitutional changes in a state with written constitution are carried out on the basis of a rule that has been set out by the constitution itself. In practice, many authors refers to articles that define the way of changing the constitution as "rules that define rules" (See for more Tracy Di Fillippo, How to Make Objections to Discovery under the Amended Rules, 25 Pretrial Prac. & Discovery 1, 2016.) Depending on the content of these rules, two sets of constitutions are generally formulated in the theory of constitutional right. The first are the flexible constitutions, which are amended in a simpler procedure, with a simple majority and in a shorter period of time. While in the second category there are the so-called rigid constitutions. Rigid are called the constitutions that have established a more extended or complicated procedure of amendment, with a qualified majority (more than just a simple majority) and a longer period of time.However, the procedure and the number of members of parliament differ. The main goal of this paper is to analyze those differencies, in oredr to find that how the procedure can affect on the constitutionality of the constittuion amendments. Is the rigid procedure a key for constitutional amendments or not? This is another question that is going to be analyzed by comparing different procedures of constitutional amendments in different countries.


Lentera Hukum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Muhammad Addi Fauzani ◽  
Nur Aqmarina Deladetama ◽  
Muhammad Basrun ◽  
Muhammad Khoirul Anam

The discussion regarding the living constitution in Indonesia has been increasingly important. The importance of this discussion deals with to the extent it has developed, particularly after Indonesia's constitutional amendment from 1999 to 2002. The current study of constitutional change in Indonesia, as a result of the constitutional amendment during Reformation, adds an emphasis on its change without a formal amendment. Thus, this paper will discuss the urgency of enforcing the amended 1945 Constitution in the lens of the living constitution and how to uphold it through the living constitution. This study uses doctrinal research and, in examining the case, it uses the statutory and conceptual approaches. The result of the study shows that the urgency of upholding the constitution through the living constitution relies on the concept of the living constitution that can dynamize the 1945 Constitution. In response to difficulties to formally amend the 1945 Constitution that depends on political will and rigid juridical condition, there should be a shift in the method of interpretation of the constitution by the Constitutional Court judges, from originalism to the living constitution. The enforcement of the 1945 Constitution through the living constitution can apply the constitutional convention and the interpretation by constitutional judges. This study suggests that the Government and the House of Representatives and other relevant state institutions can use the living constitution, by taking into account the constitutional convention is a source in the organization of the state to patch up the weaknesses of the constitution. Keywords: Living Constitution, Constitutional Changes, Formal Amendment.


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
Glenn Patmore

Under section 128 of the Australian Constitution federal parliamentarians have the power to initiate constitutional amendments. This paper examines the justifications of politicians and public figures for proposing a referendum to introduce an Australian republic. From interviews conducted between 2008 and 2011, three important justifications for proposing change emerged: promoting a new national identity; success in passing a referendum and in re-election; and timeliness. An examination of these justifications raised additional questions, including: what reasons did politicians and public figures think were significant? How did their justifications form and develop? What were the reasons that inspired political action? The reasons for initiation of a referendum for a republic, and recognition of indigenous people in the Australian Constitution are also compared. The paper adds to the literature on formal constitutional change, and also offers a critique of the field.


The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution provides an ideal first stop for Canadians and non-Canadians seeking a clear, concise, and authoritative account of Canadian constitutional law. The Handbook is divided into six Parts: Constitutional History, Institutions and Constitutional Change, Indigenous Peoples and the Canadian Constitution, Federalism, Rights and Freedoms, and Constitutional Theory. Readers of this Handbook will discover some of the distinctive features of the Canadian Constitution: for example, the importance of Indigenous peoples and legal systems, the long-standing presence of a French-speaking population, French civil law and Quebec, the British constitutional heritage, and the choice of federalism, as well as the newer features, most notably the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 35 regarding Aboriginal rights and treaties, and the procedures for constitutional amendment. The Handbook provides a remarkable resource for comparativists at a time when the Canadian Constitution is a frequent topic of constitutional commentary. For Canadians, the Handbook offers a vital account of constitutional challenges and opportunities at the time of the 150th anniversary of Confederation.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document