scholarly journals Changing People’s Preferences by the State and the Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-246
Author(s):  
Ariel Porat

Abstract In standard economic models, two basic assumptions are made: the first, that actors are rational, and the second, that actors’ preferences are a given and exogenously determined. Behavioral economics — followed by behavioral law and economics — has questioned the first assumption. This Article challenges the second one, arguing that in many instances, social welfare should be enhanced not by maximizing satisfaction of existing preferences but by changing the preferences themselves. The Article identifies seven categories of cases where the traditional objections to intentional preference change by the state and the law lose force and argues that in these cases, such a change warrants serious consideration. It then proposes four different modes of intervention in people’s preferences, varying in intensity, on the one hand, and in the identity of their addressees, on the other, and explains the relative advantages and disadvantages of each form of intervention.

The article deals with the debate on the so-called “lawyer monopoly” on representation of interests in court. The Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (on Justice)" adopted on June 2016, dated June 2, 2016, No. 1401-VIII literally divided the legal community into two camps: "for" and "against" the so-called "monopoly of the Bar". It should not be denied that both supporters of this reform and its opponents have strong arguments in favor of their beliefs. In the last four years, both camps have made new arguments in support of their point of view. But every year, since the passage of the aforementioned law, calls for change have become louder. This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, the aforementioned law introduced a gradual transition to representation in all judicial instances only by a lawyer and a prosecutor, and on the other, by the fact that the proposal to exclude the rule of “lawyer monopoly” from the Constitution of Ukraine was one of the first bills of President Vladimir Zelensky. Several steps have now been taken to abolish this "monopoly" but the whole path has not yet been completed. Thus, from January 1, 2020 the Law of Ukraine 390-IX “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Expanding the Possibilities of Self-Representation in the Court of State Authorities, Bodies of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Local Self-Government Bodies and Other Legal Entities, Whatever Their Order, came into force creation ”, but the bill announced by the President No. 1013 of 29.08.2019 still remains within the walls of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. This leads to some contradictions and inconsistencies in court cases regarding who can participate in litigation. In the article the author highlights the advantages and disadvantages of "lawyer's monopoly", as well as the problematic issues of the so-called transition period.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 11-28
Author(s):  
Kamil Zaradkiewicz

The second part of the article concerns the interpretation and application in the central parts of Poland of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code on vacant inheritances. The Code does not provide a definition of the vacant inheritance. The key to the interpretation of the provisions on the acquisition of vacant inheritances by the state is the term “is presumed to be” (a vacant inheritance) used in the former Article 811 of the Napoleonic Code (French: est réputée vacante), see the current Article 809 of the French Civil Code which omits the term “is presumed to be”).This indicates that, in the absence of suitable heirs, the law introduced a specific rebuttable presumption of a vacant inheritance, belonging to the state. Only after an appropriate period of time did the presumption turn into certainty, i.e. it resulted in the inability to invoke the inheritance title. In practice, this meant that thirty years after the time necessary to draw up an inventory of the inheritance and to deliberate (ad deliberandum), the inheritance ultimately fell to the State. The mechanism adopted in the Napoleonic Code made it possible, on the one hand, for the heir to acquire the inheritance, which remained under the supervision of a curator for the period when it was presumed vacant, and on the other hand, it prevented the existence of inheritances without a claimant, i.e. inheritances devoid of the persons entitled to take them over. In the post-war period, when the communist authorities passed subsequent legal acts concerning the provisions of the inheritance law, the deadlines for heirs to apply for inheritance changed. Ultimately, the legislator did not adopt the model of vacant inheritances in the regulations harmonising the inheritance law on the Polish lands since 1947; instead, a solution analogous to the one provided for in the German Civil Code of 1986 (BGB) was adopted. The “shortening” of the statute of limitations also influenced the assessment of the admissibility of further application of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code in regard to vacant inheritances during the period of the People’s Republic of Poland regime (despite the existence of different inheritance law solutions).


2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadav Solomonovich ◽  
Ruth Kark

This article examines land privatization in late nineteenth-century Ottoman Palestine through the extension of possession in miri lands, on the one hand, and its transformation into fee-simple property through change in land category classification (i.e., miri to mülk), on the other. Using primary sources, particularly Ottoman documents and correspondence of the German Consulate in Jerusalem, we analyze this process, as reflected in several cases involving foreign subjects and Ottoman authorities. We argue that privatization began as informal violations of the law, proceeded with the struggle of landholders against authorities who tried to reverse the process, and ended in victory for the landholders after the state ceded to their demands, inter alia, as a result of pressure from foreign nations and their consuls. Thus did de facto land privatization become de jure privatization.



The main methods (pressing and winding) of the processing of hybrid polymer composites to obtain items were examined. Advantages and disadvantages of the methods were noted. Good combinations of different-module fibers (carbon, glass, boron, organic) in hybrid polymer materials are described, which allow one to prepare materials with high compression strength on the one hand, and to increase fracture energy of samples and impact toughness on the other hand.


Author(s):  
Peter Coss

In the introduction to his great work of 2005, Framing the Early Middle Ages, Chris Wickham urged not only the necessity of carefully framing our studies at the outset but also the importance of closely defining the words and concepts that we employ, the avoidance ‘cultural sollipsism’ wherever possible and the need to pay particular attention to continuities and discontinuities. Chris has, of course, followed these precepts on a vast scale. My aim in this chapter is a modest one. I aim to review the framing of thirteenth-century England in terms of two only of Chris’s themes: the aristocracy and the state—and even then primarily in terms of the relationship between the two. By the thirteenth century I mean a long thirteenth century stretching from the period of the Angevin reforms of the later twelfth century on the one hand to the early to mid-fourteenth on the other; the reasons for taking this span will, I hope, become clearer during the course of the chapter, but few would doubt that it has a validity.


Author(s):  
Nimer Sultany

This chapter analyzes concrete Egyptian and Tunisian cases that showcase the interplay between continuity and rupture. These cases illustrate the lack of a systemic relation between law and revolution. On the one hand, the judiciary that interprets and applies the law is part of the very social and political conflicts it is supposed to resolve. On the other hand, the law is incoherent and there are often resources within the legal materials to play it both ways. Thus, the different forces at work use both continuity and rupture to advance their positions. Furthermore, legitimacy discourse mediates the contradictions between law and revolution in the experience of different legal and political actors. This mediation serves an ideological role because it presupposes a binary dichotomy between continuity and rupture, papers over law’s incoherence by reducing it to a singular voice, and reduces revolution to an event rather than a process.


1972 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-410
Author(s):  
Aharon Yoran

It is submitted that even if the hapless outsider cannot bring an action for damages because of the existing state of the law regarding fiduciary duties and breach of statutory duties, he still has an equitable remedy of rescission of the contract based on quasi-contractual principles. The crime of fraud, under secs. 13 and 54, respectively, would be made the basis of setting the contract (of sale or purchase) aside. To support this proposition we shall explore the quasi-contractual principles which enable one contracting party, the victim of a crime committed by the other party in entering the contract, to defeat this contract.In Browning v. Morris, in an oft-quoted statement by Lord Mansfield, the following principle was declared: But, where contracts or transactions are prohibited by positive statutes, for protecting one set of men from another set of men; the one, from their situation and condition, being liable to be oppressed or imposed upon by the other; there, the parties are not in pan delicto; and in furtherance of these statutes, the person injured, after the transaction is finished and completed, may bring an action and defeat the contract.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Morse

How to respond justly to the dangers persistent violent offenders present is a vexing moral and legal issue. On the one hand, we wish to reduce predation; on the other, we want to treat predators fairly. The central theme of this paper is that it is difficult to achieve both goals without compromising one of them, and that both are being seriously undermined. I begin by explaining the legal theory, doctrine and practice governing dangerous offenders (DO) and demonstrate that the law leaves a gap in the ability to confine them. Next I explore the means by which the law has overtly or covertly sought to fill the gap. Many of these measures, especially the new form of civil commitment for sexual predators, dangerously conflate moral and medical categories. I conclude that pure preventive detention is more common than we usually assume, but that this practice violates fundamental assumptions concerning liberty under the American constitutional regime.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 650-672
Author(s):  
Josef Weinzierl

AbstractQuite a few recent ECJ judgments touch on various elements of territorial rule. Thereby, they raise the profile of the main question this Article asks: Which territorial claims does the EU make? To provide an answer, the present Article discusses and categorizes the individual elements of territoriality in the EU’s architecture. The influence of EU law on national territorial rule on the one hand and the emergence of territorial governance elements at the European level on the other provide the main pillars of the inquiry. Once combined, these features not only help to improve our understanding of the EU’s distinctly supranational conception of territoriality. What is more, the discussion raises several important legitimacy questions. As a consequence, the Article calls for the development of a theoretical model to evaluate and justify territoriality in a political community beyond the state.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-110
Author(s):  
Yuval Feldman ◽  
Yotam Kaplan

Abstract Law and economics scholarship suggests that, in appropriate cases, the law can improve people’s behavior by changing their preferences. For example, the law can curb discriminatory hiring practices by providing employers with information that might change their discriminatory preference. Supposedly, if employers no longer prefer one class of employees to another, they will simply stop discriminating, with no need for further legal intervention. The current Article aims to add some depth to this familiar analysis by introducing the insights of behavioral ethics into the law and economics literature on preference change. Behavioral ethics research shows that wrongdoing often originates from semi-deliberative or non-deliberative cognitive processes. These findings suggest that the process of preference change through the use of the law is markedly more complicated and nuanced than previously appreciated. For instance, even if an employer’s explicit discriminatory stance is changed, and the employer no longer consciously prefers one class of employees over another, discriminatory behavior might persist if it originates from semi-conscious, habitual, or non-deliberative decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, actual change in behavior might necessitate a close engagement with people’s level of moral awareness. We discuss the institutional and normative implications of these insights and evaluate their significance for the attempt to improve preferences through the different functions of the legal system.


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