scholarly journals The End of Impunity? Global Law-Making and Atrocity Crimes / Den Kreislauf der Straflosigkeit durchbrechen: Internationales Strafrecht und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Karstedt

AbstractThere was nothing inevitable about the amazing development of international criminal law and justice institutions since the 1990s, and neither about the proliferation of international and domestic procedures to end im­punity for gross human rights violations and international crimes, in particular atrocity crimes. As socio-legal researchers engaged with the processes of global lawmaking in the arena of international criminal justice, thy found “recursive” cycles of lawmaking (Halliday 2009), which involved transnational and domestic politics and actors, and were driven by mechanisms resulting from structural characteristics of the global sphere, and the very nature of interna­tional law itself The article explores this development through the lens of three “constitutional moments ” and the diagnostic struggles and contestation of the legal and political concept of genocide. Finally it analyses the emerging power of international criminal law through the processes of commitment and compliance, deterrence and expressivism. In a surprising analogy to E.P. Thompson’s study of lawmaking in 18th centuy Britain, the self-binding power of law emerges as a decisive factor in international criminal lawmaking.

Postgenocide ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 112-134
Author(s):  
Jobair Alam

This chapter considers the worst contemporary state-led prosecution of a minority group, which amounts to genocide, namely the Rohingya. It examines the atrocity crimes committed against them under international criminal law (ICL) and the application of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) thereupon. It suggests that such atrocities are constitutive of violations of jus cogens which warrants obligatio erga omnes. Accordingly, the perpetrators can be brought to justice under inter/national and universal jurisdictions, which, nonetheless, has not yet occurred. Given the failure of ICL mechanisms, the normative foundations of the R2P can provide valuable tools for intercepting mass atrocity crimes. The Rohingya—who face direct and structural violence at the hands of the Myanmar state—need protection from these crimes. The chapter explains how insular national politics can undo the gains made by the international community in upholding the distinctiveness of humanitarian claims through the application of the R2P.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 128-132
Author(s):  
Maria Elander

The body is falling backwards, facing the sky. The hands are clasped together in a sampeah, as if in greeting, as if in prayer. For the artist of the Cambodian Tragedy Memorial, also called A ceux qui ne sont plus là (For those who are no longer here), the body “speak[s] both to and beyond individual identity.” By standing both as personal testimony of loss and “in memory of the Cambodian genocide and its impossible representation,” the memorial raises longstanding questions on the authority and limits of testimony, on representation, and, importantly for this symposium, on the relation between art and international criminal law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon Raj Singh

This article considers the application of international criminal law to the role of social media entities in fuelling atrocity crimes, and the legal theories that could be most valuable in fostering their accountability. While incitement of atrocity crimes is one way of framing social media's role in fomenting conflict, this paper argues that it may be more productive to conceptualise social media's role in atrocity crimes through the lens of complicity, drawing inspiration not from the media cases in international criminal law jurisprudence, but rather by evaluating the use of social media as a weapon, which, under certain circumstances, ought to face accountability under international criminal law.


Author(s):  
Mohamed Saira

This chapter considers the lost legacy of the concept of criminal organizations in international criminal law. When the notion of declaring the criminality of organizations, in addition to determining the guilt of individuals, was first proposed in anticipation of the trial before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, organizational criminality was viewed as an opportunity both to recognize the role of organizations in nurturing mass criminality and to facilitate the prosecution of masses of individuals. But by the time the Tribunal was in operation, the first of these goals had faded away, and organizational criminality represented nothing more than a tool to accomplish individual criminality. This chapter argues that treating criminal organizations as a means to secure individual criminal liability represents a loss, a missed opportunity, in international criminal law. The condemnation of organizations that can attend organizational liability could have created within international criminal law an opportunity to expose the role of organizations in the perpetration of mass atrocity, to call attention to and analyze the institutionalized nature of mass atrocity crimes, which makes these crimes not only unthinkably destructive, but also inherently and importantly distinct from criminal wrongdoing in which a person’s conduct diverges from the standards of most of society. The missed opportunity of abandoning criminal organizations liability is particularly acute, this chapter contends, in light of the research in the decades since Nuremberg establishing how organizations affect individual behaviour. With greater understanding about the mechanisms for individuals’ desire to conform with peers, to obey authorities, and to rationalize their own actions, we can now see that organizations contribute to individuals’ decisions to commit crimes by providing forums and creating environments in which individuals come to believe that criminal behaviour is necessary or normal or even good, or in which individuals fail to recognize their own part in a criminal system. The organizations thus provide not only the machinery for atrocity, but also the motivation. By abandoning the substantive core of criminal organizations, international criminal law fails to identify the foundational role of organizations in creating mass atrocity crimes.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Reike

On September 9, 2013, diplomats and civil society activists gathered in a ballroom in New York to welcome Jennifer Welsh as the UN Secretary-General's new Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). In her first public appearance in that role, Special Adviser Welsh explained that one of her top priorities would be “to take prevention seriously and to make it meaningful in practice.” “In the context of RtoP,” Welsh added during the discussion, “we are talking about crimes, and crimes have implications in terms of how we deal with them. You'll hear me say that a lot.” Welsh's approach of treating RtoP as a principle that is primarily concerned with prevention and is firmly linked to international crimes neatly captures the evolution of RtoP since its formal acceptance by states at the 2005 UN World Summit. Paragraphs 138 to 140 of the World Summit's Outcome Document not only elevated the element of prevention to a prominent place within the principle of RtoP but also restricted the scope of RtoP to four specific crimes under international law: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The crime and prevention–focused version of RtoP has subsequently been defended and promoted by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and by UN member states. This article seeks to systematically explore some of the implications of linking RtoP to the concept of international crimes, with a particular focus on the preventive dimension of RtoP, the so-called responsibility to prevent. What, then, are the consequences of approaching the responsibility to prevent as the prevention of international crimes?In order to systematically examine this question, this article turns to literature from criminology. While the criminological perspective has so far been neglected in debates on RtoP, the prominent criminologists John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond argue vehemently that “criminology is crucially positioned to contribute understanding and direction to what the United Nations has mandated as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ groups that are threatened with mass atrocities.” For the purpose of this article, the label “criminology” comprises domestic criminology, supranational criminology, and international criminal law. While insights from supranational criminology and international criminal law are directly applicable to international crimes, translating knowledge generated in relation to crimes at the domestic level to atrocity crimes at the international level is, of course, not without challenges. Reasoning by analogy is an important method in this regard, though given the anarchical nature of international society some analogies will inevitably be imperfect. The benefits of such an approach, if carefully employed, however, outweigh the risks.


Author(s):  
Frédéric Mégret

One of the most significant contributions of Bill Schabas to the study of international criminal law is his critique of the tendency of contemporary international criminal justice to focus on individuals associated with non-state actors as opposed to states. This chapter seeks to first evaluate it as an empirical claim to assess the degree to which the International Criminal Court (ICC) has, if at all, disproportionately focused on non-state actors, beyond the well-known case of state self-referrals. It then addresses the normative case against such an evolution. The real issue is jurisdictional and a matter of prosecutorial policy rather than the substantive one of whether non-state groups can commit international crimes. The conclusion envisages what it is that is common between states and certain armed groups that ought to give a particular character of gravity to their acts and recommend them for special attention from international criminal law and justice.


Author(s):  
Lawrence Douglas

By the terms of the ‘sentimental story of the state’ fashioned by thinkers such as Hobbes, the state represented the greatest bulwark against the disordering effects of violence, and obedience to the law represented the supreme virtue of the pacified citizenry. Nazi Germany fundamentally upset the sentimental story; in the parlance of Karl Jaspers, Nazi Germany was a Verbrecherstaat, a criminal state. The Nuremberg trial treated aggression as the paradigmatic crime of the criminal state; subsequent developments in international criminal law view acts of atrocity—crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes—as the paradigmatic state crimes. In this chapter, it is argued that this shift—from treating aggression to treating acts of atrocity as the paradigmatic state-sponsored crimes—has unsettled basic legal categories, such as the criminal/enemy dyad and the distinction between policing and war-making. The unsettling of these categories leaves, the chapter argues, international criminal law in a vexed state.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document