scholarly journals The United States as Nation-Builders in Afghanistan: Success or (Neoconservative) Failure?

2017 ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Stefan Hechl

The US invaded Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks and defeated the Taliban regime with the goal of bringing democracy to Afghanistan. However, many mistakes led to ineffective nation-building and a Taliban insurgency, drawing out the Afghanistan War for many years. Reasons include an ignorance of the country's history and social structure, as well as the neoconservative approach to nation-building that was pursued by the Bush administration during Bush's first presidency. Thus, not enough resources were invested into rebuilding Afghanistan and the result is not satisfactory, especially compared to more successful US efforts in nation-building.

Author(s):  
Paul Rogers

This chapter examines how global terrorism, and particularly the war on terror, has shaped US foreign policy. It first provides an overview of the 9/11 terror attacks and definitions of terrorism before discussing the US experience of terrorism prior to 9/11 as well as the political environment in Washington at the time of the attacks. It then considers the response of the Bush administration in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the nature and aims of the al-Qaeda organization. It also reviews the conduct of the war on terror in its first nine years, along with the decline and transformation of al-Qaeda after 2010. Finally, it analyzes the options available to the United States in the war against al-Qaeda, ISIS, and like-minded groups.


2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Tripp

RANDAmerica's Role in Nation-Building: from Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003)Imaging IraqOn the back cover of this book there is a warm endorsement of its contents by none other than Paul Bremer, effectively the US Governor General of Iraq from May 2003 until June 2004. He claims to regard the book as ‘a marvellous “how to” manual for post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. I have kept a copy handy for ready consultation since my arrival in Baghdad.’ Events in Iraq during the past year would suggest either that he misplaced his copy of the book early in the occupation – or simply chucked it behind a sofa when he realised that it no longer told him what he wanted to know.


Author(s):  
Lukas Hakelberg

This chapter demonstrates that the Bush administration was critical of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) harmful tax competition initiative from the outset of the administration's first term and therefore had an open ear for the anti-OECD narrative proposed by libertarian advocacy groups. Despite recurrent exchanges between senior Bush appointees and these lobbyists, however, the US Treasury did not fully embrace their requests. Much to their chagrin, it merely removed the anti-tax avoidance elements from the project, while still providing nominal support to its anti-tax evasion measures. The Bush administration's policy was thus more in line with the position of US multinationals represented by the United States Council for International Business (USCIB) than with the fundamental libertarian critique of tax cooperation in general. The administration's ability to transform this position into actual OECD policy despite being isolated within the Group of Seven (G7) is testimony to US power in international bargaining over tax matters.


2006 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Desmond King

AbstractThis paper critically assesses the description ‘empire’ as applied to the United States in the twentieth century, proposing that US policy makers lack the territorial and occupation motives pre-requisite to being an imperial power. It is proposed that the USA is better described as an empire by accident than by design. Americans’ domestic experience of nation-building within the USA, since the early twentieth century, helps account for their unwillingness to permit the USA to be an imperial nation.


Author(s):  
Alida TOMJA ◽  
Daniel BORAKAJ

The restructuring of the international order at the end of the Cold War created a unipolar system with the United States at the top, but at the same time, restored the language of empire and their categorization as an imperial power. Moreover, the foreign policy pursued by George W. Bush administration after September 11, 2001, prompted many researchers to describe the US role in the world as inseparable from this term. The debate is widely increased in recent years and the dilemma is whether to refer them as imperial or hegemonic power of this system. If it’s hegemonic nature would be purely obvious, then how can be explained that many researchers do not hesitate to define America as empire, especially after September 11, 2001? Based on the literature that deals with the US imperial character, this paper aims to answer the above questions, and to highlight that United States, do not possess anything as an imperial power beyond their Republican core.


Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha

This chapter discusses political developments in Iraq following the US and UK's military campaign in 2003. The publicly stated reason for the invasion of Iraq was Saddam's possession of weapons of mass destruction and his links with international Islamist terrorists. However, is probably more likely that from the very beginning the Bush Administration, or more precisely influential elements within it, made the removal of Saddam Husayn a central plank of the administration's policy. Whatever the reasons for the invasion, the United States found itself on April 9, 2003 the hegemonic power in Iraq, faced with the responsibilities of governance. And indeed until June 28, 2004, when sovereignty was transferred to the Iraqis, the United States (with some input by the British) ruled Iraq directly through a mostly American administration in Baghdad called the Coalition Provisional Authority.


Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Euan Hague ◽  
Alan Mackie

The United States media have given rather little attention to the question of the Scottish referendum despite important economic, political and military links between the US and the UK/Scotland. For some in the US a ‘no’ vote would be greeted with relief given these ties: for others, a ‘yes’ vote would be acclaimed as an underdog escaping England's imperium, a narrative clearly echoing America's own founding story. This article explores commentary in the US press and media as well as reporting evidence from on-going interviews with the Scottish diaspora in the US. It concludes that there is as complex a picture of the 2014 referendum in the United States as there is in Scotland.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 130-134

This section, updated regularly on the blog Palestine Square, covers popular conversations related to the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict during the quarter 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018: #JerusalemIstheCapitalofPalestine went viral after U.S. president Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and announced his intention to move the U.S. embassy there from Tel Aviv. The arrest of Palestinian teenager Ahed Tamimi for slapping an Israeli soldier also prompted a viral campaign under the hashtag #FreeAhed. A smaller campaign protested the exclusion of Palestinian human rights from the agenda of the annual Creating Change conference organized by the US-based National LGBTQ Task Force in Washington. And, UNRWA publicized its emergency funding appeal, following the decision of the United States to slash funding to the organization, with the hashtag #DignityIsPriceless.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Gerardo Gurza-Lavalle

This work analyses the diplomatic conflicts that slavery and the problem of runaway slaves provoked in relations between Mexico and the United States from 1821 to 1857. Slavery became a source of conflict after the colonization of Texas. Later, after the US-Mexico War, slaves ran away into Mexican territory, and therefore slaveholders and politicians in Texas wanted a treaty of extradition that included a stipulation for the return of fugitives. This article contests recent historiography that considers the South (as a region) and southern politicians as strongly influential in the design of foreign policy, putting into question the actual power not only of the South but also of the United States as a whole. The problem of slavery divided the United States and rendered the pursuit of a proslavery foreign policy increasingly difficult. In addition, the South never acted as a unified bloc; there were considerable differences between the upper South and the lower South. These differences are noticeable in the fact that southerners in Congress never sought with enough energy a treaty of extradition with Mexico. The article also argues that Mexico found the necessary leeway to defend its own interests, even with the stark differential of wealth and resources existing between the two countries. El presente trabajo analiza los conflictos diplomáticos entre México y Estados Unidos que fueron provocados por la esclavitud y el problema de los esclavos fugitivos entre 1821 y 1857. La esclavitud se convirtió en fuente de conflicto tras la colonización de Texas. Más tarde, después de la guerra Mexico-Estados Unidos, algunos esclavos se fugaron al territorio mexicano y por lo tanto dueños y políticos solicitaron un tratado de extradición que incluyera una estipulación para el retorno de los fugitivos. Este artículo disputa la idea de la historiografía reciente que considera al Sur (en cuanto región), así como a los políticos sureños, como grandes influencias en el diseño de la política exterior, y pone en tela de juicio el verdadero poder no sólo del Sur sino de Estados Unidos en su conjunto. El problema de la esclavitud dividió a Estados Unidos y dificultó cada vez más el impulso de una política exterior que favoreciera la esclavitud. Además, el Sur jamás operó como unidad: había diferencias marcadas entre el Alto Sur y el Bajo Sur. Estas diferencias se observan en el hecho de que los sureños en el Congreso jamás se esforzaron en buscar con suficiente energía un tratado de extradición con México. El artículo también sostiene que México halló el margen de maniobra necesario para defender sus propios intereses, pese a los fuertes contrastes de riqueza y recursos entre los dos países.


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