Conclusion and Policy Implications
This chapter highlights several important empirical conclusions that emerge from the chapters of the book. First, the statistical analysis investigating the linkages among water availability (measured as water quantity per capita) and variability of water supply and treaty-cooperation as well as the analysis investigating the type of institutions that contribute to treaty effectiveness in basins facing increased scarcity and variability support an inverted U-shape cooperation-scarcity/variability relationship. The chapter also discusses the role of several control variables that allow us to add nuance to the results and overall lessons for cooperation. Several conclusions emerge: we find little support for the claim that power asymmetry facilitates international cooperation. On the contrary, power asymmetry does not have a positive impact on treaty cooperation. We also find that incentives (which have been incorporated into existing treaties) such as financial transfers (often at the disposal of richer states) provide a better means for fostering international environmental cooperation between asymmetric parties. Both the quantitative empirical analysis and case-study investigation provide sufficient evidence to suggest that existing and future levels of scarcity and variability can be accommodated not only by institutions in and of themselves but likewise the mechanisms negotiated as part of these institutions.