Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law

Author(s):  
Arlie Loughnan

The way in which mental incapacity in criminal law has been approached to date has not produced a thorough understanding of it. The idea that mental incapacity's chief relevance in criminal law is as a basis for exculpation dominates the scholarship—both doctrinal and philosophical—on mental incapacity. In an effort to advance scholarly understanding of this area of criminal law, this article provides a reconstruction of the legal terrain concerned with mental incapacity—organized as mental incapacity doctrines, a subset of which is exculpatory. In my reconstruction, what unites the relevant aspects of the law is that each doctrine imagines an abnormal subject of the law, and where the doctrines are exculpatory, the evaluative inquiry is not indexed to the reasonable person. This reconstruction of mental incapacity in criminal law—as mental incapacity doctrines—cuts across existing categorizations of this terrain and, as such, offers a rethinking of this area of the criminal law. This reconstruction permits a reconceptualization of the role of mental incapacity in criminal law: it becomes clear that mental incapacity is the basis for doctrines which perform a multiplicity of roles—inculpation, imputation, and a procedural role—beyond exculpation.

2020 ◽  
pp. 88-124
Author(s):  
Arzoo Osanloo

This chapter studies the operations of the Iranian criminal law and analyzes how the procedural administration of the law animates the shariʻa. Iranian criminal laws provide many avenues for victims to forgo retributive sanctioning. But preserving the right of retribution serves several purposes: maintaining the sovereign's monopoly on legitimate violence, giving victims a sense of power, and halting the cycle of violence. The way Iran achieves this comprises an interesting balancing act between maintaining the monopoly over legitimate violence and granting individual victims the right of retribution, which its leaders believe, through their interpretation of the shariʻa, cannot be appropriated by the sovereign. Since the law categorizes intentional murder as qisas and leaves judges with no discretion in sentencing, the judges may use their considerable influence to pressure the family to forgo retribution. The chapter then considers the role of judges and examines how the laws (substantive and procedural) shape their reasoning and discretion in both sentencing and encouraging forbearance.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-253
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Stefanowicz

This article undertakes to show the way that has led to the statutory decriminalization of euthanasia-related murder and assisted suicide in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It presents the evolution of the views held by Dutch society on the euthanasia related practice, in the consequence of which death on demand has become legal after less than thirty years. Due attention is paid to the role of organs of public authority in these changes, with a particular emphasis put on the role of the Dutch Parliament – the States General. Because of scarcity of space and limited length of the article, the change in the attitudes toward euthanasia, which has taken place in the Netherlands, is presented in a synthetic way – from the first discussions on admissibility of a euthanasia-related murder carried out in the 1970s, through the practice of killing patients at their request, which was against the law at that time, but with years began more and more acceptable, up to the statutory decriminalization of euthanasia by the Dutch Parliament, made with the support of the majority of society.


Author(s):  
John Gardner

Torts and Other Wrongs is a collection of eleven of the author’s essays on the theory of the law of torts and its place in the law more generally. Two new essays accompany nine previously published pieces, a number of which are already established classics of theoretical writing on private law. Together they range across the distinction between torts and other wrongs, the moral significance of outcomes, the nature and role of corrective and distributive justice, the justification of strict liability, the nature of the reasonable person standard, and the role of public policy in private law adjudication. Though focused on the law of torts, the wide-ranging analysis in each chapter will speak to theorists of private law more generally.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 46-56
Author(s):  
Aleksandr V. Fedorov ◽  
◽  
Mikhail V. Krichevtsev ◽  

The article reviews the history of development of French laws on criminal liability of legal entities. The authors note that the institution of criminal liability of legal entities (collective criminal liability) dates back to the ancient times and has been forming in the French territory for a long time. Initially, it was established in the acts on collective liability residents of certain territories, in particular, in the laws of the Salian Franks. This institution was inherited from the Franks by the law of the medieval France, and got transferred from the medieval period to the French criminal law of the modern period. The article reviews the laws of King Louis XIV as an example of establishment of collective criminal liability: the Criminal Ordinance of 1670 and the Ordinances on Combating Vagrancy and Goods Smuggling of 1706 and 1711. For the first time ever, one can study the Russian translation of the collective criminal liability provisions of the said laws. The authors state that although the legal traditions of collective liability establishment were interrupted by the transformations caused by the French Revolution of 1789 to 1794, criminal liability of legal entities remained in Article 428 of the French Penal Code of 1810 as a remnant of the past and was abolished only as late as in 1957. The publication draws attention to the fact that the criminal law codification process was not finished in France, and some laws stipulating criminal liability of legal entities were in effect in addition to the French Penal Code of 1810: the Law on the Separation of Church and State of December 9, 1905; the Law of January 14, 1933; the Law on Maritime Trade of July 19, 1934; the Ordinance on Criminal Prosecution of the Press Institutions Cooperating with Enemies during World War II of May 5, 1945. The authors describe the role of the Nuremberg Trials and the documents of the Council of Europe in the establishment of the French laws on criminal liability of legal entities, in particular, Resolution (77) 28 On the Contribution of Criminal Law to the Protection of the Environment, Recommendation No. R (81) 12 On Economic Crime, the Recommendation No. R (82) 15 On the Role of Criminal Law in Consumer Protection and Recommendation No. (88) 18 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Liability of Enterprises Having Legal Personality for Offences Committed in the Exercise of Their Activities. The authors conclude that the introduction of the institution of criminal liability of legal entities is based on objective conditions and that research of the history of establishment of the laws on collective liability is of great importance for understanding of the modern legal regulation of the issues of criminal liability of legal entities.


Author(s):  
Julia S. Kharitonova ◽  
◽  
Larisa V. Sannikova ◽  

Nowadays, the law is being transformed as a regulator of relations. The idea of strengthe-ning the regulatory role of technologies in the field of streamlining public relations is making much headway in the world. This trend is most pronounced in the area of regulation of private relations. The way of such access to the market as crowdfunding is becoming increasingly widespread. The issuing of the so-called secured tokens is becoming popular for both small businesses and private investors. The trust in new ways of attracting investments is condi-tioned by the applied technology - the use of blockchain as a decentralized transparent data-base management system. Under these conditions, there is such a phenomenon as the democ-ratization of property relations. Every individual receives unlimited opportunities to invest via technologies. Thus, legal scholars all over the world face the question about the role of the law and law in these relations? We believe that we are dealing with such a worldwide trend of regulating public relations as the socialization of the law. Specific examples of issuing tokens in Russia and abroad show the main global trends in the transformation of private law. The platformization of economics leads to the tokenization and democratization of property relations. In this aspect, the aim of lawyers should be to create a comfortable legal environment for the implementation of projects aimed at democratizing property relations in Russia. The socialization of private law is aimed at achieving social jus-tice and is manifested in the creation of mechanisms to protect the rights of the weak party and rules to protect private investors. Globalization requires the study of both Russian and foreign law. To confirm their hypothesis, the authors conducted a detailed analysis of the legislation of Russia, Europe and the United States to identify the norms allowing to see the process of socialization of law in the above field. The generalization of Russian and foreign experience showed that when searching for proper legal regulation, the states elect one of the policies. In some countries, direct regulation of ICOs and related emission relations are being created, in others, it is about the extension of the existing legislation to a new changing tokenization relationship. The European Union countries are seeking to develop common rules to create a regulatory environment to attract investors to the crypto industry and protect them. Asian countries are predominantly developing national legislation in isolation from one another, but most of them are following a unified course to encourage investment in crypto assets while introducing strict rules against fraud on financial markets. The emphasis on the protection of the rights of investors or shareholders, token holders by setting a framework, including private law mechanisms, can be called common to all approaches. This is the aim of private law on the way to social justice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-379
Author(s):  
Charles Fried

Abstract In The Choice Theory of Contracts, Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller state that by arguing “that autonomy matters centrally to contract,” Contract as Promise makes an “enduring contribution . . . but [its] specific arguments faltered because [they] missed the role of diverse contract types and because [it] grounded contractual freedom in a flawed rights-based view. . .. We can now say all rights-based arguments for contractual autonomy have failed.” The authors conclude that their proposed choice theory “approach returns analysis to the mainstream of twentieth-century liberalism – a tradition concerned with enhancing self-determination that is mostly absent in contract theory today.” Perhaps the signal flaw in Contract as Promise they sought to address was the homogenization of all contract types under a single paradigm. In this Article, I defend the promise principle as the appropriate paradigm for the regime of contract law. Along the way I defend the Kantian account of this subject, while acknowledging that state enforcement necessarily introduces elements — both normative and institutional — for which that paradigm fails adequately to account. Of particular interest and validity is Dagan and Heller’s discussion of contract types, to which the law has always and inevitably recurred. They show how this apparent constraint on contractual freedom actually enhances freedom to contract. I discuss what I have learned from their discussion: that choice like languages, is “lumpy,” so that realistically choices must be made between and framed within available types, off the rack, as it were, and not bespoke on each occasion. I do ask as well how these types come into being mutate, and can be deliberately adapted to changing circumstances.


Synthese ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 197 (12) ◽  
pp. 5253-5286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton Littlejohn

AbstractCould it be right to convict and punish defendants using only statistical evidence? In this paper, I argue that it is not and explain why it would be wrong. This is difficult to do because there is a powerful argument for thinking that we should convict and punish defendants using statistical evidence. It looks as if the relevant cases are cases of decision under risk and it seems we know what we should do in such cases (i.e., maximize expected value). Given some standard assumptions about the values at stake, the case for convicting and punishing using statistical evidence seems solid. In trying to show where this argument goes wrong, I shall argue (against Lockeans, reliabilists, and others) that beliefs supported only by statistical evidence are epistemically defective and (against Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre) that these epistemic considerations should matter to the law. To solve the puzzle about the role of statistical evidence in the law, we need to revise some commonly held assumptions about epistemic value and defend the relevance of epistemology to this practical question.


1992 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 89-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Feldman ◽  
Mark Gould

In a recent issue of this journal (Volume 15, Number 4, Fall 1990), Susan Sterett examined the role of the Law Commission in the development of English administrative law. She suggested that the Commission mimicked a “peak association” and adopted an “idiom of legalism” in order to justify its reform proposals. This comment disagrees with Sterett on three grounds. First, the role and constitutional position of the Commission is far more complex than Sterett suggests, and this affects the way in which the Commission works. Second, judges and academic lawyers were central to the reform of substantive principles of judicial review in the 1960s and 1970s, making it unnecessary for the Law Commission to act in this field. Finally, it is wrong to ignore the fact that much administrative law occurs outside the judicial review procedure.


Author(s):  
Tatjana Höörnle

The "reasonable person" plays an important role in English and American criminal law, but not in German criminal law. The comparative view yields a number of differences (for example, with respect to negligent crimes, errors about justifying circumstances, and excuses like duress). Besides analyzing such differences, the article examines the legitimate role of social expectations in criminal law (which stand behind references to the "reasonable person") beyond the details of different legal systems. It concludes that one must distinguish judgments about wrongdoing from judgments about personal responsibility. The former are shaped by social expectations, while personal responsibility needs to be evaluated with a view to the individual offender.


Legal Studies ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-559
Author(s):  
JJ Child

This paper explores the role of ulterior intention (and ulterior mens rea more generally) within the criminal law. Divided into three sections, we first question the role and location of ulterior mens rea within the offence elements of acts, circumstances and results. Concluding that such accommodation is conceptually unsound, we highlight the problems this has caused in the context of inchoate liability, where the separation of elements is now essential to the application of the law. Central to this discussion is the problematic attempts case of AG Ref (No. 3 of 1992) [1994] 1 WLR 409. We contend that best way forward is to recognise a new ulterior mens rea element. Such an element has the potential to maintain conceptual coherence between offence elements and resolve substantive problems arising in the context of inchoate liability, as well as creating a new method for limiting inchoate liability (and infinite inchoate liability) from the potential for over-criminalisation.


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