scholarly journals AKIVAIZDAUS TAPATUMO KERAI

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 84-101
Author(s):  
Nerijus Čepulis
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Western Thought ◽  
Traditional Notion ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

Šiuo straipsniu siekiama permąstyti tradicinę tapatumo sąvoką. Į tapatumą Vakarų mąstymo istorijoje buvo žiūrima visų pirma ontologiniu požiūriu. Moderniųjų laikų posūkis į subjektą susitelkia į Aš kaip bet kokio tapatumo centrą, pagrindą ir gamintoją. Fenomenologinė analizė tapatumo ištakas pagilina iki Aš santykio su išore, su pasauliu, su kitybe. Tačiau kitybė, tapdama sąmonės turiniu, nėra absoliuti kitybė. Būdas, kuriuo tapatumas, įsisavindamas savinasi pasaulį ir naikina kitybę, yra reprezentacija, siekianti akivaizdumo. Reprezentacija kaip intencionalus įžvalgumas bet kokį objektą lokalizuoja sąmonės šviesoje. Šviesa ir regėjimas – tai paradigminės Vakarų mąstymo tradicijos metaforos. Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kodėl ir kaip šviesa bei akivaizdumas netoleruoja absoliučios kitybės. Iš akivaizdumo kerų tapatumas atsitokėti gali tik per atsakingą santykį su Kitu, tai yra etiką. Čia tapatus subjektas praranda pirmumo teisę kito asmens imperatyvo atžvilgiu. Begalybės idėja, draskydama totalų tapatumą iš vidaus, neleidžia jam nurimti ir skatina atsižvelgti į transcendenciją, į kitybę, idant ji būtų laisva nuo prievartinio tapimo egocentrinio tapatumo turiniu ir manipuliacijos auka. Atsakomybė kito žmogaus veido akivaizdoje eina pirma akivaizdaus suvokimo ir įteisina jį.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: tapatumas, akivaizdumas, kitybė, socialumas.Charms of Evident IdentityNerijus Čepulis SummaryIn this article I seek to rethink the traditional notion of identity. In the tradition of Western thought identity was viewed first and foremost from an ontological point of view. After the turn toward the subject, the I is thought of as the centre, the base and the producer of any identity. Phenomenological analysis deepens the origin of identity to the relation of the I to the world, i.e. to the alterity. Yet the alterity, by becoming the content of consciousness, is not an absolute alterity. The way, in which identity assimilates, possesses the world and annihilates alterity, is representation. Representation seeks evidence. Representation as intentional perceptivity localizes every object in the light of consciousness. Light and vision are paradigmatic metaphors of the traditional Western thought. Hence in this article I seek to show why and how light and evidence do not tolerate absolute alterity. Identity can be sobered from the charms of evidence only by responsible relation to the Other, i.e. by ethics. Here identical subject loses the right of priority in front of the imperative of the other person. Idea of infinity worries total identity from within. Infinity does not permit identity to quiet down and induces to heed transcendence and alterity. Only in this way alterity can escape the violence to become a content of egocentrical identity and the victim of manipulation. Responsibility in the face of the other person precedes evident perception and legitimates the latter.Keywords: identity, evidence, alterity, sociality.

scholarly journals Intersubjectivity in Maria Stepanova's poetic cycle «Spolia»

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (24) ◽  
pp. 52-57
Author(s):  
Alexei S. Bokarev ◽  
◽  
Yulia V. Tkachuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Speech Production ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Modern Artists ◽  
The Relationship

The article considers M. Stepanova's cycle of poems «Spolia» (2015) from the point of view of the relationship between the author and the hero, whose outlooks are clearly getting closer at the non-classical stage of poetics development. The authors analyse the artistic strategy where «I», being the subject of the utterence, delegates the right to speak and/or the right to make judgements to the «other», «connecting» to the «other» for the sake of self-expression. Spolia is based on the complex of meanings connected with the author's consciousness, directed towards the author, but not autonomous in relation to the subject: replication (usually not marked graphically) and «alien» intention (understood as value expression directed at the protagonist) are the most popular forms of speech production in the cycle. The author's powers are thus limited to recording judgements addressed to the heroine and critically interpreting Stepanova's texts (the poet's works must be read as meta-lyrics), and to organizing the space for dialogue. The «voices» of both classical and modern artists (from A. Griboyedov and P. Tchaikovsky to Ven. Yerofeyev and G. Dashevsky) are included in the subjective sphere of «Spolia» as inseparable but not merging with the author's voice. When the purpose of the intertext comes down to expanding the boundaries of the personality, which is no longer understood as a «center», but as a «radius» of the artistic world, it is natural to disregard the individual biography of the writer. The poet's «passport» name, according to Stepanova, is a «synonym» for the epicenter of pain: unity with the world is only bought at the cost of suffering, which opens up to the author the possibility of «no-self-speaking», rare in poetry

Ibn al-‘Arabi, Muhyi al-Din (1164–1240)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neal Robinson
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Inner Experience ◽  
Divine Essence ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Creation ◽  
One And Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Southeast Spain ◽  
The Way

Ibn al-‘Arabi was a mystic who drew on the writings of Sufis, Islamic theologians and philosophers in order to elaborate a complex theosophical system akin to that of Plotinus. He was born in Murcia (in southeast Spain) in AH 560/ad 1164, and died in Damascus in AH 638/ad 1240. Of several hundred works attributed to him the most famous are al-Futuhat al-makkiyya (The Meccan Illuminations) and Fusus al-hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom). The Futuhat is an encyclopedic discussion of Islamic lore viewed from the perspective of the stages of the mystic path. It exists in two editions, both completed in Damascus – one in AH 629/ad 1231 and the other in AH 636/ad 1238 – but the work was conceived in Mecca many years earlier, in the course of a vision which Ibn al-‘Arabi experienced near the Kaaba, the cube-shaped House of God which Muslims visit on pilgrimage. Because of its length, this work has been relatively neglected. The Fusus, which is much shorter, comprises twenty-seven chapters named after prophets who epitomize different spiritual types. Ibn al-‘Arabi claimed that he received it directly from Muhammad, who appeared to him in Damascus in AH 627/ad 1229. It has been the subject of over forty commentaries. Although Ibn al-‘Arabi was primarily a mystic who believed that he possessed superior divinely-bestowed knowledge, his work is of interest to the philosopher because of the way in which he used philosophical terminology in an attempt to explain his inner experience. He held that whereas the divine Essence is absolutely unknowable, the cosmos as a whole is the locus of manifestation of all God’s attributes. Moreover, since these attributes require the creation for their expression, the One is continually driven to transform itself into Many. The goal of spiritual realization is therefore to penetrate beyond the exterior multiplicity of phenomena to a consciousness of what subsequent writers have termed the ‘unity of existence’. This entails the abolition of the ego or ‘passing away from self’ (fana’) in which one becomes aware of absolute unity, followed by ‘perpetuation’ (baqa’) in which one sees the world as at once One and Many, and one is able to see God in the creature and the creature in God.

Robert Browning's “The Other Half-Rome”: A “Fancy-fit” or Not?

1983 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 127-148
Author(s):  
C. Stephen Finley
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Classical Mythology ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

The poet – speaker of Book 1 ofThe Ring and the Bookbelieved that the first two monologues of his grand poem balanced one another. In his preview of the monologues, he writes that Half-Rome and Other Half-Rome are equally unsuccessful in their efforts to find the truth of the murder story. The speakers possess an “opposite feel” for the truth, but each achieves a “like swerve, like unsuccess” (I.883–84). Although Other Half-Rome succeeds in being on the right side of the issue, Browning as poet-speaker considers his defense of Pompilia to be the result only of luck or a “fancy-fit.” This “fancy-fit” is a mood which inclines the speaker to choose Pompilia as it might incline him to choose between two runners in a race according to the colors of their scarves (1.885–92). Browning sets this speech by a Bernini fountain, one where Triton blows water through a conch: “Puffs up steel sleet which breaks to diamond dust” (1.900). The poet may have intended this setting to suggest the way in which he views the language and imagery that Other Half-Rome uses to tell his story. The speaker's mixture of Christian and classical mythology and his concern for the painterly qualities of Pompilia's deathbed scene do suggest an aesthetic temperament. The poet may have considered the speech of such a man to be “diamond dust” signifying nothing. In any case, the poet-speaker of Book 1 concludes his description of Other Half-Rome by saying, with apparent sarcasm, that to this speaker Pompilia “seemed a saint and martyr both” (1.909). This assessment of Other Half-Rome has been the subject of disagreement among commentators on the poem.

scholarly journals Truthmaking and the world-time parallel

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Gareth Leniston-Lee
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
To Come ◽  
Structural Parallel ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

<p>There is a close structural parallel between the way we talk about time and the way we talk about modality (i.e. matters of possibility, necessity, actuality etc.). A consequence of this is that whenever we construct a metaphysical argument within one of these domains, there is a parallel argument to be made in the other. On the face of it, this parallel between possible worlds and moments in time seems to commit us to holding corresponding attitudes to the ontological status of non-present and non-actual entities.  In this thesis I assess a claim made by Sider (2001: 41-42) that truthmaking – the idea that truth is grounded in existence – provides a way to avoid the commitment to ontological symmetry that this world-time parallel seems to foist upon us. Truthmaking challenges presentists, who deny the existence of past entities and actualists, who deny the existence of merely possible entities, to come up with a way of grounding truths that are ostensively about the events and entities that they deny exist. Sider’s claim can be broken down into three propositions:  1. Truthmaking provides reason to reject presentism. 2. Truthmaking does not provide reason to reject actualism. 3. Truthmaking breaks the ontological symmetry between time and modality.  In this thesis I argue that while 1 is false, 3 remains true. While I am not a presentist myself I do not think that truthmaking provides a sound basis for rejecting the position. Much of this thesis is dedicated to defending presentism against the challenge truthmaking poses. I also don’t believe that truthmaking undermines actualism, but do not commit myself to any particular actualist response to the truthmaking challenge in this thesis. My central aim is to show that the presentist has a viable response to the truthmaking challenge and that this response does not have a viable parallel in the modal case. So while I think that both presentists and actualists can provide adequate responses to the challenge truthmaking poses, truthmaking still breaks the symmetry because the arguments made in defence of each position are very different. So one might rationally accept one argument but not the other.</p>

scholarly journals Re-rigging Othering: Subversive Infantilisation in Contemporary Bosnian-Herzegovinian Prose

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (7) ◽  
pp. 1259-1273
Author(s):  
Fedja Borčak
Keyword(s):  
Mass Media ◽  
Bosnia And Herzegovina ◽  
The Other ◽  
Subject Position ◽  
Literary Texts ◽  
Western Discourse ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Way

In this article I put forward the concept of subversive infantilisation to designate a phenomenon in contemporary Bosnian literature, which by using a certain kind of childish outlook on the world undermines paternalistic and balkanist Western discourse on Bosnia and Herzegovina. By analysing primarily the portrayal of the role of mass media in a few literary texts, principally books by Nenad Veličkovié and Miljenko Jergovié, I highlight the way in which these texts “re-rig” and by means of irony and exaggeration illuminate the problematic logic inherent in the subject position from which one represents the other. Textual characteristics of subversive infantilisation are contextualised further and seen as a discursive continuation of experiences of the 1990s war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Vasily Polenov: Conversation with the Soul

2021 ◽  
pp. 75-83
Author(s):  
Natalya N. Rostova
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Landscape Painting ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
The Way

The article examines the work of Vasily Polenov. The author presents Polenov’s artistic path as the dramatic choice between what is commonly called genre and landscape painting. From the philosophical point of view, the problem consists in concept of understanding art. On the one hand, the essence of art can be reduced to «what», to writing a story, a big sense. On the other hand, art can be understood as «painting for painting’s sake». In this sense, the tension in Polenov’s work arises between the paintings «Moscow Courtyard» and «Christ and the Sinner». The author notes that the way out of this dilemma is to understand art as the subject that reflects the non-objectifiable and devoid of anything essence. The article analyzes the philosophical meaning of Polenov’s paintings of the gospel cycle and provides a philosophical analysis of the artist’s nostalgic paintings. The author comes to the conclusion that Polenov’s paintings are the form that establishes an emotionally experiencing human being

L’admiration comme principe phénoménologique de la subjectivité humaine

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (72) ◽  
pp. 1123-1140
Author(s):  
Wojciech Starzynski
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Dynamic Interaction ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mots Clés ◽  
Human Subjectivity ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Phenomenological Principle

L’admiration comme principe phénoménologique de la subjectivité humaine Résumé: Le texte est une tentative d'analyse phénoménologique (principalement inspiré de Ricœur) du thème de l'admiration, que Descartes dans les Passions de l’âme décrit comme passion première et principale. Envisagé comme principe de la subjectivité, cette passion expliquerait l'accès non théorique au monde et à soi-même, et permet de comprendre la constitution du sujet passionnel. En analysant ce sujet, appelé par Descartes l'union de l'âme et du corps, les catégories traditionnelles d'attention, d'imagination et enfin de volonté et de temporalité se trouvent profondément reformulées. Dans le mode admiratif spécifique d’un tel sujet, qui se caractérise par interaction dynamique de l'âme et du corps, on peut parler des étapes successives de la vie passionnée, au sein de laquelle émergent les autres passions “principales” (l'amour, la haine, le désir, la joie et la tristesse), pour trouver enfin son accomplissement dans une expérience éthique de la générosité. Mots-clés: passion; admiration; union de l’âme et du corps; Descartes; Ricoeur. A admiração como princípio fenomenológico da subjetividade Resumo: O texto é uma tentativa de análise fenomenológica (principalmente inspirada por Ricoeur) do tema da admiração, que Descartes n’As paixões da alma descreve como paixão primeira e principal. Considerado como princípio da subjetividade, essa paixão explicaria o acesso não teórico ao mundo e a si mesmo, e permite compreender a constituição do sujeito passional. Analisando esse sujeito, chamado por Descartes a união da alma e do corpo, as categorias tradicionais de atenção, imaginação e, enfim, de vontade e temporalidade se encontram profundamente reformuladas. No modo admirativo específico de um tal sujeito, que se caracteriza pela interação dinâmica da alma e do corpo, podemos falar das etapas sucessivas da vida apaixonada, ao seio da qual emergem as outras paixões « principais » (o amor, o ódio, o desejo, a alegriae a tristeza), para encontrar, enfim, sua realização numa experiência ética da generosidadade. Palavras-chave : paixão; admiração ; união da alma e do corpo ; Descartes ; Ricoeur. Admiration as a phenomenological principle of human subjectivity  Abstract: The text is a phenomenological analysis (mainly inspired by Ricœur) of the theme of admiration, which Descartes in the  Passions of the Soul describes as a first and main passion.  Considered  as a principle of subjectivity, this passion would explain the non-theoretical access to the world and to oneself, and allows us to understand the constitution of such passionate subject. Analyzing this subject, called by Descartes the union of the soul and the body, the traditional categories of attention, imagination and finally, those of will and temporality are  deeply  reformulated. In the specific admiring mode of the  subject, which is characterized by dynamic interaction of the soul and body, we can speak of the successive stages of passionate life, in which emerge the other “principal  passions"  (love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness),  to  finally find its culmination in an ethical experience of generosity. Key words: passion; admiration; union of the soul and body; Descartes; Ricoeur. Data de registro: 17/11/2020 Data de aceite: 30/12/2020

scholarly journals Imagination and the Image: A Revised Phenomenology of Imagination and Affectivity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erez Nir
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Mode I ◽  
The World ◽  
Critical Revision ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Way

In this paper I offer a critical revision of the main thematic phenomenological writings on imagination by Sartre and Edward Casey based on the following three criteria: 1. the sufficiency of their respective sui generis accounts of imagination. 2. The capacity of their respective frameworks to account for imagination’s rich affectivity. 3. Their ability to provide a coherent and purely transcendental description of the difference between imagination and perception. I argue that in both Sartre and Casey the problematic aspects of their theories derive from focusing solely on the nature of the imaginative object at the expense of the imaginative experience as a whole. Using Husserl’s transcripts on the subject, I suggest a new phenomenological analysis of imagination as the direct intuition of the experience of the object instead of an intuition of an object in a possible mode. I argue that in imagination the object is present in a marginal way and what is directly experienced is the object’s affective form, which is an intuitive aspect of the object’s value qualities. This analysis shows that the intentional presence of value qualities in objects, and the general presence of value in the world is always connected to the way we imagine objects and not the way we perceive them, and that the value of things is better to be called their imaginative structure.

scholarly journals From Narcissus to Genius through the Work of Pleshette DeArmitt

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-66
Author(s):  
Marygrace Hemme
Keyword(s):  
Hannah Arendt ◽  
The Other ◽  
Melanie Klein ◽  
Love Stories ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Spectator ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

Through my reading of the section of Pleshette Dearmitt’s book The Right to Narcissism, entitled “Kristeva: the Rebirth of Narcissus,” I illustrate the way in which DeArmitt’s reading of Narcissus is reflected in Julia Kristeva’s conception of genius. DeArmitt describes narcissism as a structure through which subjectivity, language, self-love, and love for the other come about. Narcissism develops through a metaphorical relation of identification with a “loving third” in which the subject-in-formation is transferred to the site of the other, to the place from which he or she is seen and heard through the words of the mother directed at an other. The emerging subject catches the words of others and repeats them. The speech of the other, then, is a model or pattern with which the subject-in-formation identifies repeatedly, and it is through identifying with the third that the forming subject becomes like the other, a speaking subject herself. All love comes from narcissism because it is a repetition of this identification and transference. I connect this account to Kristeva’s Female Genius Trilogy by claiming that these works are love stories since they are based on a repetition of the narcissistic structure on a cultural level in their content and in their form, though for each genius it manifests through a different register. For Hannah Arendt the relation is between the actor and the spectator; for Melanie Klein it is between the analyst and the analysand; and for Colette it is between the writer and the reader. 

A Spanish Play on the Battle of Pavia (1525)

PMLA ◽  
1930 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 516-531
Author(s):  
Joseph E. Gillet
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Title Page ◽  
The Other ◽  
External Appearance ◽  
Left Group ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
A Performance

The invasion of Italy by Charles VIII in 1494 became, shortly after, the subject of an égloga by Francisco de Madrid, and the peace of Cambray in 1529, which, it was fondly hoped, would end the Franco-Spanish wars in Italy, was celebrated dramatically by Hernán López de Yanguas. The battle of Pavia (Feb. 24, 1525), falling between these two events and marking the culmination of the struggle, is discussed, from the Spanish point of view, naturally, in the present little play which has not thus far been noticed by the students of early Spanish drama. Like the other two it is a festival-play, combining with a political preoccupation the bucolic tone of the dramatic égloga, a type of which the origin may well be the fifth égloga of Juan del Encina “adonde se introducen cuatro pastores, . . . . y primero Beneito entró en la sala adonde el Duque y Duquesa estaban, y comenzó mucho á dolerse y acuitarse porque se sonaba que el Duque, su señor, se habia de partir á la guerra de Francia; . . . . y despues llamaron á Pedruelo, el cual les dió nuevas de paz. . . . .” The play is short, however, and although possibly intended for a performance or actually performed, it is close, both in subject-matter and external appearance, to the news-sheets in ballad-form which were fairly common at the time. The print which is here reproduced formerly belonged to D. Pascual de Gayangos, and is now in the Biblioteca Nacional, in Madrid. It seems to have been mentioned only by Gallardo. On its title-page a vignette represents a battle fought under massive city- or castle-walls by knights in full armour, on foot, some wielding swords, some daggers, several carrying shields, one of which, on the right, is painted with a large human countenance. In the left group of four warriors one has already fallen, pierced by a sword. Behind the right group of three may be distinguished a throng of helmeted figures in a thicket of tall lances.

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