L’admiration comme principe phénoménologique de la subjectivité humaine

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (72) ◽  
pp. 1123-1140
Author(s):  
Wojciech Starzynski
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Dynamic Interaction ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mots Clés ◽  
Human Subjectivity ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Phenomenological Principle

L’admiration comme principe phénoménologique de la subjectivité humaine Résumé: Le texte est une tentative d'analyse phénoménologique (principalement inspiré de Ricœur) du thème de l'admiration, que Descartes dans les Passions de l’âme décrit comme passion première et principale. Envisagé comme principe de la subjectivité, cette passion expliquerait l'accès non théorique au monde et à soi-même, et permet de comprendre la constitution du sujet passionnel. En analysant ce sujet, appelé par Descartes l'union de l'âme et du corps, les catégories traditionnelles d'attention, d'imagination et enfin de volonté et de temporalité se trouvent profondément reformulées. Dans le mode admiratif spécifique d’un tel sujet, qui se caractérise par interaction dynamique de l'âme et du corps, on peut parler des étapes successives de la vie passionnée, au sein de laquelle émergent les autres passions “principales” (l'amour, la haine, le désir, la joie et la tristesse), pour trouver enfin son accomplissement dans une expérience éthique de la générosité. Mots-clés: passion; admiration; union de l’âme et du corps; Descartes; Ricoeur. A admiração como princípio fenomenológico da subjetividade Resumo: O texto é uma tentativa de análise fenomenológica (principalmente inspirada por Ricoeur) do tema da admiração, que Descartes n’As paixões da alma descreve como paixão primeira e principal. Considerado como princípio da subjetividade, essa paixão explicaria o acesso não teórico ao mundo e a si mesmo, e permite compreender a constituição do sujeito passional. Analisando esse sujeito, chamado por Descartes a união da alma e do corpo, as categorias tradicionais de atenção, imaginação e, enfim, de vontade e temporalidade se encontram profundamente reformuladas. No modo admirativo específico de um tal sujeito, que se caracteriza pela interação dinâmica da alma e do corpo, podemos falar das etapas sucessivas da vida apaixonada, ao seio da qual emergem as outras paixões « principais » (o amor, o ódio, o desejo, a alegriae a tristeza), para encontrar, enfim, sua realização numa experiência ética da generosidadade. Palavras-chave : paixão; admiração ; união da alma e do corpo ; Descartes ; Ricoeur. Admiration as a phenomenological principle of human subjectivity  Abstract: The text is a phenomenological analysis (mainly inspired by Ricœur) of the theme of admiration, which Descartes in the  Passions of the Soul describes as a first and main passion.  Considered  as a principle of subjectivity, this passion would explain the non-theoretical access to the world and to oneself, and allows us to understand the constitution of such passionate subject. Analyzing this subject, called by Descartes the union of the soul and the body, the traditional categories of attention, imagination and finally, those of will and temporality are  deeply  reformulated. In the specific admiring mode of the  subject, which is characterized by dynamic interaction of the soul and body, we can speak of the successive stages of passionate life, in which emerge the other “principal  passions"  (love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness),  to  finally find its culmination in an ethical experience of generosity. Key words: passion; admiration; union of the soul and body; Descartes; Ricoeur. Data de registro: 17/11/2020 Data de aceite: 30/12/2020

scholarly journals The Joy of Being as Anthropological Practice

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 66-73
Author(s):  
Agapov Oleg D. ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Human Subjectivity ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Human Condition

The joy of being is connected with one’s activities aimed at responding to the challenges of the elemental forces and the boundlessness of being, which are independent of human subjectivity. In the context of rising to the challenges of being, one settles to acquire a certain power of being in themselves and in the world. Thus, the joy of being is tied to achieving the level of the “miraculous fecundity” (E. Levinas), “an internal necessity of one’s life” (F. Vasilyuk), magnanimity (M. Mamardashvili). The ontological duty of any human being is to succeed at being human. The joy of being is closely connected to experiencing one’s involvement in the endless/eternity and realizing one’s subjective temporality/finitude, which attunes him to the absolute seriousness in relation to one’s complete realization in life. Joy is a foundational anthropological phenomenon in the structure of ways of experiencing the human condition. The joy of being as an anthropological practice can appear as a constantly expanding sphere of human subjectivity where the transfiguration of the powers of being occurs under the sign of the Height (Levinas) / the Good. Without the possibility of transfiguration human beings get tired of living, immerse themselves in the dejected state of laziness and the hopelessness of vanity. The joy of being is connected to unity, gathering the multiplicity of human life under the aegis of meaning that allows us to see the other and the alien in heteronomous being, and understand the nature of co-participation and responsibility before the forces of being, and also act in synergy with them.The joy of being stands before a human being as the joy of fatherhood/ motherhood, the joy of being a witness to the world in creative acts (the subject as a means to retreat before the world and let the world shine), the joy of every day that was saved from absurdity, darkness and the impersonal existence of the total. Keywords: joy, higher reality, anthropological practices, “the height”, subject, transcendence, practice of coping

scholarly journals AKIVAIZDAUS TAPATUMO KERAI

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 84-101
Author(s):  
Nerijus Čepulis
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Western Thought ◽  
Traditional Notion ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

Šiuo straipsniu siekiama permąstyti tradicinę tapatumo sąvoką. Į tapatumą Vakarų mąstymo istorijoje buvo žiūrima visų pirma ontologiniu požiūriu. Moderniųjų laikų posūkis į subjektą susitelkia į Aš kaip bet kokio tapatumo centrą, pagrindą ir gamintoją. Fenomenologinė analizė tapatumo ištakas pagilina iki Aš santykio su išore, su pasauliu, su kitybe. Tačiau kitybė, tapdama sąmonės turiniu, nėra absoliuti kitybė. Būdas, kuriuo tapatumas, įsisavindamas savinasi pasaulį ir naikina kitybę, yra reprezentacija, siekianti akivaizdumo. Reprezentacija kaip intencionalus įžvalgumas bet kokį objektą lokalizuoja sąmonės šviesoje. Šviesa ir regėjimas – tai paradigminės Vakarų mąstymo tradicijos metaforos. Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kodėl ir kaip šviesa bei akivaizdumas netoleruoja absoliučios kitybės. Iš akivaizdumo kerų tapatumas atsitokėti gali tik per atsakingą santykį su Kitu, tai yra etiką. Čia tapatus subjektas praranda pirmumo teisę kito asmens imperatyvo atžvilgiu. Begalybės idėja, draskydama totalų tapatumą iš vidaus, neleidžia jam nurimti ir skatina atsižvelgti į transcendenciją, į kitybę, idant ji būtų laisva nuo prievartinio tapimo egocentrinio tapatumo turiniu ir manipuliacijos auka. Atsakomybė kito žmogaus veido akivaizdoje eina pirma akivaizdaus suvokimo ir įteisina jį.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: tapatumas, akivaizdumas, kitybė, socialumas.Charms of Evident IdentityNerijus Čepulis SummaryIn this article I seek to rethink the traditional notion of identity. In the tradition of Western thought identity was viewed first and foremost from an ontological point of view. After the turn toward the subject, the I is thought of as the centre, the base and the producer of any identity. Phenomenological analysis deepens the origin of identity to the relation of the I to the world, i.e. to the alterity. Yet the alterity, by becoming the content of consciousness, is not an absolute alterity. The way, in which identity assimilates, possesses the world and annihilates alterity, is representation. Representation seeks evidence. Representation as intentional perceptivity localizes every object in the light of consciousness. Light and vision are paradigmatic metaphors of the traditional Western thought. Hence in this article I seek to show why and how light and evidence do not tolerate absolute alterity. Identity can be sobered from the charms of evidence only by responsible relation to the Other, i.e. by ethics. Here identical subject loses the right of priority in front of the imperative of the other person. Idea of infinity worries total identity from within. Infinity does not permit identity to quiet down and induces to heed transcendence and alterity. Only in this way alterity can escape the violence to become a content of egocentrical identity and the victim of manipulation. Responsibility in the face of the other person precedes evident perception and legitimates the latter.Keywords: identity, evidence, alterity, sociality.

Phenomenology in Pedagogical Settings. Overview of the current discourse on phenomenological pedagogy

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4 (254) ◽  
pp. 183-196
Author(s):  
Patrizia Breil
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Educational Processes ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Educational Sciences ◽  
Pedagogical Discussion

Phenomenology has been well-received in pedagogy from the very beginning. With direct reference to Husserl, Aloys Fischer calls for a Descriptive Pedagogy. Only on the basis of a close description of educational processes similar to the phenomenological reduction can the educational sciences rediscover their actual subject matter. In this article the author traces the development of phenomenological thought in educational theory with a special focus on the notions of corporeality and negativity. As a necessary condition of perception in general, corporeality constitutes an important factor in the structural being-to-the-world of the human being. Apart from being able to sense its surroundings the body can also be perceived as part of these surroundings. Due to this double role, the subject opens up to foreign influences and negativity. Thus, the other plays an important role in the constitution of the identity of the subject. Through corporeality, a sphere of intersubjectivity is opened up. A recapitulation of Käte Meyer-Drawe’s Pedagogy of Inter-Subjectivity and Wilfried Lippitz’ Theory of Bildung and Alterity shows how these thoughts can be made useful for pedagogical discussion. Hereby, sociality and alterity prove to be foundational categories for educational settings in general. Finally, the author gives an outlook on current developments in phenomenological pedagogy.

Time in the Phenomenology of Perception

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 773-785
Author(s):  
Eugene F. Bertoldi
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenology Of Perception ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject

The chapter on time is one of the central investigations in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Throughout preceding chapters of that work one meets the claim that theoretical difficulties raised by the type of description of the perceiving subject that Merleau-Ponty offers are to be resolved in the investigation of time. For example, in describing perception, it begins to seem that the perceiving subject is neither a pure for-itself, nor an in-itself, but rather belongs to some category intermediate between these two. How is such an ambiguity to be understood ? Merleau-Ponty tells us that:On the level of being one will never understand that the subject must be at once naturans and naturatus, infinite and finite. But if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing and the other, we shall understand that there is nothing to understand beyond this.

scholarly journals Às voltas com a questão do sujeito: da transparência à encarnação

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (72) ◽  
pp. 1213-1234
Author(s):  
Renato Santos
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Nous Allons ◽  
Mots Clés ◽  
Life World ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Nous Verrons

Resumo: O propósito deste artigo é mostrar a limitação do sujeito cartesiano no que diz respeito ao fenômeno da existência. Concebido como transparente a si mesmo, este sujeito não abarca as contingências do mundo da vida (Lebenswelt), pois se a verdade somente pode ser acessada por meio do pensamento, a dimensão do que escapa à representação não é contemplada. Na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, buscaremos pensar um sujeito que, diferente de Descartes, não reduz o mundo ao cogito, mas assume sua inessencialidade, sua incompletude. Por fim, veremos emergir um sujeito que somente se sustenta na medida em que afirma o non-sens que lhe atravessa. Palavras-chave: Merleau-Ponty; Carnalidade; Sujeito; Non-sens. Facing the issue of the subject: from transparency to incarnation  Abstract: The purpose of this article is to show the limitation of the Cartesian subject with regard to the phenomenon of existence. Conceived as transparent to himself, this subject does not include the contingencies of the life world (Lebenswelt), because if the truth can only be accessed through thought, the dimension of what escapes representation is not contemplated. In Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, we will try to think of a subject who, unlike Descartes, does not reduce the world to the cogito, but assumes its inessentiality, its incompleteness. Finally, we will see a subject emerge that can only be sustained insofar as it affirms the non-sens that crosses it. Key-words: Merleau-Ponty; Carnality; Subject; Non-sens. Face à l'enjeu du sujet: de la transparence à l'incarnation Résumé: Le but de cet article est montrer la limitation du sujet cartésien par rapport au phénomène de l'existence. Conçu comme transparent pour lui-même, ce sujet ne comprend pas les contingences du monde de la vie (Lebenswelt), car si la vérité ne peut être atteinte que par la pensée, la dimension de ce qui échappe à la représentation n'est pas envisagée. Dans la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty, nous allons essayer de penser à un sujet qui, contrairement à Descartes, ne réduit pas le monde à un cogito, mais assume son inessentialité, son incomplétude. Enfin, nous verrons émerger un sujet qui ne se soutient que dans la mesure où il affirme le non-sens qui le traverse. Mots-clés: Merleau-Ponty; Carnalité; Sujet; Non-sens. APOIO: Este artigo foi desenvolvido com financiamento da Bolsa CAPES de doutorado. Data de registro: 06/12/2019  Data de aceite: 16/12/2020

scholarly journals POETICS OF LIFELOGGING: ON INTERSUBJECT FORMS OF UTTERANCE IN IGOR KHOLIN’S POEMS

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 84-94
Author(s):  
Aleksei S. Bokarev ◽  
◽  
Yulia V. Tkachuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Focus Of Attention ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Field Of View ◽  
The World ◽  
Inner World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Literary Metaphor ◽  
Lyrical Subject

The article is addressed to the consideration of the subject organization of lyrics by I. Kholin, a representative of the Lianozovo literary group, who became widely known as the author of the book of poems “Residents of the Barack”. Already in the presented, debut for the poet, composition there were outlined the types of speech widely presented to him, in which the subject is likened to a life-log camera, and the focus of attention is shifted from “Self” to “you”, from internal to external to the speaking world. The term “life-logging”, meaning the automatic fixation of a person's life using a video medium fixed to the body, is used in the article as a literary metaphor, “highlighting” the difficulty of personal speaking and self-expression of the protagonist. However, just as the environment of a life logger who does not fall into his own lens gives him a sufficient (if not exhaustive) idea, the life realities in the subject's field of view can tell about his inner world no less than he by himself. The analysis of a number of poems (the most detailed is considered “Fences. Garbage cans. Posters. Advertising”) allows you to demonstrate the intersubjective nature of life-logic “optics”. The latter is used by Kholin in three different forms: as the “dissolution” of the speaker in the text, as the construction of the statement on behalf of the syncretic subject and as the priority of the “other” over the “self” when creating the verbal “self-portrait” of the hero. The impossibility of distancing from hostile reality, but also the inadequacy of selfdetermination in its conditions, testify to the formation of a kenotic model of the artist's relationship with reality. In Kholin's poetry, the lyrical subject is not only a detached viewer, but also a protagonist who fully shares his sins and suffering with the world.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-276
Author(s):  
Charlotte Epstein
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
The State ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Political Project ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Taking Responsibility

This concluding chapter returns to modernity’s defining problematique: ordering, understood coextensively as an epistemological and a political project. It discusses the extent to which the body operated as the great naturaliser of history—working to stabilise political construction, and notably the racialised and gendered figures that entered into the making of the modern category of ‘the human’ from the onset. The chapter also considers the two sets of processes, of putting together and of dividing up, that took the body as their referent and produced, respectively, the state and the individual who bears rights. It then examines the relations between construction, constitution, and another kind of corporeal agency altogether: generation (giving birth). Generation, as the distinctive agentic capacity that indexes only one kind of body, the female one, functioned throughout the seventeenth century as the ‘other’ to constitution, to the agency that was being expended and experimented with to craft the state and the subject of rights. Finally, the chapter looks at the duty of critique, considering it in its relation to agency and to the urgency of taking responsibility for the world in which people live, and therefore for changing it.

scholarly journals The experience of phenomenological ontology in the book of Ivan Štrpka “Where the cloak, there is the wind” (2018)

2020 ◽  
pp. 423-441
Author(s):  
Andrea Grominova ◽  
Nina V. Barkovskaya
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
21St Century ◽  
The Other ◽  
Poetic Language ◽  
Self Identity ◽  
Jean Paul ◽  
Search For Self ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject

Based on the material of the poetry book of one of the major modern Slovak poets — Ivan Štrpka, the article examines the features of poetics and author’s world-attitude. A hypothesis is expressed about the fi nal character of the book “Where the cloak, there is the wind”, relying on the genre model of the fi nal book of poems proposed by O. V. Miroshnikova. The complexity of the poetic language is due to the author’s desire to show “what cannot be seen”, to express the feeling of “empty forms”. The key words in the book are emptiness and light. The initial text in the book, which is a “long vers libre”, is analyzed in detail. The seman-tic dominant is defi ned by the allusion to the suprematism of Kazimir Malevich, whose painting “White on White” proclaims pointlessness as a condition of freedom of consciousness. Further, an empty world, “not a place”, is revealed through an attempt to articulate, produce speech and meaning. The subject of speech in the poem is fundamentally lone-ly — it is a “naked” consciousness, trying to realize itself. This is not a person, but a kind of pulsating point from which an attempt at speech comes. Thus, the extremely generalized form of the poetic subject is investigated, the “landscape” of the pointless space is drawn, in which the very possibility of poetry arises. Štrpka conveys the phenomenol-ogy of consciousness of the subject, trying to fi nd himself from himself, and through himself — and the world, the “other”, conveys the eff ort of consciousness to give meaning to the “empty” world. The phenom-enology of consciousness represented by Štrpka is comparable with the categorical apparatus substantiated in Jean-Paul Sartre philosophy. The search for self-identity in a God-given world ends with the image of a comprehensive ocean, with the rhythm of movement of which thespeaker’s breathing and speech eff ort merge. It is concluded that Štrpka retained the role of a “lone runner” in completely new sociocultural circumstances of the fi rst decades of the 21st century.

De-Finition

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-245
Author(s):  
Erik Ode
Keyword(s):  
Educational Research ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Scientific Terms

Abstract De-Finition. Poststructuralist Objections to the Limitation of the Other The metaphysic tradition always tried to structure the world by definitions and scientific terms. Since poststructuralist authors like Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze have claimed the ›death of the subject‹ educational research cannot ignore the critical objections to its own methods. Definitions and identifications may be a violation of the other’s right to stay different and undefined. This article tries to discuss the scientific limitations of the other in a pedagogical, ethical and political perspective.

Some Aspects of Inebriety

1908 ◽  
Vol 54 (227) ◽  
pp. 704-718
Author(s):  
Lady Henry Somerset
Keyword(s):  
Personal Experience ◽  
Moral Evil ◽  
County Council ◽  
Lunatic Asylum ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ordinary Sense ◽  
The Public ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject

I fully appreciate the very great honour which has been done to me this afternoon in asking me to speak of the experience which I have had in nearly twenty years of work amongst those who are suffering from alcoholism. Of courseyou will forgive me if I speak in an altogether unscientific way. I can only say exactly the experiences I have met with, and as I now live, summer and winter, in their midst, I can give you at any rate the result of my personal experience among such people. Thirteen years ago, when we first started the colony which we have for inebriate women at Duxhurst, the Amendment to the present Inebriate Act was not in existence, that is to say, there was no means of dealing with such people other than by sending them to prison. The physical side of drunkenness was then almost entirely overlooked, and the whole question was dealt with more or less as a moral evil. When the Amendment to the Act was passed it was recognised, at any rate, that prison had proved to be a failure for these cases, and this was quite obvious, because such women were consigned for short sentences to prison, and then turnedback on the world, at the end of six weeks or a month, as the case might be, probably at the time when the craving for drink was at its height, and therefore when they had every opportunity for satisfying it outside the prison gate they did so at once. It is nowonder therefore that women were committed again and again, even to hundreds of times. When I first realised this two cases came distinctly and prominently under my notice. One was that of a woman whose name has become almost notorious in England, Miss Jane Cakebread. She had been committed to prison over 300 times. I felt certain when I first saw her in gaol that she was not in the ordinary sense an inebriate; she was an insane woman who became violent after she had given way to inebriety. She spent three months with us, and I do not think that I ever passed a more unpleasant three months in my life, because when she was sober she was as difficult to deal with-although not so violent-aswhen she was drunk. I tried to represent this to the authorities at the time, but I wassupposed to know very little on the subject, and was told that I was very certainly mistaken. I let her go for the reasons, firstly that we could not benefit her, and secondly that I wanted to prove my point. At the end of two days she was again committed to prison, and after being in prison with abstention from alcohol, which had rendered her more dangerous (hear, hear), she kicked one of the officials, and was accordingly committed to a lunatic asylum. Thus the point had been proved that a woman had been kept in prison over 300 times at the public expense during the last twenty years before being committed to a lunatic asylum. The other case, which proved to me the variations there arein the classifications of those who are dubbed “inebriates,” was a woman named Annie Adams, who was sent to me by the authorities at Holloway, and I was told she enjoyed thename of “The Terror of Holloway.” She had been over 200 times in prison, but directly she was sober a more tractable person could not be imagined. She was quite sane, but she was a true inebriate. She had spent her life in drifting in and out of prison, from prison to the street, and from the street to the prison, but when she was under the bestconditions I do not think I ever came across a more amiable woman. About that time the Amendment to the Inebriates Act was passed, and there were provisions made by which such women could be consigned to homes instead of being sent to prison. The London County Council had not then opened homes, and they asked us to take charge of their first cases. They were sent to us haphazard, without classification. There were women who were habitual inebriates, there were those who were imbecile or insane; every conceivable woman was regarded as suitable, and all were sent together. At that time I saw clearly that there would be a great failure (as was afterwards proved) in the reformatory system in this country unless there were means of separating the women who came from the same localities. That point I would like to emphasise to-day. We hear a great deal nowadays about the failure of reformatories, but unless you classify this will continue to be so.

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