scholarly journals A gnoseologia segundo Ernest Sosa

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (spe2) ◽  
pp. 63-96
Author(s):  
João Carlos Salles
Keyword(s):  
Ernest Sosa

Resumo: Ernest Sosa enfatiza a diferença entre a teoria do conhecimento (ou, simplesmente, gnoseologia) e a ética intelectual, no interior de uma epistemologia. Com efeito, tal distinção adquire importância estratégica em sua obra, servindo bem à caraterização das tarefas de sua singular epistemologia das virtudes, sobretudo em sua versão mais recente, aperfeiçoada e télica. Exploraremos assim o sentido próprio de uma gnoseologia conforme com uma posição confiabilista, procurando mostrar como essa exigência taxonômica também se associa à análise da normatividade télica das performances humanas, por meio da qual Sosa oferece uma resposta unificada às duas questões platônicas clássicas sobre a natureza e o valor do conhecimento e também aos desafios colocados pelo problema de Gettier. Para essa resposta, procuraremos enfim mostrar, é relevante o exame da relação entre as noções de ‘performance’ e ‘sorte’, aplicadas então à avaliação do fenômeno do conhecimento.

Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey C. King
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Physical State ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Frank Jackson ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Paradox Of Analysis ◽  
Relevant Notion

This article examines the main lines of contemporary thinking about analysis in philosophy. It first considers G. E. Moore’s statement of the paradox of analysis. It then reviews a number of accounts of analysis that address the paradox of analysis, including the account offered by Ernest Sosa 1983 and others by Felicia Ackerman (1981, 1986, 1991); the latter gives an account of analysis on which properties are the objects of analysis. It also discusses Jeffrey C. King’s (1998, 2007) accounts of philosophical analysis, before turning to views of analysis that are not aimed at addressing the paradox of analysis, including those associated with David Lewis, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers. In particular, it comments on Lewis’s argument that conceptual analysis is simply a means for picking out the physical state that occupies a certain role, where formulating what that role is constitutes a conceptual analysis of the relevant notion.

Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Williams
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Vicious Circularity ◽  
Direct Answer

AbstractIn his Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers a theory of knowledge, broadly virtue-theoretic in character, that is meant to transcend simple ways of contrasting "internalist" with "externalist" or "foundationalist" with "coherentist" approaches to knowledge and justification. Getting beyond such simplifications, Sosa thinks, is the key to finding an exit from "the Pyrrhonian Problematic": the ancient and profound skeptical problem concerning the apparent impossibility of validating the reliability of our basic epistemic faculties and procedures in a way that escapes vicious circularity. Central to Sosa's anti-skeptical strategy is the claim that there are two kinds of knowledge. His thought is that animal knowledge, which can be understood in purely reliabilist terms, can ground justified trust in the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties, thus elevating us (without vicious circularity) to the level of reflective knowledge. I offer a sketch of an alternative approach, linking knowledge and justification with epistemic accountability and responsible belief-management, which casts doubt on the idea that "animal" knowledge is knowledge properly so-called. However, it turns out that this approach is (perhaps surprisingly) close in spirit to Sosa's. I suggest that the differences between us may rest on a disagreement over the possibility of providing a direct answer to the Pyrrhonian challenge.

scholarly journals ARE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES TRUTH-RELEVANT?

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-392
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Wide Range

ABSTRACTAccording to attributor virtue epistemology (the view defended by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and others), S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. Attributor virtue epistemology captures a wide range of our intuitions about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think is sufficient for rejecting it: namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that aren't truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow sense of this term. As I show in this paper, the primary objection to interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more effectively against attributor virtue epistemology.

scholarly journals Ernest Sosa: Judgment and Agency

2017 ◽  
Vol 114 (5) ◽  
pp. 274-276
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ernest Sosa

scholarly journals The epistemology of Ernest Sosa: an introduction

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 197 (12) ◽  
pp. 5093-5100
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Ernest Sosa

SYMPOSIUM ON ERNEST SOSA

2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-179
Author(s):  
Armen T. Marsoobian
Keyword(s):  
Ernest Sosa

Why Should a Knower Care?

Hypatia ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vrinda Dalmiya
Keyword(s):  
General Framework ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
Dyadic Relation

This paper argues that the concept of care is significant not only for ethics, but for epistemology as well. After elucidating caring as a five-step dyadic relation, I go on to show its epistemic significance within the general framework of virtue epistemology as developed by Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman, and Linda Zagzebski. The notions of “care-knowing” and “care-based epistemology” emerge from construing caring (respectively) as a reliabilist and responsibilist virtue.

Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-473
Author(s):  
Matthias Steup
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Cognitive Structure ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Mutual Dependence ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Temporal Priority ◽  
Vicious Circularity

AbstractAccording to externalist reliabilism and dogmatic foundationalism, it's possible to gain knowledge through a perceptual experience without being in a position to know that the experience is reliable. As a result, both of these views face the problem of making knowledge of perceptual reliability too easy, for they permit deducing perceptual reliability from particular perceptual experience without already knowing that these experiences are trustworthy. Ernest Sosa advocates a two-stage solution to the problem. At the first stage, a rich body of perceptual animal knowledge is acquired. At the second stage, perceptual knowledge becomes reflective after deducing perceptual reliability from the initial body of perceptual animal knowledge. I defend the alternative approach of rejecting both externalist reliabilism and dogmatic foundationalism. According to the alternative view, perceptual knowledge and knowledge of perceptual reliability require each other. Such a cognitive structure seems viciously circular. I propose that the appearance of vicious circularity dissipates when the relationship in question is viewed, not as one of temporal priority, but instead as synchronic mutual dependence. At a given time, one cannot have perceptual knowledge without knowledge of perceptual reliability, and vice versa. Such mutual dependence, I argue, is benign.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document