scholarly journals A SHORT DISCUSSION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IN DUPLUM RULE UPON COMMENCEMENT OF LITIGATION AND AFTER JUDGMENT: A VIEW BOTH “INSIDE” AND “OUTSIDE” THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
ML Vessio
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Short Discussion ◽  
Litigation Process ◽  
The Common ◽  
National Credit Act

It has repeatedly been confirmed by the courts that the in duplum rule forms part of South African law, and more recently section 103(5) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereinafter “the Act”) has concretized the rule into statutory form. This note examines the effects of the in duplum rule once the litigation process has been initiated by the creditor and the implications of the rule after judgment is granted against the debtor. Preceding such discussion, however, one needs first to consider whether South Africa still has a common-law in duplum rule, or whether the statutory in duplum rule has ousted the “old” rule in toto (for ease of reference andpracticality the rule as developed by the courts shall be referred to as the “common law rule” and the rule as set out in s 103(5) of the Act shall be referred to as the “statutory rule”). It is submitted that while the statutory rule has superseded the common law rule in terms of all credit agreements that fall within the jurisdiction or ambit of the Act there are those credit agreements that are not regulated by the Act and it is those credit agreements where the (“old”) common-law rule shall apply and regulate the interest component collectable by the creditor vis-a-vis the debtor. Thus the two rules must now operate together; both rules applying to different sectors of society; at least society whilst it wears its consumer cap. The codified in duplum rule as will be seen below – affects only natural persons and the juristic entity, as defined by the Act, remains to be protected by the common-law rule. Furthermore, the common-law rule will be applicable to those credit agreements which fall outside the auspices of the Act.

scholarly journals The protection of environmental interests through corporate governance: A South African company law perspective

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-20
Author(s):  
Anthony O. Nwafor
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Company Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
Corporate Administrators ◽  
Environmental Interests

The quest to maximize profits by corporate administrators usually leaves behind an unhealthy environment. This trend impacts negatively on long term interests of the company and retards societal sustainable development. While there are in South Africa pieces of legislation which are geared at protecting the environment, the Companies Act which is the principal legislation that regulates the operations of the company is silent on this matter. The paper argues that the common law responsibility of the directors to protect the interests of the company as presently codified by the Companies Act should be developed by the courts in South Africa, in the exercise of their powers under the Constitution, to include the interests of the environment. This would guarantee the enforcement of the environmental interests within the confines of the Companies Act as an issue of corporate governance.

scholarly journals Constitutional Mimicry and Common Law Reform in a Rights-Based Post-Colonial Setting: The Case of South Africa and Malawi

2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-170
Author(s):  
Sibo Banda
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The South ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
The Common

AbstractCompetent courts in Malawi must, as courts have done in South Africa, undertake a radical path in order to enhance the common law position of distinct categories of persons. This article discusses judicial appreciation of the common law-changing function of a bill of rights and its associated values, and judicial understanding as to when such a function may be brought into play. The article examines approaches taken by courts in South Africa in determining the circumstances in which the South African Bill of Rights applies to private relationships, when private parties owe each other duties arising out of the Bill of Rights and the scope of a court's authority to amend the common law in that regard. The article projects the debate, analysis and critique of these approaches onto the Malawian legal landscape through a discussion of the tenant worker contracted on the Malawi private estate.

scholarly journals A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF THE CHILD

Obiter ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
RB Bernard ◽  
MC Buthelezi
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Teddy Bear ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Minor Children ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
A Minor

Children are considered to be vulnerable, and therefore need to be protected against parents, strangers and even themselves. As a consequence, the State’s quest for the protection of children in South Africa is expressed in the implementation of legislation designed to offer greater care and protection. For instance, section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, offers a wide range of rights which are designed to offer greater protection to children. The rights of children can, in effect, be categorized into two themes. The first relates to the protection of children – as the child is dependent on those around him or her due to a lack of capacity, and is therefore vulnerable. The second theme relates to the autonomy of children. Section 28(2) of the Constitution provides that in any matter concerning a child, the best interests of the child are of paramount importance. However, most South African legislative provisions that deal with minor children seem to miss this principle, and are riddled with inconsistencies. In many statutes, where the principle is recognized, there is either limited appreciation of the significance of the principle and its overall impact on issues concerning children, or there is no coherence with the manner the courts have interpreted and applied the principle. For example, the recent judgment of  the Teddy Bear Clinic case declared sections 15 and 16 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act unconstitutional. The judgment has been heavily criticized by different segments of society for encouraging teens to engage in wanton sexual intercourse, but illustrates some of the flaws in legislation aimed at protecting the welfare of minor children in South Africa. Furthermore, the common law and other legislation such as the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, the Marriage Act, and provisions of the Children’s Act regulating contraceptives and condoms, all contain such inconsistencies. For instance, the common law and section 24 (together with s 26) of the Marriage Act allow a minor from the age of puberty to enter into a valid marriage; section 129 of the Children’s Act requires that a minor aged twelve be assisted by a guardian to undergo a surgical operation; whereassections of the Choice Act do not require parental consent for terminating a minor’s pregnancy. This note reviews the above and other inconsistences currently prevalent in the law of the child in South Africa. A brief overview of the Teddy Bear Clinic case will be considered. Thereafter, it outlines and examines various gender-based contradictions in the law, and examines the possible rationale for justifying the particular legislative measure concerned. The note concludes by proposing possible solutions to the discrepancies that have been identified.

Family Provision in South Africa

2020 ◽  
pp. 477-506
Author(s):  
Marius J de Waal
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Protection Measures ◽  
South Africans ◽  
The Common ◽  
Property Regime

At the time of the reception of Roman-Dutch law at the Cape in the seventeenth century, both children and the surviving spouse enjoyed sufficient protection at the death of the breadwinner (normally the father and husband): children by way of the civilian legitimate portion and the spouse by way of the matrimonial property regime of community of property prevalent in Roman-Dutch law of the time. However, after the English occupation of the Cape in the early nineteenth century this protection was slowly eroded. This happened, first, by the acceptance of the principle of freedom of testation under English influence and, secondly, by the growing popularity of ante-nuptial contracts excluding community of property. This chapter explains how family protection was gradually restored in South Africa. In the case of children, this happened by the courts awarding a maintenance claim against the deceased parent’s estate; and in the case of the surviving spouse it was by means of a statutory maintenance claim against the estate of the other spouse. South African law therefore chose the common law approach of discretionary maintenance over the civilian approach of fixed shares. The chapter sets out the respective histories of these two claims as well as their operation in modern South African law. It discusses other possible protection measures and potential avoidance mechanisms. Finally, the chapter contains a brief discussion of the position of South Africans living under African customary law and the importance of the customary law principle of ‘ubuntu’ in this context.

scholarly journals Oral Law in Litigation in South Africa: An Evidential Nightmare?

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Court System ◽  
The Status ◽  
Customary Laws ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Law Of Evidence

In the past, customary law has been applied rather haphazardly in the courts. Its inherent adaptive flexibility and indeterminate nature created confusion in a court system ill-equipped to deal with litigation dealing with customary law issues. Understandably, customary law was treated in the same way as a common-law custom, which also originates in a community's acceptance of certain standards of behaviour. This meant that anyone averring a rule of customary law had to prove it, except where the rule was contained in a statute or precedent. The courts were not keen to engage in law-making and where the ascertainment of customary law proved to be difficult, they would merely apply the common law. In 1998, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which allows the judiciary to take judicial notice of readily accessible customary law, made fundamental changes to this situation. The Act is still in operation, although it must now be interpreted in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). No direction on how this must be done can be found in the wording of the constitutional provisions dealing with the customary law. Besides instructing the courts to apply customary law when "applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law", the Constitution is silent on the way forward. Given the fact that most of the judiciary does not have any knowledge of the content of living customary law and the fact that there are fundamental differences between the evidentiary rules applied in the common and customary laws of South Africa, a few problems are bound to surface when litigating issues involving the customary law. They include: the status of customary law in the South African legal system; the applicability of customary law; and especially the determination of living customary law. The aim of this analysis is to determine if the existing evidentiary rules are appropriate to deal with these challenges in litigating matters involving customary law in the ordinary courts.

scholarly journals ‘The Trial the World is Watching’: The 1972 Prosecution of Derk Crichton and James Watts, Abortion, and the Regulation of the Medical Profession in Apartheid South Africa

2014 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-229
Author(s):  
Susanne M. Klausen
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
British Empire ◽  
White Women ◽  
Medical Profession ◽  
Common Law ◽  
National Party ◽  
Party Government ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government

AbstractAfter its formation in 1910 as a self-governing dominion within the British empire, the Union of South Africa followed a combination of English and Roman-Dutch common laws on abortion that decreed the procedure permissible only when necessary to save a woman’s life. The government continued doing so after South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth and became a republic in 1961. In 1972 a sensational trial took place in the South African Supreme Court that for weeks placed clandestine abortion on the front pages of the country’s newspapers. Two men, one an eminent doctor and the other a self-taught abortionist, were charged with conspiring to perform illegal abortions on twenty-six white teenagers and young unmarried women. The prosecution of Dr Derk Crichton and James Watts occurred while the National Party government was in the process of drafting abortion legislation and was perceived by legal experts as another test of the judiciary’s stance on the common law on abortion. The trial was mainly intended to regulate the medical profession and ensure doctors ceased helping young white women evade their ‘duty’ to procreate within marriage. Ultimately, the event encapsulated a great deal about elites’ attempt to buttress apartheid culture and is significant for, among other reasons, contributing to the production of South Africa’s extremely restrictive Abortion and Sterilisation Act (1975).

scholarly journals The Consequences of the Statutory Regulation of Customary Law: An Examination of the South African Customary Law of Succession and Marriage

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Fatima Osman
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
The South ◽  
Legal Context ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Of Succession ◽  
Statutory Regulation

In pluralistic legal systems, the regulation of non-state law through statute carries the risks associated with codification; namely the ossification and distortion of law. This article examines the effects of statutory regulation on unwritten systems of law in the South African legal context. It argues that the constitutional recognition of customary law in South Africa has forced the state to legislate in this arena, the most notable enactments being the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The enactments' attempt to align customary law with constitutional values have imported significant portions of the common law to regulate the customary law of marriage and succession. This has resulted in a distortion of customary law to reflect common law values and rules. Furthermore, it is argued that significant lacunae in the enactments have necessitated litigation and resulted in the judiciary playing a significant role in shaping customary law. Finally, despite the incorporation of living customary law into the enactments, the implementation thereof by courts and in practice has – and perhaps inevitably so – ossified and distorted portions of the law. Nonetheless, the article argues that legislation is critical to regulate customary law. It advocates that the shortcomings identified in the article are addressed to ensure a more accurate portrayal of customary law in legislation and the successful implementation thereof.

scholarly journals JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE DETERMINATION OF POST-DIVORCE CHILD SUPPORT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MAINTENANCE ACT 99 OF 1998 AS COMPARED TO THE CANADIAN FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES OF 1997

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marita Carnelley ◽  
Juanita Easthorpe
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Child Support ◽  
Current System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The South ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Support Guidelines

There are various models for determining and allocating child support obligations post-divorce and many different principles upon which such a policy can be based. In most legal systems the parents retain the duty to support their needy children after divorce as it is primarily their obligation to ensure the adequate financial welfare of their children. This principle is applicable in both the South African and Canadian legal systems. In South Africa, in terms of both the common law and legislation, both parents must maintain their children “according to their respective means”. The awarding of a specific amount of maintenance is, however, a complex process calculated by the courts on a case-by-case basis mainly by considering two issues: the needs of the children and the parents’ ability to maintain their children within the circumstances and means of each of the parents. Although both aspects are important in a maintenance enquiry, the focus of this note is on the interpretation of the calculation of the contribution of each of the parents, especially the non-custodial parent. The interpretation of the concept “means” obviously has important consequences for the parties: the broader the interpretation of the “means” of a parent, the higher the proportion of the contribution of that parent would be towards the support of the children. This is especially important in South Africa where a substantial proportion of those who are obligated to pay maintenance is impecunious. The Canadian law rested on similar principles until 1997 when the federal government promulgated the Federal Child Support Guidelines as an amendment to the Divorce Act. The impact of these Guidelines on the calculation of the parental share of post-divorce child support has been far-reaching. The aim of this note is firstly to examine the meaning of the term “means” within the South African legal system as set out in the common law, the various statutes and as these have been interpreted by the majority of courts over the past century. The second aim is to give a brief overview of the Canadian Guidelines and to compare their current system with the South African scenario. The rationale for choosing this jurisdiction is (i) the fact that in both jurisdictions the courts have the ultimate say over the amount of support paid; and (ii) as the Canadian position before their 1997 amendments was similar to the current South Africa system, it was envisaged that by exploring their reasons for change and evaluating their current system, some useful insights might be gained in solving some problems experienced in the South African maintenance system. The note will conclude with some suggestions for reform in South Africa in light of the Canadian experience. 

scholarly journals PRESENCE AS A BASIS FOR THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT SOUNDING IN MONEY: THE “REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION” TEST CONSIDERED

Obiter ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
GMN Xaba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Recognition And Enforcement ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
The Common ◽  
Foreign Judgment ◽  
Academic Debate

A somewhat contested basis of international competence in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in South Africa is mere presence. Over the years, an academic debate has raged in South Africa over mere presence as a basis of jurisdiction for the enforcement of foreign judgments sounding in money. A recent decision by the Constitutional Court makes the topic worth revisiting.Practical circumstances, social and political considerations as well as natural justice inevitably call for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. As Forsyth aptly puts it “[a] plaintiff may sue in one country and hear with pleasure judgment given in his favour, then discover, to his dismay, that the defendant, with his assets, has absconded to another country”. In such a situation, the judgment has become brutum fulmen in the court which pronounced it and the plaintiff is placed in a grossly prejudicial position. However, because of widely accepted values and principles, legal systems of the world recognize and appreciate that a judgment rendered by the courts of one country may be enforced elsewhere, provided certain conditions are satisfied.Under South African common law one of the conditions for the enforcement of foreign judgments is that the court which pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. (In Reiss Engineering Co Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1033 (W) 1037B the court stated that the mere fact that the foreign court may have had jurisdiction under its own laws, is not conclusive. Instead, the question of jurisdiction has to be determined in the light of the principles of our law on the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Other requirements for recognition and enforcement are that (i) the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive in its effect and not have become superannuated; (ii) the recognition and enforcement of the judgment by South African courts should not be contrary to public policy; (iii) the foreign judgment should not have been obtained by fraudulent means; (iv) the judgment must not involve the enforcement of a penal or revenue law of the foreign state; and (v) the enforcement of the foreign judgment must not be precluded by the provisions of the Protection of Business Act 99 of 1978, as amended. See Jones v Krok 1995 (1) SA 667 (AD) 685B−D.) This note is concerned only with the requirement that the foreign court that pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. The other four requirements are outside the scope of this paper and will not be discussed. It appears that the requirement that the foreign court must have had jurisdiction is a tenet central to the common law world. This requirement is a concept sui generis which is not affected by the internal jurisdiction rules of the foreign court, nor by the internal jurisdiction rules of the South African courts. Under South African common law there are, at least, two grounds which have been established with absolute clarity, that clothe a foreign court with international competence.

scholarly journals Inheritance Rights for Posthumously Procreated Children: A Growing Challenge for the Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Frederick Noel Zaal ◽  
Justin D'Almaine
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Artificial Reproduction ◽  
Cryogenic Technology ◽  
Laboratory Conditions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Human Gametes

Significant advances in cryogenic technology render it possible to freeze and store human gametes. Under appropriate laboratory conditions frozen gametes can remain viable for long periods of time. In consequence, it is possible for a child to be conceived and procreated after the death of one or both parents. This raises some challenging juristic problems. Amongst these are implications for the law of inheritance. Where a valid will expressly refers to a child who will be procreated after the testator's death, the child's right to inherit will be secured. However, where a will merely refers to children as a class, or with intestate succession, it becomes uncertain whether a posthumously procreated child has a right to inherit. South African legislation governing succession, the common law and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 all fail to provide definitive answers. Because of this and as the numbers of posthumously procreated children are likely to increase as artificial reproduction services become more widely available, there is a need for South African legislation to clarify their inheritance rights.

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