scholarly journals A COMPARATIVE EXPOSITION OF THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE IN TERMS OF ISLAMIC LAW, SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND WALES ‒ PART TWO

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Razaana Denson

The article discusses and compares the dissolution of a marriage as well as the legal consequences thereof in Islamic law, South African law and English law. This is done in order to demonstrate that despite similarities, there are vast differences between the three legal systems. This impacts on how Muslim personal law (MPL) can be recognised and regulated in South Africa and in England and Wales as constitutional democracies. South Africa, England and Wales share a commitment to human rights and have adopted various approaches in respect of accommodating the application of Islamic law. Internal pluralism also exists within the Muslim communities in South Africa, England and Wales as the majority of Muslims in these countries have to varying degrees developed diverse strategies to ensure compliance with Islamic law, as well as with South African and English law. Notwithstanding the accommodation of MPL in terms of South African and English law, the differences between these legal systems have resulted in decisions that, while providing relief to the lived realities of Muslims, are in fact contrary to the teachings and principles of Islam and therefore problematic for Muslims.

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-750
Author(s):  
Razaana Denson

The primary concern of this article is a comparative analysis of marriage law in three legal systems – namely, Islamic law, South African law and English law. The similarities and differences between these legal systems are highlighted. The comparative analysis demonstrates that although there are similarities in the three legal systems, the differences outweigh the similarities. This begs the question whether Islamic law (Muslim personal law in general and family law in particular) can be recognised and accommodated and implemented in the South African and English legal systems (both constitutional democracies) without compromising the principles of Islamic law, while at the same time upholding the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. To this end, a comparative analysis is undertaken of the law of marriage that entails a discussion, inter alia, of betrothal (engagement), the legal requirements for a marriage, as well as the personal and proprietary consequences of a marriage as applicable in Islamic law, South African law and English law.


Cultura ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-28
Author(s):  
Luis CORDEIRO-RODRIGUES

Marxist Philosophy as an explanation of social reality has, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, been largely neglected. However, some philosophers have contended that it may still be relevant to explain today’s social reality. In this article, I wish to demonstrate precisely that Marxist philosophy can be relevant to understand social reality. To carry out this task, I show that Marxist philosophy of law can offer a sound explanation of Animal law in South Africa. My argument is that South African law is a superstructure that reinforces the power of the animal farming industry in South Africa. That is, the hidden purpose of the law is to benefit the industry. In order to argue for this, I present two sets of arguments. The first set argues that the law facilitates the functioning of the animal farming industry. In the second set of arguments I contend that the law socialises individuals into approving the methods of slaughtering by the animal farming industry.


1972 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Watson

It is a commonplace that Rome's greatest contribution to the modern world is its law. Whether this is strictly true or not, Roman law is certainly the basis of the law of Western Europe (with the exception of England and Scandinavia), of much of Africa including South Africa, Ethiopia and in general the former colonies of countries in continental Europe, of Quebec and Louisiana, of Japan and Ceylon and so on. Perhaps even more important for the future is that International law is very largely modelled, by analogy, on Roman law. Just think of the perfectly serious arguments of a few years ago as to whether outer space (including the moon and planets) were res nullius or res communes and whether they were, or were not, susceptible of acquisition by occupatio. This persistence of Roman law has had undesirable consequences. First, Roman law as an academic subject has got into the hands of lawyers whose love of technicalities has frightened off classical scholars who tend not to use the legal sources. Secondly, scholars of antiquity, since Roman law is left well alone, have also been reluctant to look at other ancient legal systems. So have lawyers since these other systems have no ‘practical” value. Thirdly, following upon these but worse still, the usefulness of Roman law for later ages, coupled with its enforced isolation from other systems of antiquity, has often led to an exaggerated respect for it, and to its being regarded as well-nigh perfect, immutable, fit for all people. Many in “the Age of Reason” were ready to regard Roman law as “the Law of Reason”.


Obiter ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priya P Singh

The rapid rise in the use of social media networking sites in South Africa has posed new challenges to our courts. The law of defamation and privacy, which has long been considered well established, is now facing new demands on its boundaries because of the unique characteristics of social media in the online era.This note will discuss and critique three recent cases individually, concerning issues arising from the use of Facebook (a social media website) and the approach of the courts in extending the traditional law to the new demands of social media interaction.The aim of the note is to evaluate: the considerations which should apply to the granting of an interdict in respect of comments posted on Facebook, especially where alternative remedies are available; whether social media should be treated differently from electronic news media; how to establish ownership of a Facebook profile where such ownership is disputed; liability for anonymous defamatory posts on an individual’s Facebook profile; whether an individual can be liable for defamatory posts not made by himself personally, but in which he has been tagged; whether comments posed as questions can be regarded as defamatory; and the role played by apologies in claims for damages in defamation.The note concludes by discussing how South African courts have extended the traditional principles governing the actio injuriarium action in South African law – to the new challenges posed by the rise in popularity of social media networking sites.


Author(s):  
Jagusch Stephen ◽  
Triantafilou Epaminontas E

This chapter summarizes the key aspects of the English legal system with respect to the role of courts in arbitrations seated in England and Wales. First, it highlights the key provisions of relevant English legislation, mainly of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 and the principal court decisions arising under that legislation. Second, it describes the manner in which English law as the law of the seat affects the role of English courts in the course of three discrete stages: before the award, after the award, and during recognition and enforcement. In the process and where necessary, it addresses and ultimately rejects recently articulated concerns questioning the supremacy of England and Wales as an arbitration seat. The chapter concludes that England and Wales possesses a comprehensive and clearly articulated legal framework governing arbitration, and a sophisticated, impartial judiciary with ample experience in complex arbitral disputes and the collateral issues they raise under both English law and foreign laws and regulations. The jurisdiction is distinctly arbitration-friendly, with a keen understanding of the benefits arbitration aims to confer on parties, and the policy considerations such benefits entail.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Brown

This paper offers a new way of conceptualising how intersectional solidarities are actualised. It recounts and theorises an outbreak of radical internationalism, when working class struggles in Britain and South Africa were unexpectedly linked. It examines how intersectional solidarity was materialised through a process of coming together against the architectural fabric of the South African Embassy and considers the interwoven temporalities that enabled this action to occur. On 31 March 1990, nearly a quarter of a million people demonstrated in London against the Poll Tax that was due to take effect in England and Wales the following day. On the day, the Metropolitan Police lost control of an already enraged crowd and provoked a large scale riot that engulfed the West End of London for several hours. In the midst of the riot, during a short retreat by the police, protesters took the opportunity to attack the South African Embassy in Trafalgar Square – many windows were broken and an attempt was made to set the building alight. Drawing on interviews with former anti-apartheid protesters who were present on that day (and who had concluded a four-year long Non-Stop Picket of the embassy a month earlier), this paper explores and analyses their memories of that unexpected moment when their previously symbolic call to ‘burn it down’ was (almost) materialised. In doing so, it contributes new ways of conceptualising the spatiality and temporality of intersectional solidarity.


Author(s):  
Max Loubser ◽  
Tamar Gidron

Both the Israeli and the South African legal systems are classified as mixed legal systems, or mixed jurisdictions. In Israel, tort law was originally pure English common law, adopted by legislation and later developed judicially. In South Africa, the law of delict (tort) was originally Roman-Dutch but was later strongly influenced by the English common law. Under both systems, tort law is characterized by open-ended norms allowing extensive judicial development. This paper traces and compares the structural basis, methodology, policy, and trends of the judicial development of state and public-authority liability in the Israeli and South African jurisdictions. Specific factors that have impacted the development of state- and public-authority liability are: (1) constitutional values, (2) the courts’ recognition of the need for expanded protection of fundamental human rights and activism towards achieving such protection, (3) the multicultural nature of the societies, (4) problems of crime and security, and (5) worldwide trends, linked to consumerism, toward the widening of liability of the state and public authorities.Within essentially similar conceptual structures the South African courts have been much more conservative in their approach to state liability for pure economic loss than their Israeli counterparts. This can perhaps be attributed to a sense of priorities. In a developing country with huge disparities in wealth, the courts would naturally be inclined to prioritize safety and security of persons above pure economic loss. The South African courts have been similarly more conservative in cases involving administrative negligence and evidential loss.The development of the law on state and public-authority liability in Israel and South Africa is also the product of factors such as the levels of education, the effectiveness of the public service, and the history and pervasiveness of constitutional ordering. Despite important differences, the law in the two jurisdictions has developed from a broadly similar mixed background; the courts have adopted broadly similar methods and reasoning; and the outcomes show broadly similar trends.


1996 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farhat Ziadeh

AbstractDifferent legal systems have employed a variety of measures to insure the appearance of the defendant in court. The earliest conception of an action in Rome and in pre-Islamic Arabia was the voluntary appearance of both parties before a recognized or prestigious authority. Thus, early Roman law could not pass judgment against a defendant who failed to appear, either voluntarily or involuntarily. The idea that the court could give a judgment in the plaintiff's absence—the so-called judgment by default—took a long time to materialize in the West. Classical Islamic law requires that the defendant or his legal representative (wakīl) be present for a judgment to be given. This requirement is predicated on the assumption that the primary function of the judge is conciliation of the parties and not necessarily the vindication of rights. The law describes various measures that may be employed to force the defendant to appear in court. Failing that, it provides for the appointment of a legal representative for the defendant. Judgment by default was introduced into Muslim countries only in modern times under the influence of Western codes of procedure.


2000 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-71
Author(s):  
Joan Small ◽  
Evadne Grant

Equality occupies the first place in most written constitutions, but in South Africa, its importance is magnified both in terms of the text of the Constitution and in terms of the context in which that Constitution operates. The Bill of Rights is expected, in South Africa, to help bring about the transformation of the society. These expectations of transformation through the operation of the Bill of Rights are informing the development of the law in relation to equality and non-discrimination by the Constitutional Court. The concept of discrimination is uniquely defined in the South African Bill of Rights. The Courts are struggling to give legal effect to the terminology. The test developed by the Court to interpret the equality clause, it is submitted, is comprehensive and informed. But the application of the test is sometimes problematic. This paper addresses the evolving concepts of equality and discrimination in South Africa and discusses some of the difficulties with certain aspects of the test for discrimination, including the concepts of unfairness and human dignity, which have caused division among the judiciary.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-431
Author(s):  
Kasman Bakry ◽  
Zulfiah Sam ◽  
Jihan Vivianti Usman

This research aims to find out and understand Fikih Munakahat and the analysis of Law No. 1 of 1974 article 38-41 which discusses the breakup of marriage. This research uses a type of qualitative descriptive research, which focuses on the study of manuscripts and texts with a theological-normative approach and a juridical approach. The results showed that: First, the urgency of marriage in Islam that lasted until now is the marriage of al-Wiladah, i.e. a man came to the girl's parents to propose to her. Then he married her with his dowry; Second, the basis of marriage law in Indonesia at the level of application is contained in Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage and Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991 on compilation of Islamic law (KHI) applied in almost all marital problems, and the law is always used as the basis and back of every judge in providing legal interpretations and solutions to various problems of marriage law today; Third, the legal consequences due to the termination of marriage both in the perspective of Law No. 1 of 1974 in articles 38-41 and in the perspective of Fikih Munakahat will have an impact on; 1) children; 2) innate property; and 3) a living.


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