scholarly journals Productivity of the public employee of Legislative Decree 276 and CAS 1057 of the Municipalities of San Agustín de Cajas and Pilcomayo province of Huancayo

SCIÉNDO ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-77
Author(s):  
Aldo Abel Ramos Parra ◽  
Willian Armando Reyes Alva ◽  
Oscar Grimaldo Paita Vega
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helder Gusso

This article highlights the duty of the public employee to oppose any government policy that goes against constitutional principles and objectives. The defence of this position is made from an organizational analysis of the State. Theoretical contributions such as the understanding of State and Domination in M. Weber, Organization in D. Katz and R.L. Khan, and Control Agency in B.F. Skinner have been used. The analysis of contingencies that control the behavior of the public employee and the understanding of the notions of State and Organizations enable greater clarity about what constitutes the role of workers in the public sector. It also highlights the importance of existing mechanisms to reduce the imbalance in power relations between governors, servants and the population.


Author(s):  
Mirari ERDAIDE GABIOLA ◽  
Arantza GONZÁLEZ LÓPEZ

LABURPENA: Estatuko Aurrekontu Orokorren Legeak sektore publikoko herriadministrazio eta erakunde guztiei debekatu egiten die ekarpenik egitea enpleguko pentsio-planetan edo aseguru kolektiboko kontratuetan, erretiroagatiko estaldura jasotzen badute. Hain zuzen ere, debeku hori aztertzen da lan honetan. Azterketa Enplegatu Publikoaren Oinarrizko Estatutua eta EK-ko 149.1.13. nahiz 156. artikuluen inguruko doktrina konstituzionala oinarri hartuta egituratzen da, eta debeku haren konstituziokontrakotasuna ondorioztatzen du. Adibidez, Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoaren kasuan, debekuak Euskal Herriko Autonomia Estatutuko 10.4 artikulutik ondorioztatzen den berezko eskumen-esparru esklusiboan dauka eragina. RESUMEN: Este trabajo analiza la prohibición que impone la Ley de Presupuestos Generales del Estado a todas las Administraciones Públicas y entidades integrantes del sector público de realizar aportaciones a planes de pensiones de empleo o contratos de seguro colectivos que incluyan la cobertura de la contingencia de jubilación. El análisis se vertebra a partir del Estatuto Básico del Empleado Público y de la doctrina constitucional en torno a los artículos 149.1.13.ª CE y 156 CE, concluyendo en la inconstitucionalidad de aquella prohibición, que en la Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi incide en el ámbito competencial propio y exclusivo que deriva del artículo 10.4 del Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco. ABSTRACT: This work analyzes the prohibition imposed by the State Budget’s Act to every public administration and entity part of the public sector to contribute to pension plans or collective insurance policies that cover the retirement contingency. This analysis has as essential structure the Basic Statute of the Public Employee and the constitutional doctrine regarding articles 149.1.13 and 156 of the Constitution and it concludes with the unconstitutionality of that prohibition which in the Autonomous Community of Euskadi has an impact on the very own and exclusive powers that derive from article 10.4 of the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country.


2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2227-2246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Matsusaka

In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)


Author(s):  
Gordon Lafer

This chapter examines the legislative attacks on the public sector aimed at eliminating employee union rights and slashing public services. Corporate lobbies and their legislative allies saw the 2010 elections as an opportunity to restructure labor relations, political power, and the size of government. With no guarantee that their dominance would last into the future, the 2011–2012 legislatures were driven by an urgency to pursue ambitious reforms while it was politically feasible. The chapter analyzes the extent of this legislative offensive as well as its underlying motives and ultimate objectives. It also asks why large, private corporations would spend significant time, money, and energy fighting public employee unions in Wisconsin or Ohio, and whether public employees are to blame for state budget deficits. Finally, it discusses the political and economic impacts of antiunionism and who benefited from cutting public employee compensation and pensions.


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