Direct Democracy and Public Employees
2009 ◽
Vol 99
(5)
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pp. 2227-2246
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Keyword(s):
In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)
2011 ◽
Vol 14
(4)
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pp. 537-556
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Keyword(s):
1991 ◽
Vol 20
(4)
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pp. 449-455
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Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
1988 ◽
Vol 17
(3)
◽
pp. 253-260
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Keyword(s):
2014 ◽
Vol 3
(8)
◽
pp. 33-44
Keyword(s):