scholarly journals Why Defend Something I Don’t Agree with? Conflicts within the Commission and Legislative Amendments in Trilogues

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 40-51
Author(s):  
Thomas Laloux ◽  
Lara Panning
Keyword(s):  
Text Mining ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Legislative Proposal ◽  
Legislative Amendments

This article aims to examine the effect of intra-institutional conflicts in the European Commission on the extent of changes made to legislative proposals in trilogue negotiations. We develop and test three hypotheses related to how conflicts within the Commission, namely that intra-institutional disagreements during policy formulation (h1), and potential conflicts with previous (h2) or subsequent (h3) colleges of commissioners, increase the number of amendments to the Commission’s proposal adopted in trilogues. To test our hypotheses, we use a new dataset measuring the number of changes between Commission proposals and adopted legislation for 216 legislative acts negotiated between 2012 and 2019 by means of text-mining techniques. It is important to note that we control for differences between the Commission’s proposals and the co-legislators’ positions in order to distinguish between an effect on preferences anticipation and on the negotiations proper. Our results indicate that intra-institutional conflicts affect the Commission’s anticipation of the co-legislators’ positions. The effect on its behaviour in trilogues, that is, after the legislative proposal has been tabled, is less clear. Regarding the latter, only the number of Directorates-General involved is significantly linked with the number of amendments tabled. These findings suggest that while intra-institutional disagreements affect the Commission’s role in trilogues, the range of preferences is more important than the intensity of conflicts.

scholarly journals The European Committee of the Regions as a watchdog of the principle of subsidiarity

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-301
Author(s):  
Salvatore Fabio Nicolosi ◽  
Lisette Mustert
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
European Committee ◽  
Legislative Proposal ◽  
The Right ◽  
Committee Of The Regions ◽  
Regional Funds ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Eu

In a resolution adopted on 1 February 2018, the European Committee of the Regions noted that a legislative proposal of the European Commission concerning a Regulation that changes the rules governing the EU regional funds for 2014-2020 did not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Accordingly, the Committee considered challenging the legislative proposal before the Court of Justice if the proposal was formally agreed upon. Although at a later stage the European Commission decided to take into account the Committee’s argument and amended the proposal accordingly, such a context offers the chance to investigate more in detail the role of the Committee of the Regions in the legislative process of the EU and, more in particular, its role as a watchdog of the principle of subsidiarity. This paper aims to shed light on a rather neglected aspect of the EU constitutional practice, such as the potential of the Committee of the Regions to contribute to the legislative process, and answer the question of whether this Committee is the right body to guarantee compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.

“Think small first in the EU”? A Reality Check

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-96
Author(s):  
Typhaine Beaupérin
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Reality Check ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
The Eu

Despite recent efforts by the European Commission to improve the application of the SME test by its services, EUROCHAMBRES 2013 SME Test Benchmark reveals that the Commission is still, in the majority of the dossiers analysed, failing to ‘think small first’ and take into account the costs and benefits to smaller businesses in the preparation of legislative proposals.

NEW DEAL FOR CONSUMERS IN EUROPE?

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (XVIII) ◽  
pp. 111-127
Author(s):  
Anna Mokrysz-Olszyńska
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Public Consultation ◽  
New Order ◽  
Consumer Interest ◽  
Legislative Proposals

On 11 April 2018, the European Commission presented legislative proposals as the implementation of the project under the title “A New Deal for Consumers”. The Commission’s legislative package consists of related proposals for two directives. The first contains provisions enabling authorized entities representing the collective consumer interest to pursue claims through representative actions against infringements of Union law, in order to ensure that consumers have the tools to effectively exercise their rights and obtain compensation for the damage suffered; the second introduces changes to the four currently applicable consumer directives. Both Commission proposals are under way, taking into account broad public consultation. Do the Commission’s proposals mean a real breakthrough, as suggested by the title under which they are presented, or should they be seen only as the next step in the process of creating a new order for consumers?

scholarly journals The Recognition of Professional Qualifi cations in the European Union The Practice of Administration and European Courts – The Ski Instructor Example

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-115
Author(s):  
Stanisław Lipiec
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Recognition System ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Administrative Practices ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Cation Recognition

The case of the English ski instructor Simon Butler working in France is the best example of the malfunctioning of the professional-qualifi cationsrecognition system in Europe. The practice of European and national administration as well as the jurisprudence of the CJEU and French courts shows how important and complex the subject of qualifi cation recognition is. A review of administrative practices and an analysis of case law show the positive and negative sides of the EU’s qualifi cation recognition system. The European Commission is carrying out numerous activities aimed at improving said system. The latest solutions make the idea of qualifi cation without borders a reality. The most important task is to examine the changes and legislative proposals of the European Union, analyse the case of Simon Butler and present proposals for changes against the background of activities undertaken throughout the Union. They should be realised through legal research methods and non-reactive social methods.

scholarly journals One agenda-setter or many? The varying success of policy initiatives by individual Directorates-General of the European Commission 1994–2016

2020 ◽  
pp. 146511652096146
Author(s):  
Christian Rauh
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Systematic Research ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Initiatives ◽  
Agenda Setter ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Directorate General

Analyses of strategic agenda-setting in the European Union treat the European Commission as a unitary actor with perfect information. Yet, the constraints for correctly anticipating acceptable policies vary heavily across its individual Directorates-General. Do these internal rifts affect the Commission’s agenda-setting ability? This article tests corresponding expectations on the edit distances between 2237 Commission proposals and the adopted laws across 23 years. The quality of legislative anticipation indeed varies with the responsible Directorate-General. Legislative proposals are more likely to remain unchanged if they face less parliamentary involvement, are less complex, were drafted by an experienced Directorate-General, and were coordinated more seamlessly within the Commission. However, the uncovered variation also calls for more systematic research on the distribution of legislative capacities inside the Commission.

Advocacy, Interpretation, and Influence in the U.S. Congress

1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Smith
Keyword(s):  
National Education Association ◽  
Considerable Influence ◽  
National Education ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Legislative Proposal ◽  
Education Association ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
Basic Features ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Legislative Influence

This article examines the relationship between two variables: interpretations by members of Congress of the consequences of legislative proposals and the influence of those who advocate particular actions on the proposals. The article investigates how the legislative decisions of members depend on interpretations, how the arguments of advocates shape interpretations, and how the influence on interpretations translates into influence over patterns of congressional support expressed for a legislative proposal. The major thesis is that member interpretations and hence legislative influence are unstable, a result of basic features of human decision making in the congressional context. As a result, advocates are hypothesized to have considerable influence in maintaining and expanding the size of their congressional coalitions in some legislative situations, but not others. In particular, when faced with weakening amendments or motions, advocates are unable to prevent defections among their supporters. Evidence of the legislative influence of the National Education Association during the Ninety-fourth Congress is found to be consistent with these hypotheses.

scholarly journals Networks and Social Influence in European Legislative Politics

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1475-1498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Malang ◽  
Laurence Brandenberger ◽  
Philip Leifeld
Keyword(s):  
Social Influence ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Warning System ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Legislative Proposal ◽  
The Right

The Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the role of national parliaments in the European Union. It introduced an ‘early warning system’, granting parliamentary chambers the right to reject legislative proposals by the European Commission. Previous studies assumed independence between the decisions of parliaments to reject a legislative proposal. We apply recent advances in inferential network analysis and argue that parliamentary vetoes are better explained by conceptualizing parliaments’ veto actions as a temporal network. Network effects can be observed along the dimension of party families. Based on a new permutation approach, we find that parliaments with similar party majorities influence each other over the course of the decision period (‘social influence’), rather than basing their decisions independently on joint prior partisanship (‘selection’).

How to Win the Brussels Game? Explaining the European Parliament’s Success under the Co-Decision

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Kirpsza
Keyword(s):  
Logistic Regression ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Specific Factors ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Council Presidency ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
The Impact

Abstract: The purpose of the article is to identify the conditions that affect the success of the European Parliament’s amendments in the ordinary legislative procedure. In the first step, hypotheses were delineated predicting the impact of specific factors on the effectiveness of EP demands. Subsequently, they were verified using the logistic regression. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it applies the following negotiation techniques. First, it bundles several legislative proposals in one package. Second, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Third, it negotiates the legislative proposals in trilogues. Fourth, it is cohesive during negotiations. Fifth, it prolongs negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Sixth, it designates a rapporteur from a country acting at the same time as the Council Presidency. Seventh, it negotiates with the Council when the Presidency legislative workload is high.

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