scholarly journals How much a theory of law can tell us about the nature of morality: a response to Mark Greenberg’s How facts make law

Author(s):  
Kenneth Einar Himma

In his outstanding paper “How Facts Make Law,” Mark Greenberg argues for the antipositivist claim that descriptive facts about certain social practices are not the only necessary determinants of legal content; “value facts” – which he is committed to construing as moral facts – are another necessary determinant of legal content. In this essay, I argue that, construed as doing the work Greenberg believes it does in refuting positivism, his conclusion that legal content is not possible without value facts has certain implications about the nature of morality that no purely metaphysical considerations about the relationship between social practices and the content of social norms can plausibly have. In particular, Greenberg’s conclusion, together with the obvious (because extremely weak) truth that law is possible, seems to imply moral objectivism – a highly contested view in general ethical theorizing. I take this to be a reductio of his view, as it seems clear that no theory relying on general metaphysical claims about social practices can bear such weight.

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 383-390
Author(s):  
Lina Eriksson

Abstract Hindriks describes institutions as norm-governed social practices, and argue that his theory help bring together and complete earlier theories of institutions. In this comment on his paper, I argue that his argument would be even better if he clarified certain parts of his argument with regards to the nature of institutions and the relationship between institutions and social norms. I also argue that he should reconsider his claim that institutions (and social norms) exist in order to solve cooperation and coordination problems.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emad H. Atiq

Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, ForthcomingLegal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific — morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counterexamples. I articulate an ‘inclusive’ form of anti-positivism that is not just invulnerable to extensional challenge from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emad H Atiq

Legal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific—morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counter-examples. This form of “inclusive” anti-positivism is not just invulnerable to extensional challenges from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law.


Author(s):  
Вадим Леонидович Афанасьевский

В статье анализируется проблема взаимоотношений философии права и научной теории права. Рассматриваемая проблема стала особенно актуальной в российском образовательном пространстве в связи с введением после длительного перерыва в государственный образовательный стандарт магистратуры по юриспруденции учебной дисциплины «Философия права». Автор статьи в качестве базисного принимает тезис, согласно которому философия права, являясь сферой философской мысли, и теория права как область научного социогуманитарного знания представляют собой разные типы теоретического дискурса. Исходя из этого, в статье выстраивается теоретическая концепция, согласно которой задачей философии права как философского типа мышления является конструирование или экспликация онтологических, эпистемологических, аксиологических, феноменологических оснований для формирования и функционирования научных теоретико-правовых и историко-правовых построений. Для реализации поставленной в статье задачи подробно рассматриваются ключевые характеристики как теории философского типа, так и идеалов, норм и характеристик научного знания. Выявленное различие экстраполируется на взаимоотношение теории права как продукта научного творчества и философии права как конструкции, задающей базовые мировоззренческие смыслы. В качестве примера выработанных философией права и государства оснований научных теорий прогресса, государства, морали и права, автор приводит взгляды мыслителей западноевропейской философской классики: Т. Гоббса, Ж.-Ж. Руссо, И. Канта, Г.В.Ф. Гегеля. Именно их философские концепции предопределили образы теоретико- и историко-правовых учений XVIII, XIX, XX и даже начала XXI в. Таким образом, отношение философии права и теории права выстраивается по «вертикали»: от онтологического основания к возведению теоретико-правовых и историко-правовых научных построений. The article analyzes the problem of the relationship between the philosophy of law and the scientific theory of law. The problem under consideration has become especially urgent in the Russian educational space in connection with the introduction of the Philosophy of Law discipline master's degree in law after a long break. The author of the article takes as the basis the thesis that the philosophy of law, being the sphere of philosophical thought, and the theory of law as a field of scientific socio-humanitarian knowledge are different types of theoretical discourse. Based on this, the article builds a theoretical concept according to which the task of the philosophy of law as a philosophical type of thinking is the construction or explication of ontological, epistemological, axiological, phenomenological grounds for the formation and functioning of concrete scientific theoretical and legal and historical and legal constructions. To implement the task posed in the article, the key characteristics of both a theory of a philosophical type and ideals, norms and characteristics of scientific knowledge are examined in detail. The revealed difference is extrapolated to the relationship between the theory of law as a product of scientific creativity and the philosophy of law as a construction that sets basic philosophical meanings. As an example of the foundations of the scientific theories of progress, state, morality and law developed by the philosophy of law and the state, the author gives the views and thinkers of the West European philosophical classics T. Hobbes, J.-J. Russo, I. Kant, G.V.F. Hegel. It was their philosophical concepts that predetermined the images of theoretical and historical-legal doctrines of the XVIII, XIX, XX and even the beginning of the XXI centuries. Thus, the attitude of the philosophy of law and the theory of law is built along the «vertical»: from the ontological foundation to the construction of theoretical and historical and historical legal scientific constructions.


2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronda Roberts Callister ◽  
Barbara Gray ◽  
Donald E. Gibson ◽  
Maurice E. Schweitzer ◽  
Joo-Seng Tan

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 179-194
Author(s):  
Joanne Dono ◽  
Caroline Miller ◽  
Kerry Ettridge ◽  
Carlene Wilson

Abstract A systematic scoping review of anti-smoking mass media campaign literature provided opportunity to explore how social normative theories and constructs are used to influence smoking cessation. Synthesis of findings was constrained by significant heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the results indicate that a broader conceptualization of social norm is worthy of further exploration. Perceptions of what others think and do contributed in multiple ways to the relationship between anti-smoking messaging and quitting outcomes. Furthermore, integrating research on social norms, social identity and communication may improve understanding of why quitting intentions are enhanced in some circumstances but reactance and counter-arguing responses corresponding to lower quitting intentions occur in others. Integrating a broader theoretical understanding of normative influences into campaign development and evaluation may prove useful in demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach in behaviour change campaigns.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG KAMMERHOFER

AbstractHans Kelsen is known both as a legal theorist and as an international lawyer. This article shows that his theory of international law is an integral part of the Kelsenian Pure Theory of Law. Two areas of international law are analysed: first, Kelsen's coercive order paradigm and its relationship to the bellum iustum doctrine; second, the Kelsenian notion of the unity of all law vis-à-vis theories of the relationship of international and municipal law. In a second step, the results of Kelsenian general legal theory of the late period – as interpreted and developed by the present author – are reapplied to selected doctrines of international law. Thus is the coercive order paradigm resolved, the unity of law dissolved, and the UN Charter reinterpreted to show that the concretization of norms as positive international law cannot be unmade by a scholarship usurping the right to make law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-278
Author(s):  
TRISTAN J. ROGERS

AbstractWhat is the relationship between justice as an individual virtue and justice as an institutional virtue? The latter has been exhaustively explored by political philosophers, whereas the former remains underexplored in the literature on virtue ethics. This article defends the view that individual justice is logically prior to institutional justice, and argues that this view requires a conception of individual justice I call ‘justice as lawfulness’. The resulting view consists of three claims. First, just institutions are composed of the relations between just persons. Second, the just person has a disposition to act in accordance with the legal and social norms (collectively, thenomoi) of the existing political tradition. Third, departures from thenomoirequire that the just person act with practical wisdom to reform thenomoiaccording to an implicit standard of justice in the political tradition.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (03) ◽  
pp. 1113-1129
Author(s):  
Kali Murray

This essay considers what tools should be used to study the legal history of intellectual property. I identify three historiographical strategies: narration, contest, and formation. Narration identifies the diverse “narrative structures” that shape the field of intellectual property history. Contest highlights how the inherent instability of intellectual property as a legal concept prompts recurrent debates over its meaning. Formation recognizes how intellectual property historians can offer insight into broader legal history debates over how to consider the relationship between informal social practices and formalized legal mechanisms. I consider Kara W. Swanson's Banking on the Body: The Market in Blood, Milk and Sperm in Modern America (2014) in light of these historiographical strategies and conclude that Swanson's book guides us to a new conversation in the legal history of intellectual property law.


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