scholarly journals Glosa do uchwały Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 19 października 2018 r. (III CZP 45/18). Surogacja składników majątków osobistych małżonków w ustroju wspólności ustawowej

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 267
Author(s):  
Mirosław Nazar
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Personal Property ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Marital Property ◽  
Joint Ownership ◽  
Joint Property ◽  
Property Regime

<p>The gloss contains remarks on the resolution of the Supreme Court of 19 October 2018 (III CZP 45/18), according to which an item acquired under the joint marital property regime and financed partly from the funds derived from the personal property of one of the spouses and from their joint property becomes the personal property of the spouse concerned and the joint property of the spouses in the proportion corresponding to the proportion of the funds allocated from those assets for its acquisition, unless the funds from the personal property or the joint property transferred for the acquisition of the property was an expense towards the joint or personal property, respectively. The gloss states that the rules of civil law concerning the formation of fractional joint ownership and the regulation of the joint marital property do not justify the thesis supported in the commented resolution. The conclusion of the gloss contains a proposal for interpretation that is different from that put forward in the resolution of the Supreme Court. It must be assumed that an asset acquired by both spouses or by one of them during the period of their joint marital property in exchange for funds derived from the joint property and personal property of one of the spouses becomes <em>ex lege</em> a component of the joint property of the spouses, unless, under the agreement of the spouses, it is acquired as a fractional joint property, one share of which goes to the joint property and the other to the personal property.</p>

scholarly journals Juridical Analysis of the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number: 69 / PUU-XIII / 2015 on Article 29 Law Number 1 of 1974 Concerning Marriage

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 720
Author(s):  
Yusri Yusri ◽  
Yaswirman Yaswirman ◽  
Neneng Oktarina
Keyword(s):  
Decision Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Married Couples ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Personal Property ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Shared Property ◽  
Legal Marriage ◽  
Joint Property

Indonesia as a legal state, the presence of law in a country aims to guarantee life to protect the interests of citizens. In the Indonesian government system there are several branches of power, namely the legislative, executive and judiciary branches, the judicial power branches are the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court's authority is contained in Article 24 C paragraph (1) and (2) adjudicating at the first and last level whose decision is final to review the Law on the Constitution. Marriage agreement is a form of agreement that regulates assets in marriage and others. A marriage agreement is also an agreement which can affect other regulations. So with the regulation of the marriage agreement in Article 29 paragraph (1) prior to the lawsuit for judicial review to the Constitutional Court stating that the marriage agreement was made at the time, and before the marriage took place, this is what prevents many married couples from different citizens who previously were not have a marriage agreement while their interests require a marriage agreement. The decision analysis can be concluded that the Urgency of the marriage agreement in its decision No.69 / PUU-XIII / 2015 states that the importance of the marriage agreement is related to the position of shared property so that there is a separation of husband's assets with the wife's assets both regarding their respective belongings and the assets that belong to each other obtained during the marriage known as joint property. Whereas the assets obtained before their marriage period together are known as inheritance or personal property obtained after the marriage period which is usually referred to as acquisition assets. Due to the legal marriage agreement before MK Decision Number 69 / PUU-XIII / 2015, Indonesian citizens who carry out marriages mixed and does not make a marriage agreement, the Indonesian citizen may not have immovable property in the form of ownership or building rights.

ASSERTING CRIMINAL LAW CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE TREASURY FROM CONVICTS BOUND BY THE JOINT MARITAL PROPERTY REGIME

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (XVIII) ◽  
pp. 245-258
Author(s):  
Andrzej Pokora
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Penal Code ◽  
Property Relations ◽  
Personal Property ◽  
Marital Property ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Joint Property ◽  
Property Regime

The article covers the terms and scope of liability of convicts from their personal property and from the joint property when they are bound by the joint marital property regime. In the first place, problems of a convict’s liability from the personal property is discussed. Then, the possibility of the convict’s liability from the joint property is presented. Finally, the article discusses problems of limiting or excluding the liability under art . 28 of the Executive Penal Code and the impact of a change in property relations between spouses on the conduct of execution of criminal law liabilities.

scholarly journals Glosa do uchwały Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 19 października 2018 roku, sygn. III CZP 45/18

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 197-206
Author(s):  
Damian Dobosz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
District Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Marital Property ◽  
Separate Property ◽  
Joint Property

Glosowana uchwała Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 19 października 2018 r. sygn. III CZP 45/18 rozstrzyga zagadnienie prawne przedstawione przez sąd okręgowy, które brzmiało następująco: Czy rzecz nabyta w trakcie trwania małżeństwa, w którym obowiązuje reżim ustawowej wspólności majątkowej, w części ze środków pochodzących z majątku odrębnego jednego z małżonków, a w części z ich majątku wspólnego wchodzi w całości do majątku wspólnego, czy też wchodzi do tego z majątków, z którego pochodzi większa część środków na nabycie rzeczy, czy też wchodzi do majątku odrębnego jednego z małżonków i jednocześnie do ich majątku wspólnego w udziałach odpowiadających stosunkowi środków przeznaczonych z tych majątków na nabycie rzeczy? W glosie przedstawiony został stan faktyczny ustalony przez sąd okręgowy i przedstawione doktrynalne ujęcia majątku osobiste i wspólnego małżonków. Następnie zaprezentowano najważniejsze tezy z uchwały Sądu Najwyższego oraz konsekwencje prawne rozstrzygnięcia. Gloss of the resolution of the Supreme Court from the 19 of October 2018The glossed resolution of the Supreme Court from 19 October 2018, signature III CZP 45/18 settles the issue presented by the District Court which referred to the problem of whether an item acquired during a joint property marriage partly from funds from the separate property of one of the spouses and partly from the joint property is wholly included in joint property, or is included in the property which includes more funds for gaining the item, or is included in separate property of one of the spouses and at the same time in joint marital property in shares equivalent to the proportion of funds allocated from these properties for acquiring the item? The gloss presents the factual situation stated by the District Court and the outlooks presented by the doctrine referring to the perception of separate and joint marital property. Then, the most vital issues from the Supreme Court resolution and the consequences of this resolution are presented.

scholarly journals The Settlement Principles and Effectiveness of Divorce by Mediation of Islamic Civil Perspective: A Critical Review of The Supreme Court Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-188
Author(s):  
Abdullah Taufik
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Cost Of Living ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Procedure Code ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Religious Courts ◽  
Joint Property

Mediation of divorce is expected to be able to suppress the settlement of the case peacefully. In principle, based on the Elucidation of Law Number 1 of 19 74 concerning Marriage, the purpose of marriage is to form a happy and eternal family. Therefore it is urgent to find mediation pillars in settlement of divorce cases. To find the idea in response to these problems, three approaches: 1) laws and regulations, by examining them that relate with divorce settlement through mediation in religious courts; Supreme Court Regulation Numb. 1 of 2016, Civil Procedure Code. 2) Conceptual approach, from the view of experts/scholars, is used to find ideas by building concepts and arguments according to the issues to be examined to find the efficiency in the implementation of mediation. 3) Philosophy, studying literacy related to the theme of the study to capture philosophical content in finding the pillars of mediation in the study of Islamic civil law. The findings in this study are the pillars of mediation whose relevance to divorce disputes should be stated are: 1) Essence of Deliberation, to reach an agreement. 2) The essence of mutual forgiveness, to end the dispute. 3) The essence of respecting the rights of others, of avoiding the nature of egoism. 4) The essence of justice, giving equal opportunity to speak to each other so that both parties get the same rights. While the efficiency of the mediation implementation in settlement of divorce can be done by mediating: 1) Regarding the care and education of children, 2) cost of living of ex-wife, 3) guarantee for the maintenance of the joint property after the termination of a marriage.Mediasi diharapkan mampu menekan penyelesaian perkara penyelesaian secara damai. Pada prinsipnya berdasarkan Penjelasan Undang-Undang Nomor 1 tahun 19 74 tentang Perkawinan tujuan perkawinan adalah untuk membentuk keluarga yang bahagia dan kekal. Penurunan tingkat perceraian perlu ditekan, maka dari itu sangat mendesak untuk mencari pilar-pilar mediasi dalam penyelesaian perkara perceraian. Untuk menemukan ide dalam menanggapi permasalahan tersebut digunakan tiga pendekatan: 1) Peraturan perundang undangan, yang berhubungan dengan penyelesaian perceraian melalui mediasi di pengadilan agama; Peraturan Mahkamah Agung No. 1 tahun 2016, Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Acara Perdata. 2) Pendekatan konseptual, dari pandangan para ahli / ulama digunakan untuk menemukan ide dengan membangun konsep dan argumen sesuai dengan masalah yang akan dikaji sehingga dapat ditemukan efektifitas dalam pelaksanaan mediasi 3) Filsafat, mempelajari literasi yang berkaitan dengan tema kajian untuk menangkap muatan filosofis dalam menemukan pilar-pilar mediasi dalam kajian hukum perdata Islam. Temuan dalam penelitian ini adalah pilar-pilar mediasi yang relevansinya dengan perselisihan perceraian yang harus dikemukakan adalah: 1) Inti Musyawarah, untuk mencapai kesepakatan. 2) Inti saling memaafkan, untuk mengakhiri perselisihan. 3) Esensi menghargai hak orang lain, menghindari sifat egoisme. 4) Esensi keadilan, memberikan kesempatan yang sama untuk saling berbicara, sehingga kedua belah pihak mendapatkan hak yang sama. Sedangkan efektifitas pelaksanaan mediasi dalam penyelesaian perceraian dapat dilakukan dengan memediasi: 1) Seputar pengasuhan dan pendidikan anak, 2) biaya hidup mantan istri, 3) jaminan pemeliharaan harta bersama pasca pemutusan hubungan perkawinan.

scholarly journals Du Maintien des Appels a la Cour Supreme du Canada en Matiere de Droit Civil

1969 ◽  
pp. 144
Author(s):  
Gérald A. Beaudoin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Le Canada ◽  
Article Analyse

L'auteur de cet article analyse la question du maintien des appels en droit civil la Cour Supr&me. Dans le contexte fSdSral canadien, il se declare favorable au maintien de ces appels. II trouve plus d'avantages que de disavantages. Le Canada ayant deux systdmes de droit privi, il convient que le plus haut tribunal du pays se prononce en ces matidres il s'agit d'une richesse pour notre pays. 11 moyen d'assurer la purete" de Vun et de Vautre systdme. The author of this article analyses the question of the retention of the civil law appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada. He is in favour of such appeals in our federation. We have in Canada two private law systemss one inspired from the Common Law of England and the other from "le droit civil" of France. It is appro priate for our highest tribunal to render judgments in both systems. This is great advantage for our country. Steps may be taken to assure the purity of both systems.

ASAS TERBUKA UNTUK UMUM DAN KEHADIRAN FISIK PARA PIHAK DALAM SIDANG DI PENGADILAN NEGERI PASCA PERATURAN MAHKAMAH AGUNG NOMOR 1 TAHUN 2019

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 237-250
Author(s):  
Bernadette M Waluyo
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Basic Principle ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
District Court ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Court Proceedings

The Indonesian Supreme Court, in response to the information era, modernizes the civil procedural rules at the district court level.  This is done by issuing Supreme Court Regulation no. 1 of 2019 re. Administration of Justice at Civil Law Courts and Electronic-Court Proceedings. Undoubtedly, modernization of existing rules on the administration of justice is much needed.  On the other hand, these changes may violate a number of procedural civil law principles.  The author argues, from a civil procedural law perspective, that the above Supreme Court regulation violates the basic principle of transparency of court proceedings and physical attendance at court proceedings. 

A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Eastern Cape ◽  
High Court ◽  
Nelson Mandela ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

O ENSINO RELIGIOSO EM QUESTÃO

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (21) ◽  
pp. 459
Author(s):  
Mauro Rocha Baptista
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Religious Education ◽  
Common Core ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
National Curriculum ◽  
The Other ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common

Neste artigo analisamos a relação do Ensino Religioso com a sua evolução ao longo do contexto recente do Brasil para compreender a posição do Supremo Tribunal Federal ao considerar a possibilidade do Ensino Religioso confessional. Inicialmente apresentaremos a perspectiva legislativa criada com a constituição de 1988 e seus desdobramentos nas indicações curriculares. Neste contexto é frisado a intenção de incluir o Ensino Religioso na Base Nacional Curricular Comum, o que acabou não acontecendo. A tendência manifesta nas duas primeiras versões da BNCC era de um Ensino Religioso não-confessional. Uma tendência que demarcava a função do Ensino Religioso em debater a religião, mas que não permitia o direcionamento por uma vertente religioso qualquer. Esta posição se mostrava uma evolução da primeira perspectiva histórica mais associada à catequese confessional. Assim como também ultrapassava a interpretação posterior de um ecumenismo interconfessional, que mantinha a superioridade do cristianismo ante as demais religiões. Sendo assim, neste artigo, adotaremos o argumento de que a decisão do STF, de seis votos contra cinco, acaba retrocedendo ante o que nos parecia um caminho muito mais frutífero.Palavras-chave: Ensino Religioso. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Confessional. Interconfessional. Não-confessional.Abstract: On this article, we analyze the relation between Religious education and its evolution along the currently Brazilian context in order to understand the position of the Supreme Court in considering the possibility of a confessional Religious education. Firstly, we are going to present the legislative perspective created with the 1988 Federal Constitution and its impacts in the curricular lines. On this context it was highlighted the intention to include the Religious Education on the Common Core National Curriculum (CCNC), which did not really happened. The tendency manifested in the first two versions of the CCNC was of a non-confessional Religious Education. A tendency that delineated the function of the Religious Education as debating religion, but not giving direction on any religious side. This position was an evolution of the first historical perspective more associated to the confessional catechesis. It also went beyond the former interpretation of an inter-confessional ecumenism, which kept the superiority of the Christianity over the other religions. As such, in this paper we adopt the argument that the decision of the Supreme Court, of six votes against five, is a reversal of what seemed to be a much more productive path on the Religious Education.Keywords: Religious Education. Brazilian Supreme Court. Confessional. Inter-confessional. Non- confessional.Enviado: 23-01-2018 - Aprovado e publicado: 12-2018

scholarly journals The Limits of Arbitration Law in Addressing Cultural Diversity: The Example of Ismaili Arbitration in the United Kingdom

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
Sandrine Brachotte
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Cultural Studies ◽  
Cultural Diversity ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The Other ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Arbitration Clause ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Employment Equality

This article studies religious arbitration from the perspective of global legal pluralism, which embraces both normative plurality and cultural diversity. In this context, the article considers that UK arbitration law regulates both commercial and religious arbitration while relying on a monist conception of arbitration. It further identifies two intertwined issues regarding cultural diversity, which find their source in this monist conception. Firstly, through the study of Jivraj v. Hashwani ([2011] UKSC 40), this article shows that the governance of religious arbitration may generate a conflict between arbitration law and equality law, the avoidance of which can require sacrificing the objectives of one or the other branch of law. The Jivraj case concerned an Ismaili arbitration clause, requiring that all arbitrators be Ismaili—a clause valid under arbitration law but potentially not under employment-equality law. To avoid such conflict, the Supreme Court reduced the scope of employment-equality law, thereby excluding self-employed persons. Secondly, based on cultural studies of law, this article shows that the conception of arbitration underlying UK arbitration law is ill-suited to make sense of Ismaili arbitration. In view of these two issues, this article argues that UK arbitration law acknowledges normative multiplicity but fails to embrace the cultural diversity entangled therewith.

The Supreme Court, Ideology, and the Decision to Cite or Borrow from Amicus Curiae Briefs

2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110321
Author(s):  
Kayla S. Canelo
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Extreme Groups ◽  
Insight Into

Scholars have sought to understand the dual characterization of Supreme Court justices as both legal and political actors. One way to further uncover this complexity is to assess how the justices engage with the interest groups that file amicus curiae or “friend-of-the-Court” briefs. Scholars have revealed that the justices often “borrow language” from these briefs in their opinions. However, much less often, they cite the amici. These two uses are distinct in that one is revealed to the reader while the other is not. So which interest groups do the justices decide to cite and which do they borrow language from? I find the justices borrow more language from ideologically similar interests, but that ideology plays a less central role in the decision to cite. Specifically, I find that the justices are less likely to cite briefs filed by ideologically overt interests, but this only extends to the most ideologically “extreme” groups. Further, the justices are not more likely to cite briefs filed by interests that are ideologically similar to their own preferences. These findings provide insight into how the justices balance policy and legitimacy goals.

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