scholarly journals Notas sobre el silogismo práctico en Aristóteles

1988 ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Salvador Rus Rufino ◽  
María Asunción Sánchez Manzano
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
The Other ◽  
Practical Syllogism ◽  
The Mind

<p>En el trabajo se hace un estudio del significado del problema del silogismo práctico en la Obra de Aristóteles, considerando lo siguiente:</p><p>a) Las teorías modernas sobre el tema. No se citan las obras, sólo en la nota primera se hace referencia a los autores que han estudiado la cuestión.</p><p>b) La interpretación que se puede hacer del silogismo práctico desde la perspectiva de los tratados de Filosofía Práctica más que desde el Organon o la Metafísica, que serían la fundamentación teórica del problema.</p><p>c) Se concluye que la lógica o la filosofía teorética es insuficiente o no es el único instrumento para analizar en profundidad el problema que se plantea.</p><p>There is very little reason to foist a special practical syllogism on Aristotle. Rather than drawing a contrast in the logic of reasoning, we try to draw out the parallels and the distinctions Aristotle's points to between the processes of theoretical and practical reasoning.</p><p>These processes are similar in that they begin with certain sentences which the mind puts together in some way such that some conclusion follows. In one case the conclusion of the process is a sentence which the mind affirms, in the other an action which the man commits unless he is prevented by some other consideration or by external necessity.</p><p>Our paper will also bring out features relevant to Aristotle's simile of deliberation being like analysis in geometry</p>

Behavioral flexibility in Belief-Desire- Intention (BDI) architectures

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 343-377
Author(s):  
Adel Saadi ◽  
Ramdane Maamri ◽  
Zaidi Sahnoun
Keyword(s):  
Critical Review ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Behavioral Flexibility ◽  
The Other ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
Simple Experiment ◽  
Bdi Agents ◽  
Popular Approach ◽  
Other Hand

The Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model is a popular approach to design flexible agents. The key ingredient of BDI model, that contributed to concretize behavioral flexibility, is the inclusion of the practical reasoning. On the other hand, researchers signaled some missing flexibility’s ingredient, in BDI model, essentially the lack of learning. Therefore, an extensive research was conducted in order to extend BDI agents with learning. Although this latter body of research is important, the key contribution of BDI model, i.e., practical reasoning, did not receive a sufficient attention. For instance, for performance reasons, some of the concepts included in the BDI model are neglected by BDI architectures. Neglecting these concepts was criticized by some researchers, as the ability of the agent to reason will be limited, which eventually leads to a more or less flexible reasoning, depending on the concepts explicitly included. The current paper aims to stimulate the researchers to re-explore the concretization of practical reasoning in BDI architectures. Concretely, this paper aims to stimulate a critical review of BDI architectures regarding the flexibility, inherent from the practical reasoning, in the context of single agents, situated in an environment which is not associated with uncertainty. Based on this review, we sketch a new orientation and some suggested improvements for the design of BDI agents. Finally, a simple experiment on a specific case study is carried out to evaluate some suggested improvements, namely the contribution of the agent’s “well-informedness” in the enhancement of the behavioral flexibility.

scholarly journals I. The Croonian Lecture.—On the theory of the vertebrate skull

1859 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 381-457 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Biological Science ◽  
The Other ◽  
Small Space ◽  
Half Century ◽  
Organic Structure ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Articles Of Faith ◽  
The Mind

The necessity of discussing so great a subject as the Theory of the Vertebrate Skull in the small space of time allotted by custom to a lecture, has its advantages as well as its drawbacks. As, on the present occasion, I shall suffer greatly from the disadvantages of the limitation, I will, with your permission, avail myself to the uttermost of its benefits. It will be necessary for me to assume much that I would rather demonstrate, to suppose known much that I would rather set forth and explain at length; but on the other hand, I may consider myself excused from entering largely either into the history of the subject, or into lengthy and controversial criticisms upon the views which are, or have been, held by others. The biological science of the last half-century is honourably distinguished from that of preceding epochs, by the constantly increasing prominence of the idea, that a community of plan is discernible amidst the manifold diversities of organic structure. That there is nothing really aberrant in nature; that the most widely different organisms are connected by a hidden bond; that an apparently new and isolated structure will prove, when its characters are thoroughly sifted, to be only a modification of something which existed before,—are propositions which are gradually assuming the position of articles of faith in the mind of the investigators of animated nature, and are directly, or by implication, admitted among the axioms of natural history.

Hume on Necessary Causal Connections

Philosophy ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 66 (258) ◽  
pp. 517-521
Author(s):  
Katherin A. Rogers
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cause And Effect ◽  
Causal Connections ◽  
Repeated Observation ◽  
The Mind

According to David Hume our idea of a necessary connection between what we call cause and effect is produced when repeated observation of the conjunction of two events determines the mind to consider one upon the appearance of the other. No matter how we interpret Hume's theory of causation this explanation of the genesis of the idea of necessity is fraught with difficulty. I hope to show, looking at the three major interpretations of Hume's causal theory, that his account is contradictory, plainly wrong, or (at best) inherently impossible to verify.

“Time is the Mind of Space”

Philosophy ◽  
1950 ◽  
Vol 25 (94) ◽  
pp. 225-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothy Emmet
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
The Mind

It is a sobering experience to be giving my first Sir Samuel Hall Oration in the line of succession of Samuel Alexander. Some of his Sir Samuel Hall Orations have been published in his book on Beauty and the Other Forms of Value and the Philosophical and Literary Pieces, and they must indeed have been a joy to his audiences. I think it is fitting that I should devote this first lecture to Samuel Alexander, taking one of the central ideas of his philosophy and considering it. If some of what I have to say is critical, I think he would have thought that was all in order. “Pitch into me,” he used to say. After all, the best tribute one can pay to a philosopher is to try to go on with one's own thinking helped by the stimulus of his ideas, and often not least helped by finding oneself impelled to criticize them.

scholarly journals Demons of the mind: The ‘psy’ sciences and film in the long 1960s

2021 ◽  
pp. 095269512110285
Author(s):  
Tim Snelson ◽  
William R. Macauley
Keyword(s):  
Child Development ◽  
Science Fiction ◽  
The Other ◽  
Research Centre ◽  
Film Culture ◽  
Radical Feminist ◽  
Critical Engagement ◽  
The Sixties ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Mind

This introduction provides context for a collection of articles that came out of a research symposium held at the Science Museum's Dana Research Centre in 2018 for the ‘ Demons of Mind: the Interactions of the ‘Psy’ Sciences and Cinema in the Sixties' project. Across a range of events and research outputs, Demons of the Mind sought to map the multifarious interventions and influences of the ‘psy’ sciences (psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis) on film culture in the long 1960s. The articles that follow discuss, in order: critical engagement with theories of child development in 1960s British science fiction; the ‘horrors’ of contemporary psychiatry and neuroscience portrayed in the Hollywood blockbuster The Exorcist (1973); British social realist filmmakers' alliances with proponents of ‘anti-psychiatry’; experimental filmmaker Jane Arden's coalescence of radical psychiatry and radical feminist techniques in her ‘psychodrama’ The Other Side of the Underneath (1973); and the deployment of film technologies by ‘psy’ professionals during the post-war period to capture and interpret mother-infant interaction.

The Evolution of the Colour Sense

1901 ◽  
Vol 47 (199) ◽  
pp. 678-679
Author(s):  
F. W. Edridge-Green
Keyword(s):  
Nerve Impulse ◽  
The Other ◽  
Physiological Basis ◽  
Black And White ◽  
Normal Distance ◽  
Colour Sense ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Colour Blindness ◽  
The Mind

All the facts which can be gathered from the study of museums or literature point to the conclusion that the sense of light was developed first, then the sense of colour. The tendency has been to regard colour-blindness as “chromic myopia;” but this is not correct unless there is a defective perception of light as well, as shown by the cases which I have recorded. A man may be able to see light of all colours at twice the normal distance, and yet be colour-blind. I specially wish to emphasise the fact that there is no definite relation between light and colour. When light falls upon the eye it sets up a nerve impulse, which is conveyed to the brain. In the impulse itself we have the physiological basis of light, and in the quality of the impulse the physiological basis of colour. My contention is that these two factors are perceived by two entirely different sets of cerebral cells, those devoted to the perception of colour being developed at a later period than those conveying to the mind the sensation of light. All the evidence which can be obtained shows that all objects were first seen as in a photograph, that is, in different degrees of black and white. In the evolution of the colour sense those waves which differ most physically, namely, red and violet, were first recognised as different, the remainder of the spectrum appearing grey. Homer's colour vision was of this class, which represents the degree just preceding total colour-blindness. I have recorded a case of this kind of a man who was colour-blind with one eye, and who was therefore able to tell me exactly how objects appeared with this eye. He said that the spectrum appeared nearly all grey, but with a tinge of red at one end and a tinge of violet at the other; he could see very much better with the colour-blind eye than with the other.

scholarly journals Evolution in the Brain, Evolution in the Mind: The Hierarchical Brain and the Interface between Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-377
Author(s):  
Leonardo Niro Nascimento
Keyword(s):  
Brain Evolution ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Source ◽  
Evolutionary Models ◽  
Anatomy And Physiology ◽  
Psychodynamically Oriented ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Shed Light

This article first aims to demonstrate the different ways the work of the English neurologist John Hughlings Jackson influenced Freud. It argues that these can be summarized in six points. It is further argued that the framework proposed by Jackson continued to be pursued by twentieth-century neuroscientists such as Papez, MacLean and Panksepp in terms of tripartite hierarchical evolutionary models. Finally, the account presented here aims to shed light on the analogies encountered by psychodynamically oriented neuroscientists, between contemporary accounts of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system on the one hand, and Freudian models of the mind on the other. These parallels, I will suggest, are not coincidental. They have a historical underpinning, as both accounts most likely originate from a common source: John Hughlings Jackson's tripartite evolutionary hierarchical view of the brain.

scholarly journals Solidification of the Sense of Eminency by Distraction of Light and Shadow at Sheikh Lotfollah Mosque

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (Special-Issue1) ◽  
pp. 208-214
Author(s):  
Moeid Farsa ◽  
Mahdiye Jahri ◽  
Mehdi Alirezai
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Natural Light ◽  
Present Survey ◽  
Traditional Architecture ◽  
Physical Presence ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Light And Shadow

Architecture and light are to that extent dependent on each other which body and spirits are.One for living and the other for physical presence in this world needs the other and while light is flown on the body of the space both two perceptible worlds become “ existed “.Since long ago, bright and shimmering materials which remind something living in the mind of individual were respectable and adorable. Being aware of the process of exploitation of sunlight is of importance as much as the process of materials formation or different fundamental forms of construction in order to design. Almost in all religions, light is the symbol of Devine wisdom and the Essene of all beneficence and purities and mobility from darkness to light, was considered as the main objective. Islamic Mosques which are ornamented with light are perfectly able to transmit this divine and moral sense. In such spaces which are lighten up with a shimmering light and by observance of the imprecise shadows of substances and masses, individual starts to complete the pictures in his mind and by such an activity gets in to an ecstasy and as a result a feeling of getting close to the source of existence and reality wakens up inner inside him. The present survey by depending on descriptive-analytic methods, studies light in Islamic and traditional architecture. This paper by case study of Sheikh Lotfollah Mosque, aims to find out whether the presence of light and specifically natural light in architecture might have further meaning rather than brightness, and whether accessing an accurate pattern of application of light is possible or there is basically no compulsion in it ?

scholarly journals To write or not to write: censorship in "The Woman in the Photo" by Tia Șerbănescu and "A Censor’s Notebook" by Liliana Corobca

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-27
Author(s):  
Monica Manolachi
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Literary Texts ◽  
Psychological Process ◽  
Production Of Knowledge ◽  
Mise En Abyme ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Compare And Contrast

Censorship as a literary subject has sometimes been necessary in times of change, as it may show how the flaws in power relations influence, sometimes very dramatically, the access to and the production of knowledge. The Woman in the Photo: a Diary, 1987-1989 by Tia Șerbănescu and A Censor’s Notebook by Liliana Corobca are two books that deal with the issue of censorship in the 1980s (the former) and the 1970s (the latter). Both writers tackle the problem from inside the ruling system, aiming at authenticity in different ways. On the one hand, instead of writing a novel, Tia Șerbănescu kept a diary in which she contemplated the oppression and the corruption of the time and their consequences on the freedom of thought, of expression and of speech. She thoroughly described what she felt and thought about her relatives, friends and other people she met, about books and their authors, in a time when keeping a diary was hard and often perilous. On the other hand, using the technique of the mise en abyme, Liliana Corobca begins from a fictitious exchange of emails to eventually enter and explore the mind of a censor and reveal what she thought and felt about the system, her co-workers, her boss, the books she proofread, their authors and her own identity. Detailed examinations and performances of the relationship between writing and censorship, the two novels provide engaging, often tragi-comical, insights into the psychological process of producing literary texts. The intention of this article is to compare and contrast the two author’s perspectives on the act of writing and some of its functions from four points of view: literary, cultural, social and political.

scholarly journals Narration as attraction. Mind-game films and postclassical spectacles

Panoptikum ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 109-129
Author(s):  
Barbara Szczekała
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Stimulation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Alternative Framework ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Theoretical Proposal

The article is a theoretical proposal which aims to create an alternative framework for mapping postclassical cinema. This framework is based on establishing various modes of relations between narration and spectacle, especially those represented by mind-game films and post-plot films. Instead of considering narration and spectacle as opposition, I suggest redescribing their complementary dynamics. I argue that there is visible feedback between mind-game films and the cinema of digital attractions, which I see as complementary processes of making “spectacular mind games” and “mind-gaming the spectacles”. The article contains an analysis of similar types of cinematic experiences delivered by “narration” and “attractions” and indicates the mutual influences between these two phenomena. Both narration and attraction may bring similar, affective sensations: the notion of shock and dissonance, discomfort, astonishment, kinesthetic impulse or cognitive stimulation. As for the article’s conclusion: postclassical cinema variously reshapes the distribution of narration and attraction. Mind-game films are becoming cinematic spectacles. On the other hand, more and more “post-plot” blockbusters are introducing the “mind-gaming the spectacle” strategy, and are engaging viewers with “cognitive” attractions as well.

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