scholarly journals The Changes of Electoral Systems for the Korean National Assembly and Political Effects: Focused on Electoral District Structure and Proportional Representation System

2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-288
Author(s):  
Seung-Gook Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Representation System ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Electoral District ◽  
Political Effects

Electoral Systems and the Substantive Representation of Marginalized Groups: Evidence from Women’s Issue Bills in South Korea

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110282
Author(s):  
Yesola Kweon ◽  
Josh M. Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Substantive Representation ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Representation Of Women ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
The Relationship

How do electoral rules shape the substantive representation of traditionally underrepresented groups? Using an original dataset of introduced and passed bills in the Korean National Assembly, which has both single-member districts and proportional representation, we examine the extent to which institutions condition the relationship between lawmaker gender and the substantive representation of women. While women lawmakers engage in higher levels of substantive representation of women, proportional representation allows both women and men to introduce more women’s issue bills than their counterparts elected through single-member districts. Furthermore, legislators elected through proportional representation are more effective at achieving passage of women’s issue legislation when compared with those elected in single-member districts, and this effect is especially pronounced for men. Our findings show that electoral systems matter for the representation of marginalized groups and that proportional representation systems allow both female and male politicians to increase their substantive representation of women.

A House Divided

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Thames
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Representation Election ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Limited Evidence ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Party Discipline ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Empirical Results

Mixed-member electoral systems embrace two views of representation by electing some legislators in single-member district elections and others in a proportional representation election. This can potentially create a “mandate divide” in legislatures, because single-member district legislators have an incentive to embrace parochial issues and proportional representation legislators have an incentive to center on national issues. Previous studies of this question have only found limited evidence of its existence. The author argues that the level of party system institutionalization will fundamentally determine whether a mandate divide will exist in a mixed-member legislature. Using roll-call voting data from the Hungarian National Assembly, the Russian Duma, and the Ukrainian Rada, the author analyzes patterns of party discipline in each legislature. The empirical results show that a mandate divide only existed in the legislature with the most weakly institutionalized party system, the Russian Duma.

Did They Write Back? A Mandate Divide in Response to Constituent Casework in Devolved Bodies

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 522-541
Author(s):  
Alex Parsons ◽  
Rebecca Rumbul
Keyword(s):  
Response Rate ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
The Public ◽  
Scottish Parliament ◽  
The Uk

Abstract Three devolved bodies in the UK (the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the London Assembly) use Multi Member Proportional Representation electoral systems. These bodies have two groups of representatives, regional and constituency, elected through different methods. Using a survey of members of the public who contacted their representative, constituency representatives are shown to have a higher response rate across all three bodies, and this effect is isolatable from the role of being a government party. In Scotland, this effect is demonstrable when comparing the behaviour of the same people holding different roles, suggesting that individuals adapt their behaviour to the expectations of the role.

The Electoral System as a Factor in Striking a Balance between Governmental Stability and Representation

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fany Yuval
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Simple Solution ◽  
National Party ◽  
Representation System ◽  
Comparative Review ◽  
Regional Elections

The relevant literature provides substantial empirical evident supporting the fact that the ability to govern weakens as the degree of representation increases. Democracies use various mechanisms to maintain the balance between stability and representation. Using simulation analysis, this work seeks to understand to what extent the various structures of electoral systems affect the level of governmental stability without excessively undermining the principle of representation. Can electoral systems be differentiated from one another, and which system is most advantageous? To clarify these questions, this work processed the actual results of the three last elections in Israel, for 2003-2009, using the format of various electoral systems. A comparative review of the simulations leads to the conclusion that a mixture of nationwide and regional elections, a small number of constituencies and the single-seat method will moderate the results, providing a better balance between the two democratic—the ability to rule and the degree of representation. The total representation (T.R.) system seems to be best for striking a reasonable balance between regional and national issues. It also offers a simple solution for resolving the disadvantage of majority systems in single-seat constituencies, the lack of representation for the losing votes in the constituencies. In the total representation system, the winners' votes are counted to determine the regional winner, while the losers' votes are totaled on the national party level and awarded proportional representation. This procedure makes the total representation system seem fairer than its competitors.

scholarly journals The Personalization of Electoral Rules: How Shifting Influence From Selectors to Voters Affects Party Unity

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292098789
Author(s):  
Thomas Däubler
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Group Leadership ◽  
Representation System ◽  
Electoral Impact ◽  
Party Group

How does making electoral systems more candidate-centered affect party unity? Using a principal-agent perspective, this study makes three contributions to the literature on this topic. Conceptually, it suggests thinking about the incentives due to personalization as arising from a shift in electoral impact from party selectors to voters. Theoretically, it incorporates this notion into a spatial model of parliamentary voting that also considers principals’ monitoring capacities. From the resulting framework follows a rich set of observable implications, notably that candidate-centered electoral systems facilitate rather than undermine collective action within parliamentary parties under certain conditions. Empirically, this study then analyzes the 2010 reform of Sweden’s flexible-list proportional representation system, which changed the preference vote threshold. As expected, I find that when extreme (district-based) selectors disagree with the moderate bills supported by the party group leadership, personalized rules incentivize politicians to support these policies and vote in unison.

Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

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