Conspiracy thinking: A scapegoat is always useful

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 42-45
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
1996 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 353
Author(s):  
Robert M. Dorn

Author(s):  
Steven M. Smallpage

When university professors engage with conspiracy theories, the public is pushed to the limit in terms of what it will or will not tolerate. Professors that publicly hold conspiracy beliefs force the central question of political tolerance: what is the line between the intellectual inquiry that allows for communities to flourish, on the one hand, and the expression of viewpoints that undermine that community’s integrity altogether, on the other? The line is blurry, as careful skepticism underlies both the best academic work and the psychology of conspiracy thinking. Since conspiracy theorists often anger, provoke, and sometimes harass the public, we must decide as a community if we will tolerate professors who hold controversial conspiracy beliefs. Such decisions require thoughtful reflection on the similarities and differences between conspiracy thinking and its relationship to desirable traits of democratic citizens, like tolerance, independent thinking, and academic freedom.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-97
Author(s):  
Asbjørn Dyrendal ◽  
Leif Kennair ◽  
James Lewis

Recent studies on conspiracy thinking has concluded that the strongest predictor of the tendency towards conspiratorial thinking is a one-dimensional construct-conspiracy mentality-that is relatively stable over time and valid across cultures. Lantian et al. (2016) found that a single, elaborate question can work as a measure of conspiracy beliefs. We assess the validity of this question for an untypical, religious group: self-identified Neopagans. We also test some recent findings on the relation between conspiracy thinking and paranormal beliefs, attitudes towards group equality, political identification, age, gender, and education. The general patterns hold up well in our investigation, but there was a clear distinction between conspiracy theories about powerful actors and those about minorities. The single-item measure was the largest predictor of the former kind of conspiracy belief followed by level of paranormal beliefs. Anti-egalitarianism and holding a right-wing political identity were the strongest predictors of conspiracy beliefs about minorities. Education was negatively related to conspiracy beliefs of all kinds.


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 884-886 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Grzesiak-Feldman ◽  
Anna Ejsmont

The study examined the relationship between paranoia and conspiracy thinking of Jews, Arabs, Germans, and Russians among 50 university student volunteers using Fenigstein and Vanable's Paranoia Scale for nonclinical populations and the Conspiracy Beliefs Scale. The scores for conspiracy stereotypes of all the nationalities were positively correlated with paranoia.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 205316801774310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph E. Uscinski ◽  
Santiago Olivella

Even though climate scientists are nearly unanimous that climate change is real and manmade, about 40% of Americans reject the scientific consensus. Why? The largest contributing factor is partisanship; however, recent studies argue that underlying conspiracy thinking exerts a positive, linear effect on climate change denial. In this article, we reexamine the effect of conspiracy thinking on climate change attitudes by accounting for the various pathways that conspiracy thinking could drive denialism in a politically polarized environment. We find the effects of conspiracy thinking on climate change denial are not only larger than previously suggested, but also non-monotonic and conditional on individuals’ party identification. Moreover, we find evidence suggesting conspiracy thinking affects independents’ positions, and even their partisan leanings. These findings further explain why people reject the scientific consensus on climate change, and suggest that climate change denial is not merely the product of partisan polarization.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 363-383
Author(s):  
Jelka Stojanov ◽  
Sara Stanisavljavić ◽  
Višnja Tatić ◽  
Aleksa Pantić

Conspiracy thinking is defined as a form of reasoning about events and situations of personal, social, and historical significance, where “conspiracies” are a dominant factor. This research aims to construct and validate Conspiracy Thinking Inventory (CTI), which purpose is to measure general propensity for conspiracy thinking, rather than beliefs in specific conspiracy theories. Study 1 (N = 356), a preliminary version of CTI consisting of 93 items, was constructed and subsequently shortened to 23 items arranged in 4 facets: Control of Information, Government Malfeasance, Threat towards One’s Own Country, Threat towards Personal Well-being. In Study 2 (N = 180), factor structure and validity of CTI were tested, resulting in a two-factor solution: Conspiracy Thinking Aimed at Health and Well-being (CT), and Attitudes towards the Government Institutions and Representatives (AtGI). The pattern of correlations between CT and relevant constructs confirmed its convergent validity, and CT was also shown to be a good predictor of beliefs in specific conspiracy theories. Previously confirmed convergent and criterion validity and its psychometric characteristics show that CTI may be used as an indicator of conspiracy thinking. Nevertheless, divergent validity has yet to be confirmed by using other constructs (e.g., personality traits). Despite not having been foreseen, extraction of the second factor might be the consequence of using items with predominantly political content. This factor was not correlated with any external criteria which indicate that it does not reflect conspiracy thinking.


2021 ◽  
Vol 134 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-253
Author(s):  
Helmer Helmers

Abstract Conspiracy Thinking and the Culture of Fear During the Twelve Year’s Truce: The Character Assassination of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1617-1619) A remarkable public attack was launched against John of Oldenbarnevelt during the Dutch Truce Conflicts of 1609-1619, which culminated in his execution in May 1619. This article analyses the genesis and effectiveness of this early modern ‘character assassination’ of a leader of state. It argues that this attack derived its power from a carefully nourished, international, protestant culture of fear, in which the preservation of the Dutch Republic was deemed essential to the survival of protestantism as a whole. Two interconnected elements of this culture of fear played into the hands of Oldenbarnevelt’s opponents: the steady stream of international news to the Dutch Republic due to its new infrastructure of news, and the dominant conspiratorial mindset amongst the elite and the wider public alike.


Author(s):  
Joseph E. Uscinski

Conspiracy theories have become a more prominent part of political discourse in recent years. But, social scientists are only beginning to learn about their role in political persuasion. This chapter considers some important questions regarding them: Can conspiracy theories, or a worldview shaped by conspiracy thinking, change attitudes, alter behavior, or generate collective action? Who uses conspiracy theories to persuade and for what purposes? Are such attempts successful? It first reviews what social scientists have learned about conspiracy theories and the people who believe them and then advocates for a research agenda which better situates conspiracy theories within the literature addressing political persuasion.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Jonathan Judaken

We live in dark times, as Hannah Arendt might have said. Just open the Jewish or general press on any given day and you will read about swastikas scrawled on buildings. Or hear about the reiteration of anti-Jewish tropes by members of Congress or by the president of the United States or by any number of European prime ministers. You might discover the latest instance of the desecration of Jewish cemeteries or the burning of synagogues. Or perhaps you will linger on the most recent incident of the beating of Jews in New York or Paris or Berlin. Most spectacularly, white Christian nationalists or militant jihadi terrorists have slain Jews en masse in several horrific events, most famously at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh and in the linked attacks on Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher in Paris.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Bradley Byington

Conspiracy theories, and especially antisemitic conspiracy theories, form a core ideological component of right-wing violent extremism in the United States. This article argues that conspiracy narratives and their psychological antecedents are key to understanding the ideological appeal of right-wing extremist formations such as white supremacist and Christian Identity movements, providing insight into the motivations and behaviors of those individual participants who become sufficiently radicalized to carry out terrorist actions. It is further proposed that standard radicalization models can be enhanced for applications specific to right-wing extremism through an understanding of conspiracy thinking (both antisemitic and otherwise), and that this understanding can assist in addressing the motivated roots of the ideologies that sustain this particular type of violent extremism through a public health approach to counter-radicalization that aims to “inoculate” the public against the cognitive tendencies exemplified in antisemitic con- spiracy theories and in conspiracist culture more generally. The proposed approach would complement existing efforts in a unique way, as it would have the potential not only to improve public security, but also to provide further societal benefits by countering other negative tendencies associated with conspiracy belief (for example, decreased intention to vaccinate). This would provide an exceptional cost versus benefit ratio while supporting existing counter-radicalization programs and leaving them intact.


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