Conspiracy Theories for Journalists

Both scholars and journalists should consider the positive aspects of conspiracy theories and consider that removing them from society (if such a thing could be done) may present unintended consequences. Conspiracy theories have been covered by news outlets more frequently in recent years. How should journalists address conspiracy theories? When should conspiracy theories and theorists attract news attention? What are the pitfalls that journalists need to avoid when discussing conspiracy theories? What can news outlets do more generally to curb belief in conspiracy theories? It is vitally important in democracies that news outlets be perceived as independent and trustworthy, but conspiracy theories, particularly those about the media, undermine public trust. How can new outlets regain this trust?

The Credulity of Conspiracy Theorists

Where does entertaining (or promoting) conspiracy theories stand with respect to rational inquiry? According to one view, conspiracy theorists are open-minded skeptics, being careful not to accept uncritically common wisdom, exploring alternative explanations of events no matter how unlikely they might seem at first glance. Seen this way, they are akin to scientists attempting to explain the social world. On the other hand, they are also sometimes seen as overly credulous, believing everything they read on the Internet, say. In addition to conspiracy theorists and scientists, another significant form of explanation of the events of the world can be found in religious contexts, such as when a disaster is explained as being an “act of God.” By comparing conspiratorial thinking with scientific and religious forms of explanation, features of all three are brought into clearer focus. For example, anomalies and a commitment to naturalist explanation are seen as important elements of scientific explanation, although the details are less clear. This paper uses conspiracy theories as a lens through which to investigate rational or scientific inquiry. In addition, a better understanding of the scientific method as it might be applied in the study of events of interest to conspiracy theorists can help understand their epistemic virtues and vices.

The Conspiracy Theory Pyramid Scheme

The conspiracy theory pyramid scheme has three tiers. First, writers and intellectuals who reinforce and legitimate conspiracy memes, sometimes without explicitly endorsing conspiracy theories. Second, people with a psychological affinity for conspiracy theories. And third, people who feel threatened by a specific issue and become persuaded that a conspiracy is at work. The pyramid metaphor should not be taken to imply that the top tier is in control and dominates the second and third tiers of the pyramid. Interaction between the tiers is reciprocal, not hierarchical. The authors examined in this chapter have played an important role on the first tier of the conspiracy theory pyramids: Andrew Wakefield, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Frederick Seitz, James Inhofe, Vandana Shiva, Noam Chomsky, and Edward Herman.

Conspiracy Thinking, Tolerance, and Democracy

When university professors engage with conspiracy theories, the public is pushed to the limit in terms of what it will or will not tolerate. Professors that publicly hold conspiracy beliefs force the central question of political tolerance: what is the line between the intellectual inquiry that allows for communities to flourish, on the one hand, and the expression of viewpoints that undermine that community’s integrity altogether, on the other? The line is blurry, as careful skepticism underlies both the best academic work and the psychology of conspiracy thinking. Since conspiracy theorists often anger, provoke, and sometimes harass the public, we must decide as a community if we will tolerate professors who hold controversial conspiracy beliefs. Such decisions require thoughtful reflection on the similarities and differences between conspiracy thinking and its relationship to desirable traits of democratic citizens, like tolerance, independent thinking, and academic freedom.

On the Democratic Problem of Conspiracy Politics

Distrust is an essential part of democratic politics. Familiar institutions and practices, such as the separation of powers, partisan competition, and public vigilance, are premised on a positive expectation that others intend to harm our interests. Such practices can organize and domesticate distrust, and make it productive for the democratic system. Yet distrust can go wrong in two sorts of ways. One is through partisan distrust spiraling into what I call conspiracy politics as a result of the process of seeking to represent conspiracy-minded constituents. The other is that public vigilance premised on distrust can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, generating the behavior that fulfills those low expectations.

Conspiracy Theory

Conspiracy theories have been around for a long time, though how long is a matter of debate. As for the concept of conspiracy theory, it might seem reasonable to expect a more exact answer about the moment of its emergence. When do we first find people talking and writing about conspiracy theories? While much of the literature points to the twentieth-century philosopher Karl Popper and his famous work The Open Society and Its Enemies (1st edition: 1945), newspaper databases allow us to locate earlier occurrences of “conspiracy theory.” They reveal that the term proliferates in newspapers from the 1870s onward, particularly after the assassination of President Garfield in July 1881. What can this discovery then tell us about the modern-day phenomenon of conspiracy theories?

Conspiracy Theory Psychology

Conspiracy theories tend to be taken more seriously by people who are mistrustful and prone to certain forms of magical thinking, have a worldview that generally fits with conspiratorial interpretations of events, feel alienated from society and its norms, and frequently come into contact with other topics outside of the mainstream such as alternative medicine. Conspiracy theories are less plausible when the audience has a positive attitude toward the group implicated as the conspirators, when they are engaged in analytical, detail-focused thinking, and when they feel like they are generally in control of their own fate.

Who Believes in Conspiracy Theories in Great Britain and Europe?

From JFK to the X-Files to Trump, are conspiracy theories the preserve of the United States? Drawing on two YouGov surveys—the first of their kind—in Great Britain in February 2015 and across Europe (Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden) in March 2016, this chapter shows that the British and Europeans are as likely to believe in conspiracy theories as are their American counterparts. The surveys suggest that political and economic exclusion are the greatest predictors of conspiracy theorizing. Policies that promote political and economic integration may therefore help reduce conspiracy theorizing.

Conspiracy Theories in U.S. History

Although many Americans believe that conspiratorial thinking is reaching new heights in the twenty-first century, conspiracy theories have been commonplace throughout U.S. history. In the colonial and early republic eras, Americans feared that Catholics, Jews, Masons, Indians, and African Americans were plotting against them. In the nineteenth century they added international bankers, rich businessmen, and Mormons to the list of potential conspirators. In the twentieth century, conspiracy theories continued to evolve, and many Americans began to suspect the U.S. government itself of plotting against them. These theories gained more credibility after the revelation of real government conspiracies, notably CIA assassination plots, the Watergate scandal, and the Iran–-Contra affair.

Conspiracy Theory Phobia

Many scholars and journalists have recently questioned why people believe in conspiracy theories. Perhaps equal consideration should be given to the opposing question, why do people not believe in conspiracy theories. People who refuse to evaluate conspiracy theories evenly and openly may suffer from conspiracy theory phobia. This phobia manifests when a person rejects conspiracy theories out of hand without an appropriate evaluation of the available evidence, or if her reaction toward conspiracy theories is one of mockery, contempt, or hostility. Conspiracy theory phobia is likely explained by non-rational psychological mechanisms. In this chapter, we show how confirmation bias and pragmatic hypothesis testing can drive the rejection of conspiracy theories. Arguably, conspiracy theory phobia can distort social science and undermine political accountability within functional democracies.