scholarly journals Diversified Ownership Structure and Dividend Pay‑outs of Publicly Traded Companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (345) ◽  
pp. 93-110
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Pieloch-Babiarz

The aim of this article is to identify and characterise the relationship between the ownership structure and dividend pay‑out of listed companies. The research hypothesis states that along with an increase in a degree of ownership concentration both the propensity to pay a dividend and its amount increase. The research has been conducted on a group of 354 non‑financial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The basic research method is the analysis of logistic and tobit regression. The research shows that along with an increase in the complexity of the ownership structure, the share of the State Treasury, institutional investors and board members, decisions on dividend pay‑out are made more often, and the amount of dividend is higher. Examining the degree of ownership concentration expressed by the Herfindahl‑Hirschman index, diversified results have been obtained. An estimation of some regression models shows that stronger ownership concentration favours the decision to pay a dividend (dividends are paid out more frequently), however, as a degree of ownership concentration increases, a decrease in the amount of dividend is observed. The research results presented in this article are a supplement to the existing analyses carried out on the global markets and an extension of the existing research conducted on the companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Tarcísio Pedro da Silva ◽  
Maurício Leite ◽  
Jaqueline Carla Guse ◽  
Tania Cristina Chiarello

The study examined the relationship of ownership concentration in the economic and financial performance of publicly traded Latin American companies possessing American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Generally, the capital structure decisions are tied directly to the results of the organizations, thus reflecting the economic and financial performance. The correlation between the set of variables within the group of ownership structure with the group of economic and financial performance showed significant correlation with the linear combinations, when analyzed in the set of all the samples of companies and taken separately by country. However, the results did not show similar correlation to Venezuela, Colombia and Peru due to the existence of few observations. The results also portrayed a significant correlation within economic and financial performance, higher to Mexican companies, when compared with the results of other countries and among the set of the two groups of variables that highlighted the analysis by ownership structure and economic and financial performance as well.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-146
Author(s):  
Thi Xuan Anh Tran ◽  
Quoc Tuan Le

Abstract This research examines the possible association between ownership structure and Vietnam listed companies’ dividend payout policy over the period of 2009 – 2015. We have investigated 642 listed firms in Hochiminh stock exchange and Hanoi stock exchange, using pannel data analysis. Ownership structure is described with two main sub-variables: ownership concentration and ownership composition. Specifically, the Herfindahl index (or H-index) was applied to measure the level of ownership concentration /dispersion for all major shareholders in the company, including the five biggest investors, corporate institutional investors, the ownership concentration level, and foreign investors. It has been observed that the H-index of all major shareholders has an average of less than 0.5 but the value of the H-index of institutional investors at 0.594 indicates that institutional investors are more likely to be concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors. The result showed linear relationship between institutional ownership and the dividend rate, but not statistically significant for the relationship between managerial ownership and dividend payout ratio.


2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per-Olof Bjuggren ◽  
Helena Bohman

The relationship between ownership, control and firm value is the subject matter studied. The study is essentially empirical. Data about the most actively traded non-financial companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange is used. A comparison is made between the years 1999 and 2001. What do the relationships between firm value and different ownership characteristics like ownership concentration, foreign ownership and inside ownership look like? Do these characteristics differ between the booming year of 1999 and the recession year of 2001? Is there a relation between stock price and ownership structure? These are the three main questions addressed in the study.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Aluchna ◽  
Bogumil Kaminski

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the links between company ownership structure and financial performance in the context of the largest Central European stock market. Using the framework of agency theory, the authors address the question of the expropriation effect by dominant owners and the effect of collusion between shareholders of different types on company performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors test hypotheses on the relations between ownership concentration and the involvement of different shareholders (state, CEO, industry and financial investors) vs return on assets (ROA). The authors adopt the panel model controlling for endogeneity and sector of operation and analyze the data from the unique sample of 495 Polish non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in years 2005-2014 with a total of 3,203 observations. Findings The authors identify a negative correlation between ownership concentration by the majority shareholder and ROA, which corresponds with the expropriation rationale of blockholders. The authors also observe negative effects due to ownership concentration by the second largest shareholder, supporting the notion of collusion. The results show that ownership by industry investors is associated with a higher ROA. Ownership by the CEO, state and financial investors proves to have no statistically significant effect on performance. Originality/value The paper further develops the nature of ownership-performance relations in the specific economic context of a post-transition, emerging European stock market, weak external corporate governance mechanisms, insufficient investor protection and significant concentration of share ownership. The results add to the understanding of monitoring vs expropriation effects by large owners and the collusion between different types of shareholders.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elfina Astrella Sambuaga

<p>This study aims to provide empirical evidence related to the influence of family ownership, tax reform on corporate debt policy, and further prove the impact on the firm value.This study examined the effect of changes in tax rates in 2009 and 2010 on the relationship between family ownership structure and corporate debt policy. The population of this research is manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for 8 consecutive years (2006-2013), with the period of observation for 7 years (2007-2013). A period of 8 years was taken to see a company that is consistently listed on the Stock Exchange prior to the end of the observation period. The result of this study shows that tax reform from progressive tax rates to a flat rate does not affect the relationship between family ownership structure and corporate debt policy. In contrast to the year 2009, changing rate from 28% to 25% in late 2010 was a significant effect on the debt policy with the company of family ownership. Based on the results, it was found that family ownership and debt policy significantly affect the company's enterprise value. It can be concluded, the higher the family ownership, the company's value would be diminished. Instead, the company's value will increase when the company adds to its debt policy.</p><p>Keywords : debt policy, family ownership, firm value, tax reform.</p>


Author(s):  
Ahmed Sayed Rashed ◽  
Ebitihj Mostafa Abd ◽  
Esraa Fathi Mohamed Ismail ◽  
Doaa Mohamed Abd El Samea

This paper aims to examine the relationship between Ownership Structure Mechanisms (Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Block holder Ownership and Outside Director Ownership) and Investment Efficiency by using panel data analysis. To investigate this relationship used the multiple regression models. Findings of investigation of 35 firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange in the period 2006 to 2015 by balanced Panel model representative. Results indicated that Managerial Ownership isn’t related with investment efficiency. In contract, institutional ownership, block holder ownership and outside director ownership have a negative relationship with investment efficiency. In addition, the researcher found that control variables (Firm size, Debt ratio, Tobin’s Q) not related to investment efficiency. These findings imply that the Majority of Egyptians firms relies on institutional without individual ownership and then reduces much of possible from agency problems and decreasing information asymmetry and facilitating the monitoring of investment decisions.


Author(s):  
Lisa Siraganian

A lively debate over “corporate mind” materialized in legal, philosophical, and political scientific guises throughout the first decades of the twentieth century. Legal theorists such as Harold Laski, Jethro Brown, and Frederic Maitland sought to ascribe intentions to mindful corporations to understand why corporations acted as they did and to treat them accordingly; theorists like Morris Cohen, John Salmond, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. thought this tactic made no sense. This chapter examines their dispute to argue that Gertrude Stein’s conceptualizing of groups of artists proposed representational solutions both similar to and ultimately divergent from these conceptions of corporate minds. A radical reading of Stein’s revolutionary prose poem, G.M.P. (1912), is offered, supported by archival manuscript evidence. That text ponders the difference between a publicly traded corporation, with its repetitive daily “life” exposed to anyone with a ticker-tape machine, and the creations of a group of painters and poets. Abstracting the art collectivity and giving the movement a name (“G.M.P.”) more typical of publicly traded companies on a stock exchange, Stein registers its divergence from a crowd, a corporate collective, or an individual. Like business entities, aesthetic movements possess emergent properties that are more than the sum of their artist parts; yet art’s immortality differs from a corporation’s life in perpetuity. Offering context for the period’s corporate ideas from various disciplines—political science, jurisprudence, philosophy, psychology—this chapter catches writers thinking through how a corporate group imagines and creates.


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