Speech out of Thin Air

Author(s):  
Randall P. Bezanson

This chapter examines the Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. Since age eight, James Dale had been a Scout in his home town of Monmouth, New Jersey. By 1988, when he finished as a youth Scout on his eighteenth birthday, he had earned twenty-five merit badges and had become an Eagle Scout, one of the highest honors in Scouting. At age 19, Dale “came out” while attending Rutgers, and became actively involved in the university's lesbian and gay organization. He later received a letter from the Boy Scouts of America saying that he no longer met its standards for leadership, since avowed homosexuals were not permitted in the organization. Dale sought to appeal the decision, but to no avail. He was dismissed from his position as assistant scoutmaster, and his adult membership in the Scouts was revoked. Dale sued, claiming that the Scouts' decision was illegal under the terms of the New Jersey public accommodations law. Dale's lawsuit ultimately prevailed in the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Boy Scouts then appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court. In order to get to the Supreme Court the Scouts had to argue that the New Jersey law could not constitutionally be applied to the Boy Scouts based on its First Amendment right of free speech.

This chapter discusses child pornography speech which the United States Supreme Court first categorically excluded from First Amendment protection in New York v. Ferber (1982). The goal of the chapter is to provide an overview of the child-pornography jurisprudence. The chapter also highlights a case applying the Supreme Court precedent on child pornography to student speech. The chapter concludes that, due to its unprotected nature, students censored for child pornography speech have no First Amendment recourse.


Author(s):  
Julie Van Camp

Reno v. ACLU, the 1997 landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court providing sweeping protection to speech on the Internet, is usually discussed in terms of familiar First Amendment issues. Little noticed in the decision is the significance of the ontological assumptions of the justices in their first visit to cyberspace. I analyze the apparent awareness of the Supreme Court of ontological issues and problems with their approaches. I also argue that their current ontological assumptions have left open the door to future suppression of free speech as the technology progresses. Ontology is significant because zoning in the physical world has long been recognized as a way to segregate "adult" entertainment from minors. So far, at least, the justices seem to agree that such zoning is not possible in cyberspace, and therefore that adult zones for certain forms of expression are not possible. But this conclusion is far from settled. The degree of free speech on the Internet in the future will depend on whether or not our ontological understanding of cyberspace supports such zoning or renders it incoherent or impossible.


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-116
Author(s):  
Łukasz Machaj

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits any abridgement of freedom of speech, must be regarded as a cornerstone of the American social and political order. The number of expressive categories placed beyond the First Amendmentʼs pro-tective mantle is very small. In particular, there is no hate speech exception to the free speech Constitutional clause. The article analyzes the decision of the United States’ Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin v. Mitchell. The issue at hand concerned the question of whether it is constitu-tionally permissible to enhance criminal punishment for bias-motivated crimes in comparison with crimes motivated by other factors. In those types of cases, the factual basis for meting out a more severe punishment is usually and necessarily provided by a criminal’s expression that reveals the aforementioned bias. By considering such regulations to be constitutional, the Supreme Court cre-ated an exception regarding the First Amendment protections granted to hate speech by permitting the courts — albeit in a very narrow and specific set of circumstances — to attach negative con-sequences to someoneʼs engagement in constitutionally protected expressive activity. The article critically describes the doctrinal justifications given for this conclusion by the Supreme Court, con-sidering them to be cursory and doctrinaire. The author contends that the Mitchell decision is an example of results-oriented jurisprudence, issued with the political aim of combatting hate crimes in mind. While this objective remains a worthy one, it does not — in the author’s opinion — provide a sufficient justification for reducing the scope of the First Amendment’s protection of (admittedly outrageous, immoral, and shocking) expression a majority may find distasteful. While the legisla-tive branch ought to be permitted to consider specific motives as aggravating factors in a crime (at least from the First Amendment standpoint), a penalty-enhancement should not be contingent on the question whether the accused engaged in protected expressive activity, distinguishing “silent” and “vocal” criminals. The paper utilizes descriptive and analytical methods.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-150
Author(s):  
Jill Oeding

Many state legislatures are racing to pass antiabortion laws that will give the current Supreme Court the opportunity to review its stance on the alleged constitutional right to have an abortion. While the number of abortions reported to be performed annually in the United States has declined over the last decade, according to the most recent government-reported data, the number of abortions performed on an annual basis is still over 600,000 per year. Abortion has been legal in the United States since 1973, when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion prior to viability (i.e. the time when a baby could possibly live outside the mother’s womb). States currently have the right to forbid abortions after viability.  However, prior to viability, states may not place an “undue burden” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The recent appointments of two new Supreme Court justices, Neil Gorsich and Brett Kavanaugh, give pro-life states the best chance in decades to overrule the current abortion precedent. The question is whether these two new justices will shift the ideology of the court enough to overrule the current abortion precedent.


2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 989
Author(s):  
Georgia L. Holmes ◽  
Penny Herickhoff

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">On January 11, 2012 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School v. Equal Opportunity Commission, et al.</span></span><a name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" href="http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JABR/author/saveSubmit/3#_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> that the First Amendment free exercise of religion clause requires the recognition of a ministerial exception from the application of the discrimination provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Lower federal courts had long recognized such an exemption in federal anti-discrimination statutes, yet the U.S. Supreme Court had never formally done so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The decision of the Court was unanimous, although separate concurring opinions were filed by Justice Thomas and by Justice Alito, who was also joined by Justice Kagan.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, in its decision, the Court has mandated immunity for religious organizations from the laws that prohibit discrimination, and retaliation in the workplace.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Hosanna Tabor decision raises issues of how far such a ministerial exemption extends and to what extent it immunizes religious organizations from liability for other types of statutorily prohibited and tortious conduct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is concern in some sectors that too broad an exemption would immunize religious organizations under numerous neutral, generally applicable laws, such as those governing sexual abuse, unemployment compensation, employer social Security deductions, and sales taxes, all of which have previously been applied to religious organizations.</span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><div style="mso-element: footnote-list;"><br /><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> <hr size="1" /></span><div style="mso-element: footnote;" id="ftn1"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;" class="MsoFootnoteText"><a name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" href="http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JABR/author/saveSubmit/3#_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[1]</span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span><span style="font-size: 9pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">____ U.S. ____.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"></span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 499
Author(s):  
Edilton MEIRELES

RESUMONeste trabalho tratamos do direito de manifestação em piquetes e da responsabilidade que possa advir desses atos em face da jurisprudência da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América. A partir da análise das principais decisões da Suprema Corte se pode concluir que, de modo geral, os participantes do piquete não respondem quando agem de forma não ilegal. Está sedimentado, no entanto, o entendimento de que o organizador do piquete responde pelos atos dos participantes. A pesquisa desenvolvida se justifica enquanto estudo comparativo e diante do pouco debate existente no Brasil a respeito do tema. Na pesquisa foi utilizado o método dedutivo, limitada à ciência dogmática do direito, com estudo de casos apreciados pelo judiciário. PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Responsabilidade; Piquete; Estados Unidos; Suprema Corte; Liberdade De Expressão. ABSTRACTIn this work we deal with the right of demonstration in pickets and the responsibility that may arise from these acts in the face of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. From the analysis of the Supreme Court's main decisions it can be concluded that, in general, the picket participants do not respond when they act in a non-illegal way. It is settled, however, the understanding that the picket organizer responds by the acts of the participants. The research developed is justified as a comparative study and in view of the little debate that exists in Brazil regarding the subject. In the research was used the deductive method, limited to the dogmatic science of law, with study of cases appreciated by the judiciary.KEYWORDS: Responsibility; Picket; United States; Supreme Court; Freedom Of Expression.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (21) ◽  
pp. 97-160
Author(s):  
李順典 李順典

鑑於美國最高法院重新激活了專利適格性標的要件,其認為涉及發明的自然法則、自然現象或抽象概念,除非它們也包含「發明的概念」,否則不具專利適格性,因而引發了巨大爭議。因為新專利適格性原則不當削弱了美國在創新中的領導地位,而且它們已經給美國專利制度注入了巨大的法律不確定性,所以美國應重新思考生物技術產業創新的激勵措施生物技術公司的專利適格性在不同的國家面臨不斷的改變,故必須發展保護生物技術創新的全球策略,可行的發展策略應是根據國家的法律標準申請專利。In view of the United States Supreme Court has reinvigorated the patent-eligible subject matter requirement, holding that inventions directed to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas are not eligible for patenting unless they also contain an ''inventive concept.'' As a result, the Supreme Court has sparked tremendous controversy. Since the new patent eligibility doctrine is undermining U.S. leadership in innovation, so the U.S. shall reconsider the incentives for innovation in the biotechnologyindustry. Biotech companies facing constant changes in patent eligibility in different countries have to develop global strategies for protecting biotechnology innovations, and a recommended strategy is to file patent applications tailored to the legal standards of the countries of interest.


Author(s):  
Shira Tarrant

What Is the Definition of Pornography? In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States faced a controversy over whether Louis Malle’s French film The Lovers violated the First Amendment prohibition against obscene speech. In determining what exactly distinguishes pornography from obscenity,...


Author(s):  
Shira Tarrant

What Is the Definition of Pornography? In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States faced a controversy over whether Louis Malle’s French film The Lovers violated the First Amendment prohibition against obscene speech. In determining what exactly distinguishes pornography from obscenity,...


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