scholarly journals Maniobras estratégicas: combinando lo razonable y lo efectivo en el discurso argumentativo

Acta Poética ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frans H. Van Eemeren

Después de explicar su concepción de la argumentación como tema para teorizar, Frans H. van Eemeren presenta un esbozo del programa de investigación del acercamiento pragma-dialéctico a la argumentación, introduciendo los principales componentes de la teoría de la argumentación que resultan del desarrollo de este programa. Posteriormente se centra en el problema fundamental que confrontan los teóricos de la argumentación al buscar distinguir entre los movimientos argumentativos razonables y los falaces. Al respecto, presenta el tratamiento pragma-dialéctico de las falacias como una alternativa constructiva a las severas críticas dirigidas al tratamiento estándar lógico. En la perspectiva pragma-dialéctica, las falacias se consideran violaciones de las reglas para conducir una discusión crítica orientada a resolver una diferencia de opinión de fondo, lo que está en juego en el discurso argumentativo. Van Eemeren introduce la noción de maniobra estratégica para explicar el poder persuasivo de las falacias, a pesar de tratarse de argumentaciones que van en contra de lo razonable. La noción de maniobra estratégica captura el predicamento inherente a todo movimiento argumentativo de reconciliar, a la vez, la búsqueda de resultados efectivos con la necesidad de respetar parámetros razonables. Las falacias son descarrilamientos de las maniobras estratégicas que violan una o más reglas de la discusión crítica. A través de la distinción entre un argumento de autoridad razonable y el argumentum ad verecundiam (que corresponde con una falacia) van Eemeren concluye su ensayo explicando, con este ejemplo, por qué los descarrilamientos de las maniobras estratégicas pueden, en la práctica, pasar tan fácilmente inadvertidos, lo que ayuda a que las falacias no sean detectadas.

1999 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas N. Walton

In this paper, it is shown how formal dialectic can be extended to model multi-agent argumentation in which each participant is an agent. An agent is viewed as a participant in a dialogue who not only has goals, and the capability for actions, but who also has stable characteristics of types that can be relevant to an assessment of some of her arguments used in that dialogue. When agents engage in argumentation in dialogues, each agent has a credibility function that can be adjusted upwards or downwards by certain types of arguments brought forward by the other agent in the dialogue. One type is the argument against the person or argumentum ad hominem, in which personal attack on one party's character is used to attack his argument. Another is the appeal to expert opinion, traditionally associated with the informal fallacy called the argumentum ad verecundiam. In any particular case, an agent will begin a dialogue with a given degree of credibility, and what is here called the credibility function will affect the plausibility of the arguments put forward by that agent. In this paper, an agent is shown to have specific character traits that are vital to properly judging how this credibility function should affect the plausibility of her arguments, including veracity, prudence, sincerity and openness to opposed arguments. When one of these traits is a relevant basis for an adjustment in a credibility function, there is a shift to a subdialogue in which the argumentation in the case is re-evaluated. In such a case, it is shown how the outcome can legitimately be a reduction in the credibility rating of the arguer who was attacked. Then it is shown how the credibility function should be brought into an argument evaluation in the case, yielding the outcome that the argument is assigned a lower plausibility value.


Argumentation ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 437-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Ciurria ◽  
Khameiel Altamimi

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-315
Author(s):  
Marcin Koszowy ◽  
Douglas Walton

Abstract The aim of this paper is to elaborate tools that would allow us to analyse arguments from authority and guard against fallacious uses of them. To accomplish this aim, we extend the list of existing argumentation schemes representing arguments from authority. For this purpose, we formulate a new argumentation scheme for argument from deontic authority along with a matching set of critical questions used to evaluate it. We argue that clarifying the ambiguity between arguments from epistemic and deontic authority helps building a better explanation of the informal fallacy of appeal to authority (argumentum ad verecundiam).


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (6) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Magdalena Hawrysz

W opracowaniu obserwacji poddano szczególny zabytek ze zbioru poloników kijowskich, tj. Paterikon abo żywoty ss. Oycow pieczarskich Sylwestra Kossowa. Jest to piśmienne świadectwo wielokulturowości dawnej Rzeczpospolitej oraz wielopłaszczyznowych relacji polsko-ruskich. Celem szkicu jest wskazanie generycznych elementów polemiki z poziomu kompozycji i pragmatyki tekstu oraz identyfikacja podporządkowanego im repertuaru środków językowych realizujących perswazyjne cele tekstu polemicznego. Analizy pozwoliły wskazać, że polemiczny charakter utworu widać zarówno w strukturze tekstu, gdzie dominują elementy refutacji, jak i w specjalnym użyciu języka, związanym przede wszystkim z probacją. W tym drugim obszarze ujawniono dwie globalne strategie komunikacyjne: uwiarygodnienie treści (na które składa się powoływanie się na źródła historiograficzne i dokumenty oraz dokonywanie zabiegów etymologizujących) oraz apoteoza osób i miejsca (którą realizują strategie osadzania przekazu w przeszłości, odwołanie do genealogii, maksymalizacja cnót świętych, sakralizacja zakonnej rzeczywistości). Wśród środków perswazyjnych znalazły się m.in. sylogizmy, argumentum ad verecundiam, argumentum ad baculum, argument z tradycji, wyliczenie, kontrast. Sposób ukształtowania tekstu na opisywanych poziomach potwierdza wspólnotę europejskiej kultury retorycznej, a z Kossowa czyni modelowego reprezentanta humanistycznych wartości i sposobów ich wyrażania.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-165
Author(s):  
Paola Gabriela Konrad ◽  
Maria Eduarda Giering

Este estudo, amparado pela concepção de ethos proposta por Amossy (2005) e pelos clássicos tipos de argumentos apresentados por Fiorin (2015), propõe-se a analisar fragmentos de fala pertencentes ao gênero discursivo interrogatório policial de modo a investigar (1) se o ethos prévio (AMOSSY, 2005) ou pré-discursivo (MAINGUENEAU, 2008) dos participantes do interrogatório policial se confirma no ethos discursivo dos enunciadores; e (2) os tipos de argumentos (FIORIN, 2015) utilizados pelos enunciadores do interrogatório policial. O corpus deste estudo advém de gravações em áudio e vídeo de três interrogatórios policiais de uma Delegacia de Polícia Civil do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil. Quanto ao primeiro propósito deste estudo, no que tange aos policiais, seu ethos prévio se confirma discursivamente em todos os fragmentos de fala analisados. Em relação aos interrogados, a sua imagem prévia é reelaborada ao longo do discurso. Concernente ao segundo propósito deste estudo, uma série de tipo de argumentos são utilizados pelos enunciadores nos interrogatórios policiais, a saber: argumento de comparação, argumentum ad hominem, argumentum ad verecundiam, argumentum ad misericordiam e argumentum ad baculum. Por fim, a análise revela que os tipos de argumentos utilizados pelos policiais e pelos interrogados nas interações operam como recurso para a construção do ethos dos enunciadores. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Argumentação; Ethos; Tipos de Argumentos; Interrogatório Policial.


2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Walton

This paper offers a solution to the problem of understanding how a fallacious argument can be deceptive by “seeming to be valid”, or (better) appearing to be a better argument of its kind than it really is. The explanation of how fallacies are deceptive is based on heuristics and paraschemes. Heuristics are fast and frugal shortcuts to a solution to a problem that sometimes jump to a conclusion that is not justified. In fallacious instances, according to the theory proposed, this jump overlooks prerequisites of the defeasible argumentation scheme for the type of argument in question. Three informal fallacies, argumentum ad verecundiam, argumentum ad ignorantiam and fear appeal argument, are used to illustrate and explain the theory.


2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuele Bardone ◽  
Lorenzo Magnani

In this paper we show how some reasoning, though fallacious, can appear to be attractive and useful for beings-like-us. Although they do not provide conclusive evidence to support or reject a certain claim the way scientific statements do, they tell us something interesting about how humans build up their arguments and reasons. First of all, we will consider and investigate three main types of fallacies: argumentum ad hominem (argument against person), argumentum ad verecundiam (appeal to authority), and argumentum ad populum (appeal to popularity or bandwagon). These three fallacies are traditionally considered as examples of a broader category called ignoratio elenchi. Secondly, we show how people who commit these fallacies rely on information about other human beings in their reasoning. That is, they do not follow certain logical procedures that eventually lead them to correct conclusions. But they simply make use of others as social characters. For example, being an authority, being an expert, being part of a class, etc., become the substitutes for more direct evidence to support a certain claim or to make an argument more appealing.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Manzoor Malik

This research is aimed at providing critical appraisal of some informal logical fallacies from the Quran and Sunnah. The fallacies are defined adequately, analyzed logically, understood conceptually, and then criticized from Islamic perspective based on the Quran and Sunnah. First some fallacies of relevance are undertaken. Argumentum ad Hominem (Argument Directed at the Person) according to Islamic perspective is valid in respect to transmitted knowledge (uloom naqliah); on the other hand, this fallacy is invalid in respect to rational knowledge (uloom aqliyah) in inclusion of empirical knowledge (uloom tajribiyah). Argumentum ad Populum (Appeal to the People) fallacy according to Islamic perspective is accepted as a valid fallacy if what someone, elite, or majority hold is against the evidences and facts. However, in terms of keeping law and order in a society, Islam encourages the concept of Shura (consultation and group decision) and jamaah (unity and group) to make it possible that among many good options, Muslims would be able to follow any one with majority agreement to get over any disagreement or conflict. Among fallacies of presumption, some fallacies were undertaken as follows. Secundum quid (Fallacy of Hasty Generalization) is accepted fallacy according to Islamic perspective. The Islamic spirit is against hasty generalizations. Argumentum ad Verecundiam (Argument from Authority) is an accepted fallacy according to Islamic perspective. Islam emphasizes on evidence and proof in accepting or negating any fact. This is primary. However, proper authorities should be consulted on matters, this is what the Quran and Sunnah encourages.


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