scholarly journals La aplicación del primer protocolo adicional del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos a las prestaciones sociales ¿freno para las reformas de seguridad social? = The application of the first additional protocol of the European Human Rights Convention to social benefits, brake for social security reforms?

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 676
Author(s):  
Cristina Sánchez-Rodas Navarro

 Resumen: Aunque el derecho a la Seguridad Social aparece regulado en numerosos Tratados inter­nacionales, ni el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos ni sus Protocolos Adicionales la contemplan. Y, sin embargo, son numerosas las sentencias del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos que tienen por objeto la tutela del derecho a percibir prestaciones sociales contributivas, no contributivas y de natu­raleza mixta. El elemento en común que tienen esas sentencias –que se analizan en el primer bloque– es que el Tribunal parte de la premisa de que el derecho a prestaciones sociales es un derecho de propiedad tutelable al amparo del artículo primero del Primer Protocolo Adicional al Convenio Europeo de Dere­chos Humanos. En base a dicho precepto España ya ha sido condenada en dos ocasiones en materia de pensiones de Seguridad Social. Esta jurisprudencia podría convertirse, además, en un límite a la potestad legislativa de los Estados que, como España, introdujeron importantes recortes en materia de pensiones en los años más duros de la última crisis económica y financiera mundial.En el segundo bloque se estudia el impacto de dicha jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Dere­chos Humanos en el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, del que la cuestión prejudicial Florescu es, hoy por hoy, la única exponente. Por último se analiza la jurisprudencia de nuestro Tribunal Consti­tucional que viene manteniendo el criterio que en materia de prestaciones sociales no existe un derecho de propiedad, sino una expectativa de derecho no indemnizable.Palabras clave: Derecho de propiedad, prestaciones contributivas, prestaciones no contributivas, Primer Protocolo Adicional al Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos.Abstract: Although the right to Social Security is regulated in numerous international Treaties, neither the European Convention on Human Rights nor its Additional Protocols contemplate it. Never­theless, there are numerous judgments of the European Court of Human Rights that have for object the protection of the right to receive social contributory, non-contributory and of a mixed nature benefits. The common element in these judgments - which are analyzed in the first block - is that the Court starts from the premise that the right to social benefits is a property right that can be protected under the first article of the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention. of Human Rights. Based on this pre­cept, Spain has already been sentenced twice in cases related to Social Security pensions. This jurisprudence could also become a limit to the legislative power of States that, like Spain, introduced important pension cuts in the harshest years of the last global economic and financial crisis.The second block examines the impact of this jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the Court of Justice of the European Union, of which the preliminary question Florescu is, at present, the only exponent. Finally, we analyze the jurisprudence of our Constitutional Court that has maintained the criterion that in the field of social benefits there is no property right, but an expectation of non-compensable right.Keywords: Property rights, contributory benefits, non-contributory benefits, First Additional Pro­tocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingrid Leijten

This article discusses recent developments concerning the right to minimum subsistence as a matter of property protection under the European Convention on Human Rights. It starts with two recent cases: Bélané Nagy v. Hungary and Baczúr v. Hungary. In its judgments in these cases, the European Court of Human Rights emphasised that, in determining whether an interference with a benefit is proportional, an important consideration is whether the individual still receives a subsistence minimum. It moreover held that a right to a (minimum) benefit can exist even if the conditions for receiving this benefit have not been met. Read together, Bélané Nagy and Baczúr flag an increasingly social interpretation of the property right enshrined in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR involving positive obligations and a focus on the neediest. On a closer look, however, the Court’s interpretation is not a very straightforward one. Judgments rendered after Bélané Nagy and Baczúr show that, although there is a clear trend to protect claimants’ means of subsistence, the relationship between property and a right to such means remains opaque, and the potential of a property right to guarantee the latter, limited. In this article, I present the recent case law against the background of the increasing significance of Article 1 P1 in the field of social security as well as the obstacles to protecting a subsistence minimum. I will delineate the questions that promise to haunt the Court in the cases to come and explore some of the answers it could formulate in this regard. It is argued that a positive right to a subsistence minimum is, for various reasons, unlikely to be developed as a matter of property protection under the Convention.


Author(s):  
Lara Redondo Saceda

El artículo 8 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos –que protege los derechos al respeto la vida privada y familiar, el domicilio y la correspondencia– se ha configurado en estos setenta años de Convenio como uno de los escenarios habituales del desarrollo del margen de apreciación nacional y la doctrina de las obligaciones positivas del Estado. Esto parece justificarse en el contenido y estructura de este artículo y en las restricciones y limitaciones al ejercicio de estos derechos establecidas por su párrafo segundo. En este marco, el objetivo de este artículo es analizar cuál ha sido el papel del artículo 8 CEDH en el desarrollo de estos estándares interpretativos y cómo ha influido en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights –which protects the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence– has been configured as a traditional place for the development of the margin of appreciation and the doctrine of State’s positive obligations. The scope and structure of this article and its limitation clause in the second paragraph seem to justify these developments. In this context, the objective of this article is to analyse the role of Article 8 ECHR in the development of these interpretative standards and its influence in the European Court of Human Rights case-law.


Author(s):  
Luis López Guerra

En estrecha conexión con la crisis económica, se ha presentado un considerable número de demandas ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos solicitando la protección de derechos económicos y sociales. Aún cuando el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos se ocupa de los llamados derechos «de la primera generación», la jurisprudencia del Tribunal, a partir de Airey c. Irlanda ha mantenido que no existe una completa separación entre derechos civiles y derechos sociales. Aplicando esta jurisprudencia, el Tribunal, en los últimos años, ha emitido diversas sentencias en que se considera que los derechos del Convenio también imponen obligaciones a los estados en materias de relevancia económica y social, como la cuantía de las pensiones, el derecho a la vivienda familiar o el tratamiento de los inmigrantes.Closely related to the economic crisis, a considerable number of requests for protection of economic and social rights have been filed at the European Court of Human Rights. Although the European Convention on Human Rights addresses the so-called «first generation» rights, Court case law since Airey vs. Ireland has maintained that a complete separation of civil and social rights cannot be made. In applying that case law, over the last few years the Court has issued several judgments underscoring that Convention rights also impose obligations on the States in matters of economic and social relevance, such as the amount of pensions, the right to a family home or the treatment of immigrants.


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-63
Author(s):  
Yves Haeck ◽  
Clara Burbano Herrera ◽  
Leo Zwaak

Provisional or interim measures before the European Court of Human Rights – Historic judgment in the case of Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain – The non-compliance by a State with an interim measure leads to a violation of Article 34 ECHR, irrespective of the subsequent finding of a violation of other material provisions of the ECHR by the Court – Remaining (loopholes for) recalcitrant states – Lack of reasoning of interim measures – Lack of clarity as to applicants' unwillingness to abide by an interim measure and currently untenable, extremely narrow scope ratione materiae of situations in which interim measures are indicated by the Court – Codification of the institute of provisional measures by including it as a separate provision into the European Convention through an additional protocol.


Author(s):  
Edorta COBREROS MENDAZONA

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Hitzarmenaren 7. Protokoloaren 2. artikuluaren arabera, administrazio-zehapen larrietarako jurisdikzio-auzialdi bikoitzaren bermea exijentzia bat da, eta ezinbestekoa dugu administrazioarekikoauzien antolamendurako, batez ere duela gutxi Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiak emandako Saquetti Iglesias c. España epaitik aurrera. ABSTRACT: The guarantee of the right of appeal in the case of serious administrative penalties is a requirement by art. 2 of Protocol number 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights which constitutes an imperative need for our contentious-administrative order, especially since the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights Saquetti Iglesias vs. Spain. RESUMEN: La garantía de la doble instancia jurisdiccional para las sanciones administrativas graves es una exigencia del art. 2 del Protocolo núm. 7 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos que constituye una necesidad imperiosa para nuestro ordenamiento contencioso-administrativo, sobre todo a partir de la reciente STEDH Saquetti Iglesias c. España.


Author(s):  
Sergio Alejandro Fernández Parra

Resumen: En el presente escrito se estudiará la figura del margen nacional de apreciación y su aplicación por parte del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Este estudio tiene como objeto demostrar que la utilización frecuente de esta figura impide que exista una interpretación uniforme del derecho a la libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y religión en el Sistema Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Para probar la hipótesis planteada, la figura aludida será comparada con el control de convencionalidad y la forma en que se ha aplicado esta última figura por parte de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Esto último se realizará con el fin de evidenciar las falencias interpretativas y de protección de los derechos que genera la utilización del margen nacional de apreciación. Palabras clave: margen nacional de apreciación, control de convencionalidad, Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y religión, Estado laico. Abstract: This paper will study the figure of the national margin of appreciation and its application by the European Court of Human Rights. The purpose of this study is to show that the frequent use of this figure prevents a uniform interpretation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the European System of Human Rights. To test this hypothesis, the aforementioned figure will be compared with the control of conventionality and the way in which the latter figure has been applied by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The latter in order to highlight the interpretative and protection flaws of the rights generated by the use of the national margin of appreciation. Keywords: National appreciation margin, control of conventionality, European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, secular State.


Author(s):  
Lyusya Mozhechuk ◽  
Andriy Samotuha

The article deals with the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in protecting the right to social security. There is the analysis of the case law of the ECtHR on the violation of the right to social security, namely the right to receive a pension, which the ECtHR classifies as property rights. The authors have outlined the ways to improve the practice of the ECtHR in this area in modern national and world socio-economic conditions. According to available estimates, around 50 per cent of the global population has access to some form of social security, while only 20 per cent enjoy adequate social security coverage. Ensuring an ap-propriate mechanism for the protection of human and civil rights is a priority for every country. However, according to case law, the number of complaints of violations or non-recognition of their rights is growing every year. An important role in the protection of human rights in today's conditions is played by an international judicial body - the European Court of Human Rights. In Ukraine, where socio-economic rights are recognized at the constitutional level, their guarantee content in the current laws is still not clearly defined, and therefore, as evidenced by the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, legal mechanisms their protection, in particular the means of judicial control remain ineffective. The right to social security is the right to access and retention of benefits, both in cash and in kind, without discrimination in order to protect, in particular, against (a) lack of income from work caused by illness, disability, maternity, occupational injuries , unemployment, old age or death of a family member; (b) inaccessible access to medical care; (c) insufficient family support, especially for children and adult dependents. It is well known that the European Convention does not contain many socio-economic rights as such (with a few exceptions - protection of property and the right to education). Thus , the former president of the ECtHR Jean-Paul Costa specifically pointed to another important European human rights treaty – the European Social Charter. Human rights are a universal value, and their protection is the task of every state. The European Court of Human Rights plays an important role in protecting human rights in modern conditions. The functioning of such an international judicial institution can not only solve a problem of protection of violated rights, but also affect the development of the judicial system of each state. The main principle of realization and judicial protection of social rights is non-discrimination on the grounds of sex, age, race, national and social origin of the individual, and the role of auxiliary institutions of the Council of Europe in generalizing and improving the ECtHR’s activity has been emphasized.


Author(s):  
Juan M. VELÁZQUEZ GARDETA

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren Negrepontis-Giannisis vs. Grezia epaiak atzerriko erabakiak libre zirkulatzeko bidea zabaldu du, prozesu zuzen bat izateko eskubidetik etorria, Giza Eskubideen Europako Hitzarmeneko 6.1 artikuluan aitortua. GEEAren jurisprudentzia-lerro horren eboluzioa abiatzen da Wagner eta J.M.W.L. vs. Luxenburgo eta McDonald vs. Frantzia erabakiekin, baina guk aipatzen duguna aurrerapausoa handia da, eskubidea ez zaiolako lotzen beste zuzenbide substantibo bati, eta berezko eskubidea dela planteatzen da. Gainera, ohar aipagarriak egiten dira atzerriko epai judizialak geldiarazteko ordena publikoko salbuespenari buruz, eta haien eragina leuntzen da. Oso interesgarria da EBko arautegien aplikazio-esparrutik ihes egiten duten erabakietan aplikatzeko, non exequaturra desagertzen den ad hoc prozedura gisa, baina eragindako alderdiak hura ez aitortzeko aukera mantentzen da. Ildo horretan, GEEAk Negrepontis-en erabilitako argudioak garrantzi berezikoak dira, kontuan hartuz GEEHk inspiratzen duela Batasuneko Zuzenbidea eta auzitegiak egiten duen artikuluen interpretazioa. RESUMEN: El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos abre en su sentencia Negrepontis-Giannisis c. Grecia una vía de ampliación de las posibilidades a la libre circulación de decisiones extranjeras como un derecho derivado del derecho a un proceso equitativo reconocido en el art. 6.1 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. La evolución de esta línea jurisprudencial del TEDH arranca con las decisiones Wagner y J.M.W.L. c. Luxemburgo y McDonald c. Francia pero en la que nos ocupa se produce un avance considerable porque no se ata el derecho al reconocimiento a otro derecho sustantivo sino que se plantea como un derecho en sí mismo. Además se establecen notables consideraciones en cuanto a la excepción de orden público como freno a la ejecución de decisiones judiciales extranjeras y se suaviza su efecto. Es especialmente interesante para su aplicación en aquellas decisiones que escapan del ámbito de aplicación de los correspondientes reglamentos de la UE donde desaparece el exequátur como procedimiento ad hoc pero se mantiene la posibilidad de oposición al reconocimiento por la parte afectada. En este sentido, los argumentos utilizados por el TEDH en Negrepontis son de especial relevancia, teniendo en cuenta el carácter inspirador del Derecho de la Unión que tiene el CEDH y por ende de la interpretación que dicho tribunal haga de su articulado. ABSTRACT: The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece opens the extension of the possibilities for a free movement of foreign decisions as a right derived from the right to a fair hearing of article 6.1 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The evolution of this case law trend of the ECHR begins with decisions Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg and McDonald v. France but in the judgment we are now analyzing a considerable development is made because the right to the recognizition is not linked to other substantive right but it is considered as a right itself. Besides remarkable considerations are established as far as the exception to the public order is concerned as a brake to the execution of foreign judicial decisions and it softens its effect. It is especially interesting for its application in those decisions that go beyond the scope of application of the corresponding regulations of the EU where the exequatur as an ad hoc procedure is missing but it maintains the possibility of opposition to the recognizition by the affected party. In this sense, the reasoning of the ECHR in Negrepontis is of special relevance, taking into account the inspiring character of the European Law forthe ECHR and hence the interpretation of that Tribunal of its articles.


Author(s):  
Lucía CASADO CASADO

LABURPENA: Lan honetan, lehen-lehenik, hurbilpen orokor bat egingo dugu Giza Eskubideak eta Oinarrizko Askatasunak Babesteko Europako Hitzarmenak jasotzen dituen diskriminazio-debekuaren eta hezkuntzarako eskubidearen eraketari; eta ondoren, arraza-diskriminazioaren debekuak hezkuntzarako eskubidearekin duen lotura aztertuko dugu, Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren jurisprudentziaren esparruan. Horretarako, eremu horretako lau epai esanguratsuri helduko diegu: Giza Eskubideak eta beste batzuk Txekiar Errepublikaren aurka kasua, bi epai sortarazi dituena (bata Bigarren Sekzioarena, eta bestea Sala Nagusiarena); Sampanis eta beste batzuk Greziaren aurka kasua, eta Orsus eta beste batzuk Kroaziaren aurka kasua. Kasu horietan planteatzen den auzia da ea estatu jakin batzuek ijito etniako umeak eskolaratzeko abiarazi dituzten neurriak diskriminatzaileak diren ala ez. Horretaz gainera, gogoeta batzuk egingo ditugu alor horretako jurisprudentziaren bilakaeraz eta beraren ondorioez. RESUMEN: este trabajo, tras realizar una aproximación general a la configuración de la prohibición de discriminación y al derecho a la instrucción en el Convenio Europeo para la protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, analiza la prohibición de discriminación racial en conexión con el ejercicio del derecho a la instrucción en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Para ello, examina cuatro sentencias relevantes recaídas en este ámbito (casos D.H. y otros contra República Checa, que ha dado lugar a dos sentencias —una de la Sección 2.ª y otra de la Gran Sala—; Sampanis y otros contra Grecia; y Orsus y otros contra Croacia), en las que se plantea si las medidas adoptadas por determinados Estados en relación con la escolarización de niños de etnia gitana son o no discriminatorias. También se realizan algunas consideraciones en torno a la evolución jurisprudencial en este ámbito y sus consecuencias. ABSTRACT: After a general approximation to the configuration of the prohibition of discrimination and of the right of instruction by the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, this work analyzes the prohibition of racial discrimination in relation with the exercise of the right of instruction within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. For this purpose, four relevant judgments on the subject (cases D.H and others against the Czech Republic, which produced two rulings: one by the Second section and other by the Grand Chamber; Sampanis against Greece; and Orsus and others against Croatia) where it arose whether the measures adopted by some States in relation to the schooling of kids from the gypsy ethnic group are or not discriminatory are studied. Some considerations regarding the evolution by the case law regarding this area are also carried out and their consequences.


Author(s):  
Luis E. Delgado del Rincón

El trabajo analiza la doctrina fijada por el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos sobre la vulneración del derecho a ser juzgado en un plazo razonable del art. 6.1 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos y su aplicación al Estado Español en las sentencias condenatorias que hasta ahora se han dictado. También se examinan y se proponen algunas medidas preventivas destinadas a acelerar los procedimientos y a corregir los retrasos de los tribunales, así como otras de carácter reparatorio.The paper analyzes the doctrine established by the European Court of Human Rights on the violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time of art. 6.1 of the European Convention of Human Rights and its application to the Spanish State in the condemnatory judgments that until now have been pronounced. It also examines and proposes some preventive measures aimed at streamline the process and correcting court delays, as well as other reparations.


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