scholarly journals Las reglas del juego político en Chile: incentivos y restricciones para la gobernabilidad

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Moreno

RESUMEN: El propósito del artículo es explorar las instituciones y reglas del juego que rigen el comportamiento y las relaciones entre los actores políticos chilenos desde una perspectiva de gobernabilidad democrática. Se examina en qué forma las instituciones y reglas del juego –formales e informales– contribuyen positiva o negativamente a la gobernabilidad democrática en Chile. Se centrará la atención primero en las instituciones políticas de carácter formal y después, en las de carácter informal. Al examinar las instituciones de carácter formal se distinguirá a aquellas que se vinculan más estrechamente con la forma de gobierno, los mecanismos de pesos y contrapesos, el sistema electoral y el sistema de partidos. En las informales se repasarán brevemente aquellas más visibles: clientelismo, circuitos extrainstitucionales del poder y captura del Estado. El punto de partida para este análisis recoge la idea de que un criterio clave para determinar el nivel de la consolidación democrática en un país es el que resulta de una adecuación razonablemente cercana entre reglas formales y comportamientos y prácticas de los actores.ABSTRACT: The intention of this article is to explore the institutions and rules of the game that govern the behavior of and relations between Chilean political actors from a perspective of democratic governability. It examines the ways in which the institutions and rules of the game –both formal and informal– contribute positively or negatively to democratic governability in Chile. It first focuses its attention on formal political institutions and later examines those that are informal in nature. When examining formal institutions, a special emphasis is put on those most closely linked to the form of government, the mechanisms of weights and counterweights, the electoral system and the party system. The examination of informal institutions concentrates on the most visible such institutions: clientelism, extrainstitutional circuits of power and the capture of the State. The point of departure for this analysis is the idea that a key criterion for determining the level of democratic consolidation in a country is the relative fit between formal rules and the behavior and practices of political actors.

1970 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Libbey

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC STATES HAVE USUALLY COME into existence as the manifestation of a principle of political philosophy or as the result of a compromise among forces with different aspirations for the polity. Often both factors have been involved. Certainly the consequences for political behaviour of introducing any particular structure have been of concern to its architects, but many of these consequences are unforeseeable and the actual impact of an institutional change or the character of a formal role may in time become quite different from that intended.For a political actor, such as an individual, an interest group or a party, formal structures are given attributes of the political environment. Along with the more diffuse qualities of the political culture, they constitute the framework within which political actors must compete for influence over public policy. This framework, both formal and informal, is uneven in its effects on the fortunes of the various political forces. It favours some approaches and some groups more and in different ways than it favours others. The British Labour Party, with its concentrated voting strength, is disadvantaged by the single-member district/plurality electoral system, while its counterpart in Germany is able to maximize its strength in a system of proportional representation.


Author(s):  
Óscar Alzaga Villaamil

Noting that in sociological studies at European level Spain is almost at the bottom of civic appraisal of its democracy and its political, the study explores the historical roots of poor political representation in the nineteenth century Spanish with management from the Crown Decrees of dissolution of parliament and full control by governments shift elections based on small districts and on a rooted cacique system. The 1977 Law for Political Reform conditioned the electoral system for the Parliament, distorting proportional representation in terms that have come down to us and who have devoted bipartisanship when none of the major parties has a majority depends on the Nationalist forces, they have made great revenues as unique representative map. The Spanish legislation regulating political parties with great precision how the upcoming ban terrorism forces, but hardly develops the constitutional requirements regarding the organization and internal functioning must be democratic, nor on party funding, for what you need to consider the reform of the parties Act 2002.Tras constatar que en los estudios sociológicos de ámbito europeo España se sitúa prácticamente a la cola de valoración ciudadana de su democracia y de sus políticos, el estudio profundiza en las raíces históricas de la mala representación política durante el Siglo XIX español con manejo desde la Corona de los Decretos de disolución de las Cortes y pleno control por los gobiernos del turno de unas elecciones basadas en distritos pequeños y en un arraigados sistema caciquil. La Ley de 1977 para la Reforma Política condicionó el sistema electoral para las Cortes, distorsionando la representación proporcional en términos que han llegado a nuestros días y que han consagrado un bipartidismo que cuando ninguno de los principales partidos tiene mayoría absoluta depende de las fuerzas nacionalistas, que han obtenido grandes réditos de tan singular mapa representativo. La legislación española de partidos políticos regula con gran precisión la forma de prohibir las fuerzas próximas al terrorismo, pero prácticamente no desarrolla los imperativos constitucionales en cuanto a que la organización y el funcionamiento interno deben ser democráticos, ni sobre la financiación de los partidos, por lo que procede abordar la reforma de la Ley de partidos de 2002.


1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Milner

AbstractIn this article, it is argued that Canada's relatively low rate of political participation is related to its electoral system being nonproportional, but that a complementary factor is to be found in its political institutions being discontinuous. Discontinuous institutions are manifested in relatively weak links between political organizations active municipally, regionally (provincially) and nationally. While the relationship between proportional representation (PR) and high turnout has been well established in the literature, there is still a puzzle surrounding the theoretical explanation for it. The author argues that the key to the solution to this puzzle lies less in the additional potential benefits to the voter in a PR system than in the reduction of costs, specifically information costs under such a system. PR is seen to frame incentives and disincentives for political actors in such a manner as to result in a reduction of the cost of political information. This is especially the case when PR is embedded in integrated (non-discontinuous) political institutional arrangements. The most salient manifestation of this effect is seen in comparative turnout levels in municipal elections.


Author(s):  
Enrique Arnaldo Alcubilla ◽  
Miguel Azpitarte Sánchez ◽  
Francisco Bastida Freijedo ◽  
Paloma Biglino Campos ◽  
Roberto Blanco Valdés ◽  
...  

En esta encuesta un grupo de profesores de Derecho Constitucional contestan un conjunto de preguntas sobre el sistema electoral, las diferencias entre los sistemas proporcionales y mayoritarios, la influencia del sistema electoral en el sistema de partidos, el origen histórico del sistema electoral español y las posibilidades de reforman, tanto desde el punto de vista procedimental como desde el punto de vista de su posible modificación para lograr una mejor representación de la pluralidad social.In this academic survey a group of Constitutional Law Professors answer some questions about the electoral system, the differences between proportional and mayority systems, the influence of the electoral system in the party system, the origin of the electoral system in Spain, and the procedural ways of a possible reform and the possible changes on it in order to get a better representation of the social plurality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-592
Author(s):  
Olivera Komar ◽  
Meta Novak

AbstractThis paper creates a framework for the comparison of two similar and yet different democratisation cases – Slovenia and Montenegro. The two countries have obvious similarities: their geography and small population, as well as their common socialist Yugoslav heritage and common aspirations to join international organisations, most importantly the European Union. However, while Slovenia went through the democratisation process rather smoothly, Montenegro took the longer road, struggling for more than a decade to regain its independence and complete its transition. We take into account different internal and external factors in these two cases such as the year of independence and of joining NATO, the political and electoral system, ethnic homogeneity, the viability of civil society, EU integration status, economic development and the presence of war in each territory in order to identify and describe those factors that contributed to the success of democratisation in different areas: the party system, the interest groups system, the defence system, Europeanisation and social policy. We find that the democratisation process in these countries produced different results in terms of quality. Various objective measures of the quality of democracy score Slovenia higher compared to Montenegro, while public opinion data shows, in general, greater satisfaction with the political system and greater trust in political institutions in Montenegro than in Slovenia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 73-80
Author(s):  
Y. Kvashnin

The article examines the Greek party system under the Third Republic and identifies the key trends in its development during the years of the “great recession” (2008–2016) and the subsequent post-crisis recovery. Economic and social cataclysms led to the political fragmentation, the decline of the once largest party PASOK, the rise of radical parties, both left and right wing. However, the period of political chaos was short-lived. As a result, Greece has come to a quasi-two-party system, similar to the one that functioned in the pre-crisis decades. The return to normalcy was partly caused by the failure of the anti-European agenda, which brought SYRIZA and Independent Greeks to power in 2015 on the crest of a populist wave. But there were other reasons. First, the revitalization of the bipartisan system was facilitated by a reinforced proportional electoral system, which gave 50 bonus seats to the leading party. Second, political competition is constrained by the conservatism of Greek society, its weak susceptibility to new ideas (liberal, «green», regionalist, etc.). Third, bipartisanship is cemented by widespread clientelistic ties between the largest parties and voters who receive public sector jobs and other benefits in exchange for their loyalty. Fourth, the lion’s share of media resources is concentrated in the hands of a small number of media moguls associated with the leading parties, and citizens receive rather scant information about smaller political actors. These factors contribute to political stability, but at the same time they limit political competition, which poses serious risks for the country.


1953 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannah Arendt

The following considerations have grown out of a study of the origins, the elements and the functioning of that novel form of government and domination which we have come to call totalitarian. Wherever it rose to power, it developed entirely new political institutions and destroyed all social, legal and political traditions of the country. No matter what the specifically national tradition or the particular spiritual source of its ideology, totalitarian government always transformed classes into masses, supplanted the party system, not by one-party dictatorships, but by a mass movement, shifted the center of power from the army to the police, and established a foreign policy openly directed toward world domination. Present totalitarian governments have developed from one-party systems; whenever these became truly totalitarian, they started to operate according to a system of values so radically different from all others, that none of our traditional legal, moral, or common sense utilitarian categories could any longer help us to come to terms with, or judge, or predict its course of action.


Author(s):  
Francesco Clementi

En los veintiséis años que caracterizan a las seis últimas legislaturas italianas (1994-2020) ha habido una intensa actividad político-institucional, acompañada de una fuerte modificación del sistema de los partidos políticos. En este contexto, el sistema electoral y sus continuas modificaciones con nuevas leyes electorales ha influido fuertemente en la forma de gobierno, marcando su dinámica, tanto directa como indirectamente. Sin embargo, el rápido cambio de los diferentes sistemas electorales en los últimos años no ha estado acompañado de reformas parejas en el texto constitucional, produciéndose una asimetría en el funcionamiento de los nuevos sistemas electorales que se iban adoptando gradualmente, que los hacía sustancialmente incompletos, incoherentes y, en definitiva, frágiles. Todo ello ha terminado degradando el sistema a ojos de la ciudadanía. Las presentes notas tienen por objeto poner de relieve las transformaciones que se han producido sobre el sistema electoral, tratando de subrayar las dificultades de su consolidación, en el marco de la llamada Segunda República (1994-2020) y de su nuevo sistema de partidos políticos.In the twenty-six years that characterize the last six Italian legislatures (1994-2020) Italy has seen, from the political-institutional point of view, an intense activity that was accompanied by a very similar vitality of the political party system. In this context, the electoral system and its continuous modifications with new electoral laws has strongly influenced the form of government, marking, by the decisive conditioning factor that represents the party system, its dynamics, both directly and indirectly. However, the rapid change of the different electoral systems in recent years has not been accompanied by an equal change in the constitutional text, so there has been an asymmetry in the functioning of the new electoral systems that were being adopted gradually, making them substantially incomplete, inconsistent and ultimately fragile. Faced with an immutability of the constitutional system, this continuous mutability in the electoral system has not only made the whole political-institutional system very weak, but also degraded it in its function in the eyes of the voters, as it seemed a clearly inefficient tool with respect to the needs of the constitutional system. Therefore, the present contribution aims to highlight the transformations that have taken place on the electoral system, trying to underline the difficulties of its consolidation, within the framework of the so-called Second Republic (1994-2020) and its new system of political parties.


Author(s):  
Robert G. Moser ◽  
Ethan Scheiner ◽  
Heather Stoll

Scholars commonly argue that in democratic societies, the size (or fragmentation) of party systems is a linear function of social heterogeneity, in interaction with political institutions such as the electoral system. This “interactive hypothesis” has generated a large body of research, mostly in support of its fundamental claims. Despite the prominence of this literature, there is also a growing body of research that casts doubt on the interactive hypothesis. Although societies exhibit a variety of different types of heterogeneity, from religious to socioeconomic diversity, which vary within countries by subnational region, political scientists typically characterize countries’ heterogeneity almost exclusively according to measures of national-level ethnic diversity. This chapter uses original census data to show just how misleading such a characterization can be. We conclude with the implications for theories that seek to relate heterogeneity to key aspects of democratic party systems.


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