scholarly journals The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 345-368
Author(s):  
Dušan Pavlović ◽  
Stevo Đurašković
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Emotional Reaction ◽  
Emotional Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
The Third ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Yugoslav Committee

We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian Cabinet and the yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical (rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the receiver is satisfied with any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction in the receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe this behavior in the emotional behavior of frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the leaders of the yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime minister nikola Pašić who opposed any concessions to the yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces two conclusions. first, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.

A Multidisciplinary Framework to Model Complex Team-Based Product Development

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Takai
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Product Development ◽  
Decision Analysis ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Design Decision ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Model Complex ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Team Project

This paper investigates a multidisciplinary framework that simulates design decisions in a complex team-based product development in which engineers simultaneously work in a team project and individual projects. The proposed framework integrates cooperative and noncooperative design models with (1) equilibrium analysis, (2) uncertainty modeling based on behavioral game-theory results, and (3) decision-making using decision analysis. In the proposed framework, noncooperative design is used to simulate engineers’ decisions about team project commitment and to analyze potential free-riding; cooperative design is used to model design outcomes when engineers collaborate in the team project; equilibrium analysis and behavioral game-theory results are used to infer about other engineers’ decisions; and decision analysis is used to calculate expected values of decision alternatives. The proposed framework and the design decision-making model are illustrated using a pressure vessel design as a team project conducted by two engineers: a design engineer and a materials engineer.

scholarly journals Progress in Behavioral Game Theory

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin F Camerer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Experimental Findings

Behavioral game theory aims to predict how people actually behave by incorporating psychological elements and learning into game theory. With this goal in mind, experimental findings can be organized into three categories: players have systematic 'reciprocated social values,' like desires for fairness and revenge. Phenomena discovered in studies of individual judgments and choices, like 'framing' and overconfidence, are also evident in games. Strategic principles, like irrelevance of strategy labels and timing of moves, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and backward induction, are violated. Future research should incorporate these findings, along with learning and 'pregame theory,' into formal game theory.

Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (04) ◽  
pp. 1750021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Benndorf ◽  
Dorothea Kübler ◽  
Hans-Theo Normann
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Labor Market ◽  
Empirical Distribution ◽  
Similar Distribution ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Text Types ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Text Model

The level-[Formula: see text] model is a workhorse in behavioral game theory. For comparisons across experiments and predictions in future studies, it is crucial to assess the empirical distribution of [Formula: see text]-levels. We present a revelation game suitable for this purpose. In a labor market context, workers can choose to reveal their productivity at a cost, and players’ strategies reveal their level of reasoning in terms of a [Formula: see text]-level. We find that the most frequently observed reasoning levels are [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. In our game roughly 30% of the players are [Formula: see text] and 25% are [Formula: see text]. We compare our results to other experiments that identify level-[Formula: see text] distribution, foremost to the money request (or 11–20) game. Despite various differences to the 11–20 game, our revelation game suggests a very similar distribution of level-[Formula: see text] types.

An Application of Behavioral Game Theory in Equilibrium Analysis of Concurrent Product-Development Projects

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Takai
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Product Development ◽  
Material Selection ◽  
Development Project ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Process Selection ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Dominant Design ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Development Tasks

This paper analyzes design equilibrium in a concurrent product-development project using the results from behavioral game theory. In this study, a project consists of a team of three engineers who represent three product-development stages: product design, material selection, and process selection. Product-development tasks are globally distributed, and engineers are allowed to independently make product-development decisions (i.e., non-cooperative design). In addition, the engineers are evaluated according to the outcomes of both individual and team product-development tasks. When multiple design equilibria exist, but a dominant design equilibrium does not, the past behavioral-game-theory studies indicate that design equilibrium may be reached under two conditions. In the first condition, one engineer is allowed to announce his/her intended alternative even though he/she does not need to actually choose the announced alternative. In the second condition, one engineer is selected to make his/her choice first but the other engineers do not know what that choice is. Sensitivity analysis indicates that a wide variety of design equilibria will emerge depending on how engineers are evaluated.

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