Piano Technique

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-116
Author(s):  
Matthew Arthur ◽  
Sang-Hie Lee ◽  
Brenda Wristen ◽  
Gail Berenson ◽  
Kathleen Riley

I am an amateur pianist enquiring into improving piano technique but feeling slightly disillusioned by the lack of attention given to technique in the field of piano teaching. And whilst, however, there are many books out there written by great pianists that seem to combine logic, empirical knowledge, and scientific knowledge in a very convincing manner, their assertions are void of being subject to strict scientific investigation and therefore, in my opinion, cannot be treated too seriously. [with Replies]

Author(s):  
William Newman

When Isaac Newton's alchemical papers surfaced at a Sotheby's auction in 1936, the quantity and seeming incoherence of the manuscripts were shocking. No longer the exemplar of Enlightenment rationality, the legendary physicist suddenly became “the last of the magicians.” This book unlocks the secrets of Newton's alchemical quest, providing a radically new understanding of the uncommon genius who probed nature at its deepest levels in pursuit of empirical knowledge. The book blends in-depth analysis of newly available texts with laboratory replications of Newton's actual experiments in alchemy. It does not justify Newton's alchemical research as part of a religious search for God in the physical world, nor does it argue that Newton studied alchemy to learn about gravitational attraction. The book traces the evolution of Newton's alchemical ideas and practices over a span of more than three decades, showing how they proved fruitful in diverse scientific fields. A precise experimenter in the realm of “chymistry,” Newton put the riddles of alchemy to the test in his lab. He also used ideas drawn from the alchemical texts to great effect in his optical experimentation. In his hands, alchemy was a tool for attaining the material benefits associated with the philosopher's stone and an instrument for acquiring scientific knowledge of the most sophisticated kind. The book provides rare insights into a man who was neither Enlightenment rationalist nor irrational magus, but rather an alchemist who sought through experiment and empiricism to alter nature at its very heart.


2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul M. Dombrowski

The connection between language and empiricism is a central issue in technical writing and communication, more so than in other fields. Our field deals with technical and scientific knowledge which is oftentimes very definite and objective, yet there has been increasing recognition over the past few decades that this knowledge is socially constructed and rhetorically negotiated. Debates have ensued over the rhetoricity of technical communication in contrast to its empirical and instrumental aspects. W. V Quine, one of the most influential American philosophers of the twentieth century, however, rejected the distinction between empirical knowledge and knowledge stemming from language and social negotiation. Understanding technical writing and communication through the lens of Quine's theory ameliorates the tension between instrumental and rhetorical/humanistic views of technical discourse by recognizing the validity of both views and integrating the two. This understanding in turn will facilitate our pedagogical interactions with technical and scientific majors.


Author(s):  
Hans Radder

AbstractIn this article, I put forward a basic philosophical claim: empirical scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge generated in experimental and observational practices, presupposes real causation. My discussion exploits two core notions from the philosophical analysis of scientific experimentation and observation: the aim of realizing object-apparatus correlations and the required control of the relevant interactions between environment and experimental or observational system. The conclusion is that, without the notion of real causation, acquiring epistemically sound empirical knowledge is impossible. Several empiricist objections to this conclusion are discussed and refuted. As a consequence, empiricism faces an unsolvable dilemma: either it cannot account for empirical knowledge or it should accept the existence of unobservable but real causal interactions.


Etyka ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 173-190
Author(s):  
Abraham Edel

Vast transformations in the conditions of human life and the growth of scientific knowledge call for large-scale reconstruction in morality. This is the historical context for the contemporary problem of the relation between empirical knowledge and ethics. The present paper examines the metaethical aspects of this problem. It is argued that the sharp isolation of ethics from empirical science, representing a philosophical convergence of Kantian, phenomenological and positivist theses, should be seen as a distinctive intellectual program in the 20th century ethics and not as an established theory; that this program has by now had its trial and failed, both on the conceptual and the empirical side; that the program rests on a psychology now abandoned in the progress of science. It is suggested that an opposing integrative program which relates empirical knowledge and ethics is more likely to succeed, that it is better grounded psychologically and stands a better chance of a helping deal with the practical problems of morality in the contemporary world. These several theses are explored in outline, with some indication of the way conceptual frameworks in ethics are to be justified in the long run.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack David Eller

In this paper, I address the question of whether metaphysics and theology are or can become science. After examining the qualities of contemporary science, which evolved from an earlier historic concept of any body of literature into a formal method for obtaining empirical knowledge, I apply that standard to metaphysics and theology. I argue that neither metaphysics nor theology practices a scientific method or generates scientific knowledge. Worse, I conclude that both metaphysics and theology are at best purely cultural projects—exercises in exegesis of local cultural and religious ideas and language—and, therefore, that other cultures have produced or would produce radically different schemes of metaphysics or theology. At its worst, metaphysics is speculation about the unknowable, while theology is rumination about the imaginary.


2000 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
pp. 47-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Cartwright

Empiricism has traditionally been concerned with two questions: (a) What is the source of our concepts and ideas? and (b) How should claims to empirical knowledge be judged? The empiricist answer to the first question is ‘From observation or experience.’ The concern in the second question is not to ground science in pure observation or in direct experience, but rather to ensure that claims to scientific knowledge are judged against the natural phenomena themselves. Questions about nature must be settled by nature — not by faith, nor metaphysics, nor mathematics, and not by convention or convenience either. From Francis Bacon to Karl Popper empiricists have wanted to police the methods of scientific enquiry.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Syamsul Huda

<p>Karl Popper once criticizes the positivistic paradigm by means of what he calls the theory of falsification. To him, the positivistic paradigm constitutes a failure simply because it cannot distinguish between science and prude science, that is, between empirical method and non-empirical method. In the scientific knowledge, empirical science, mathematics and logic must be differentiated, something that the positivistic paradigm has failed to do. This paradigm furthermore, did not have a clear picture what logic-based science is, empirical knowledge and psychology of knowledge. It also fails to properly understand knowledge that springs from tradition, emotion, authority and so forth. All positivistic paradigms such as that of Karl Max’s Historicism, Freud’s theory of Psycho Analysis, Adler’s theory of Individual Analysis and Newton’s theory of Gravitation fall into this trap of failure.</p>


1997 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 293-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ype H. Poortinga ◽  
Ingrid Lunt

In national codes of ethics the practice of psychology is presented as rooted in scientific knowledge, professional skills, and experience. However, it is not self-evident that the body of scientific knowledge in psychology provides an adequate basis for current professional practice. Professional training and experience are seen as necessary for the application of psychological knowledge, but they appear insufficient to defend the soundness of one's practices when challenged in judicial proceedings of a kind that may be faced by psychologists in the European Union in the not too distant future. In seeking to define the basis for the professional competence of psychologists, this article recommends taking a position of modesty concerning the scope and effectiveness of psychological interventions. In many circumstances, psychologists can only provide partial advice, narrowing down the range of possible courses of action more by eliminating unpromising ones than by pointing out the most correct or most favorable one. By emphasizing rigorous evaluation, the profession should gain in accountability and, in the long term, in respectability.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document