scholarly journals Political Warfare: The People's Republic of China's Strategy "to Win without Fighting"

MCU Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-93
Author(s):  
Kerry K. Gershaneck
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Marine Corps ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Political Warfare

The Commandant of the Marine Corps has identified the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an existential threat to the United States in the long term. To successfully confront this threat, the United States must relearn how to fight on the political warfare battlefield. Although increasingly capable militarily, the PRC employs political warfare as its primary weapon to destroy its adversaries. However, America no longer has the capacity to compete and win on the political warfare battlefield: this capacity atrophied in the nearly three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Failure to understand China’s political warfare and how to fight it may well lead to America’s strategic defeat before initiation of armed conflict and to operational defeat of U.S. military forces on the battlefield. The study concludes with recommendations the U.S. government must take to successfully counter this existential threat.

In Afghanistan: Western and Soviet Methods of Counterinsurgency

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Lasha Tchantouridze
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Social Issues ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Limited Success ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Military Mission ◽  
Lasting Change

The two-decade-long U.S.-led military mission in Afghanistan ended in August 2021 after a chaotic departure of the NATO troops. Power in Kabul transferred back to the Taliban, the political force the United States and its allies tried to defeat. In its failure to achieve a lasting change, the Western mission in Afghanistan is similar to that of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. These two missions in Afghanistan had many things in common, specifically their unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts. However, both managed to achieve limited success in their attempts to impose their style of governance on Afghanistan as well. The current study compares and contrasts some of the crucial aspects of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Soviet and Western forces during their respective missions, such as special forces actions, propaganda activities, and dealing with crucial social issues. Interestingly, when the Soviets withdrew in 1988, they left Afghanistan worse off, but the US-backed opposition forces subsequently made the situation even worse. On the other hand, the Western mission left the country better off in 2021, and violence subsided when power in the country was captured by the Taliban, which the United States has opposed.

Choice in the West

1953 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-167
Author(s):  
S. Bernard
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
World War ◽  
The West ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Working Out

The advent of a new administration in the United States and the passage of seven years since the end of World War II make it appropriate to review the political situation which has developed in Europe during that period and to ask what choices now are open to the West in its relations with the Soviet Union.The end of World War II found Europe torn between conflicting conceptions of international politics and of the goals that its members should seek. The democratic powers, led by the United States, viewed the world in traditional, Western, terms. The major problem, as they saw it, was one of working out a moral and legal order to which all powers could subscribe, and in which they would live. Quite independently of the environment, they assumed that one political order was both more practicable and more desirable than some other, and that their policies should be directed toward its attainment.

The United States and Southeast Asia: A Case of Strategic Surrender

1983 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leszek Buszynski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Southeast Asia ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
United States Policy ◽  
Global Context ◽  
The Soviet Union

Southeast Asia in United States policy fell from a region of high priority during the Vietnam war to become, after the fall of Indochina, an area of relatively minor interest. For the United States, Southeast Asia evoked memories of misperception, intensified over-commitment, and simplistic assumptions that characterized the American effort to defeat local Vietnamese national communism. Since the formulation of the Nixon doctrine of disengagement in 1969, United States policy towards Southeast Asia has been undergoing a process of long-term readjustment in recognition of the exaggerated significance that the region had assumed in American thinking. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 was a major stimulus to this readjustment as it gave the Americans compelling reasons to anticipate a reassertion of Soviet influence in the region. Successive American administrations attempted to place the region in a wider global context to avoid the dangers of extreme reaction to local national communism while developing the flexibility to coordinate a response to the Soviet Union at a global level. The main concern of American policy was to remove the basis for direct United States involvement in the region in a way that would satisfy post-Vietnam war public and congressional opinion and the demands of strategic planners for greater freedom of manoeuvre against the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet Split and Problems for the United States in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, 1956–64

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
China’S Foreign Policy

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.

KYRGYZ - US RELATIONS AFTER 1991

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 222-229
Author(s):  
Kaniet Zhamilova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Economic Sphere ◽  
The Relationship

This work is dedicated to learn about the Kyrgyz - US relationships after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The paper analyzed the political and economic relationships between two independent countries after 1991. This work is identified the three steps of the development of bilateral relationships, analyzed how the cooperation changes during the different president administrations and how do external and internal problems affected on it. It has also identified that the relationship between the United States and Kyrgyzstan in political and economic sphere was different as far as presidents were different. So, every president had their own ideas, provisions, strategies and priorities based on their awareness and knowledge of politics and international relations.

The Origins of the Cold War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
Common Cause ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter traces the deterioration of Soviet-American relations at the end of World War II and into the beginning of the cold war. While the United States and the Soviet Union found common cause during World War II in defeating Hitler’s Germany, their relationship began to deteriorate as the eventual defeat of Germany became more certain. The chapter emphasizes that it was growing beliefs about malign Soviet intentions, rather than changes in Soviet capabilities, that fuelled the origins of the cold war. In particular, the chapter details crises in Iran, Turkey, and Germany that contributed to U.S. beliefs about long-term Soviet intentions. As uncertainty evaporated, the enmity of the cold war took hold.

The Influence of Political Culture upon Cross-Cultural Misperceptions and Foreign Policy: The United States and Germany

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Kalberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Government ◽  
Technology Products ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Middle Range ◽  
Trade Sanctions ◽  
The Military

The disagreement between Germany and the United States over thewar in Iraq was massive. During the winter of 2002, many observersspoke of a long-term rift between these longstanding allies and atotal loss of credibility on both sides. No one can doubt, regardlessof recent healing overtures,1 that the German-American partnershiphas been altered and significantly weakened. It has suffered a blowfar more damaging than those that accompanied past conflicts over,for example, Ostpolitik, the neutron bomb, the Soviet gas pipeline,the flow of high technology products to the Soviet Union, the impositionof trade sanctions in 1980 against the military government inPoland, the stationing in the late 1970s of middle-range missiles onGerman soil, and the modernization of short-range missiles in 1989.

scholarly journals Conflits et recomposition d'un ordre régional dans la Corne de l'Afrique

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-321
Author(s):  
Roland Marchal
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Horn Of Africa ◽  
Internal Dynamics ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Gulf States

From 1988, there has been a change in the pace of events in the Horn of Africa. The United States and the Soviet Union opted out of the logic of cold war which obtained up to then, leaving more room open to an intervention by neighbouring States (Israel, Irak, the Gulf States). The extension into the Horn of the Middle-Eastern rivalries is all the more real since the political powers are all in a precarious position, despite their use of an unmitigated coercion. Yet, the internal dynamics, which are complex, are still prevailing. It does not seem from their current evolution that there is any hope for real peace talks to end the conflicts.

Deterrence in 1939

1977 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Alexandroff ◽  
Richard Rosecrance
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Deterrence Theory ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Time Perspectives ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Time Perceptions

Rather than a case where deterrence was not tried, 1939 is a case where deterrence failed. As such, it has important implications for deterrence theory. Mutual deterrence must operate on roughly the same time perceptions. Britain felt impelled to deter Germany after Prague, but could offer only a long-term deterrent. Germany's short term appeared so favorable that the long-term uncertainties posed by Britain and France failed to restrain her. The experience of 1939 also underlines the importance of political factors, particularly realignment in mutual deterrence. The Russo-German Pact tipped the balance toward war. In the contemporary setting, calculations of time perspectives between the Soviet Union and the United States are important for mutual deterrence, especially in Europe. Changes in the Sino-Soviet split hold further implications for contemporary deterrence.

Nixon's Back Channel to Moscow

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Moss ◽  
James USN (Ret.) Stavridis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
White House ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
International Environment ◽  
Effective Instrument ◽  
The 1960S

The changing international environment of the 1960s made it possible to attain détente, a relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Back-channel diplomacy—confidential contacts between the White House and the Kremlin, mainly between National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin—transformed that possibility into reality. This book argues that although back-channel diplomacy was useful in improving U.S.-Soviet relations in the short term by acting as a safety valve and giving policy-actors a personal stake in improved relations, it provided a weak foundation for long-term détente. This book traces the evolution of confidential channels during the Nixon administration and examines certain flashpoints in U.S.-Soviet relations, such as the 1970 Cienfuegos crisis, Sino-American rapprochement, and the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Moscow’s support for Hanoi remained constant irritants in U.S.-Soviet relations. The back-channel relationships allowed both sides to agree to disagree and paved the way for the Moscow Summit of May 1972. This focused examination of U.S.-Soviet back-channel diplomacy mitigates some of criticisms levied against Nixon and Kissinger in their secretive conduct of diplomacy by showing that back channels were both necessary and an effective instrument of policy. However, back channels worked best when they supplemented rather than replaced more traditional diplomacy.

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