Evaluation and Validation (E&V) Team Public Report. Volume 5

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Szymanski
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Anne C. Rouse ◽  
Brian J. Corbitt

Much of the research that has been carried out into outsourcing is based on relatively successful case studies. Yet drawing inferences from case studies when those with largely negative outcomes rarely see the light of day represents a significant problem. When negative cases are systematically unrepresented, there is less opportunity to subject theory to scrutiny. This chapter goes some way towards redressing this trend, by reporting on a large scale “selective” outsourcing arrangement that has been publicly described as a failure — the Australian Federal Government’s “whole of government” IT infrastructure outsourcing initiative. This initiative, originally promoted as likely to lead to a billion dollar saving, was abandoned early in 2001, after a damning public report by the Australian Auditor General. However, a detailed study of the initiative suggests that the “failure” occurred despite the project adhering to many of the recommended guidelines for successful outsourcing that had been derived from earlier case analysis. The findings have important implications for decision makers confronted with outsourcing choices. The study suggests that the risks of outsourcing are often downplayed, or ignored in the rush to reap the expected benefits. The study also suggests that expectations of savings from outsourcing IT are often substantially higher than those that have been empirically confirmed in the field. Decision makers are advised that key assumptions about costs, savings, managerial effort, and the effects of outsourcing on operational performance might be incorrect, and to plan for their outsourcing activity accordingly. They should pay particular attention to coordination and transaction costs, as these tend to be overlooked in the business case. These costs will be magnified if “best in breed” multiple-vendor outsourcing is chosen, and if contracts are kept short. Decision-makers are also warned of the difficulties they are likely to have at the end of an outsourcing contract if there is not a large and robust pool of alternative vendors willing to bid against the incumbent.


JAMA ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 302 (21) ◽  
pp. 2330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack V. Tu ◽  
Linda R. Donovan ◽  
Douglas S. Lee ◽  
Julie T. Wang ◽  
Peter C. Austin ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (06) ◽  
pp. 503-512
Author(s):  
Murni Yanti ◽  
◽  
Wicipto Setiadi ◽  

After about 15 (fifteen) years of its formation, the Prosecutors Commission is deemed not optimal in its performance of duties, especially in dealing with public report or complaint, considering that the provisions of Article 4 item a and b Presidential Regulation on Prosecutors Commission that is the basis for the Prosecutors Commission to perform its duties as set forth in Article 3 Presidential Regulation concerning Prosecutors Commission causes multiple interpretations that, according to the provisions of Article 4 item a in performance of its duties of supervising, monitoring and assessing the performance and behaviors of prosecutors and/or employees of Prosecutor Office, the Prosecutors Commission has the authority to accept and follow up public reports or complaints, the extent of the Prosecutors Commissions authority to follow up public reports or complaints are not clearly regulated. However, according to the provisions of Article 4 item b, it is the Prosecutors Commissions authority to forward public reports or complaints to the Attorney General for follow-up. According to the provisions of Article 10 Presidential Regulation No. 18 of 2011 concerning Prosecutors Commission, the Prosecutors Commission has the right to participate in the hearing of a case which attracts public attention. Therefore, the Prosecutors Commission needs to make efforts to optimize its duties performance in dealing with public complaints, for example, by using the concept of the progressive law theory popularized by Satjipto Raharjo, that in progressive law application, law is not enforced according to the letter, but according to the very meaning of laws or regulations in a broad sense. Similarly, in performance of the Prosecutors Commissions authority in dealing with complaints, in which the authority is deemed to have weaknesses, the Prosecutors Commission cannot perform its functions optimally as an external supervisory agency. All this time, the Prosecutors Commission, in dealing with complaints, only focuses on reviewing the substance of complaint without performing functional supervisory activities such as monitoring, data collection, inspection and review. The reason is since the Prosecutors Commission has not applied the progressive law, while in dealing with public complaints related to cases which attract public attention, the Prosecutors Commission should have the psychology and morality to position itself as the avant-garde in dealing with cases which attract public attention, so as to give justice to the people in dealing with cases transparently and accountably. As a concrete measure of optimizing its duty performance, the Prosecutors Commission has internally amended the Prosecutors Commission regulations which are deemed not conforming to the progressive law, such as the amendment to the provisions of Article 1 point 14 of Prosecutors Commission Regulation number PER-05/KK/04/2012. In addition, the progressive law should be applied to Prosecutors Commissions preventive supervision by participating in the hearing of important cases dealt with by Prosecutors, either directly or by using technology, such as attending a hearing online, thus the presence of the Prosecutors Commission will be felt better, which means that the purpose of the Prosecutors Commission formation as an external supervisory agency for better transparency and accountability is achieved.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Yasmirah Mandasari Saragih, Teguh Prasetyo dan Jawade Hafidz

Abstrak : Meningkatnya tindak pidana korupsi yang tidak terkendali akan membawa bencana tidak saja terhadap kehidupan perekonomian nasional tetapi juga terhadap kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara pada umumnya. Pengambilalihan penyidikan dan penuntutan sebagaimana dimaksud dilakukan oleh Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi dengan alasan laporan masyarakat mengenai tindak pidana korupsi tidak ditindaklanjuti, proses penanganan tindak pidana korupsi secara berlarut-larut atau tertunda-tunda tanpa alasan yang dapat dipertanggungjawabkan. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui dan menganalisis apa yang menjadi dasar hukum bagi kewenangan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi untuk melakukan penyidikan dan penuntutan? Apa kendala-kendala yang dihadapi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi untuk melakukan penyidikan dan penuntutan dalam tindak pidana Korupsi?. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah yuridis normative. Jenis data yang digunakan adalah data sekunder. Hasil penelitan yaitu Kewenangan KPK untuk menangani kasus korupsi diatur dalam Pasal 6 huruf c UU KPK bahwa KPK mempunyai tugas melakukan penyelidikan, penyidikan, dan penuntutan terhadap tindak pidana korupsi. Namun, KPK memiliki kewenangan tambahan yaitu dapat mengambil alih perkara korupsi walaupun sedang ditangani oleh Kepolisian atau Kejaksaan (Pasal 8 ayat (2) UU KPK). Akan tetapi, pengambil alihan perkara korupsi tersebut harus dengan alasan yang diatur dalam Pasal 9 UU KPK. Selain kewenangan untuk mengambil alih perkara korupsi, ada hal lain yang menjadi kewenangan KPK yaitu sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 11 UU KPK dan Pasal 50 UU KPK. Kesimpulan diperlukan pengaturan yang disepakati bersama untuk menghilangkan anggapan adanya tumpang tindih kewenangan dalam hal siapa yang berwenang untuk melakukan penuntutan terhadap tindak pidana korupsi muncul setelah dikeluarkannya UndangKata Kunci : Penuntut, Tindak Pidana Korupsi.�THE ANALYSIS JURIDIS FOR AUTHORITY� THE CORRUPTION ERADICATION COMMISSION AS PROSECUTOR TOWARD THE� ACTORS OF CORRUPTION �Abstract : The increasing uncontrolled corruption in general will bring disaster to the life of national economy and nation and state. The existence of a public report on corruption is not followed up, and all the consequences of the process of handling corruption in a protracted manner without a justifiable reason then the corruption eradication commission takes over the aforementioned and the demands.� The purpose of this study is to know and analyze what is the� basis law� for the authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission to conduct investigations and prosecutions,�� and� what are the constraints faced by the Corruption Eradication Commission to conduct investigations and prosecutions in Corruption.� The research method used is juridical normative, the type of data used is secondary data. The result of research is KPK's authority to handle corruption cases regulated in Article 6 letter C of KPK Constitution,� that KPK has duty to conduct investigation, investigation and prosecution of corruption crime. However, the KPK has the additional authority of being able to take over the corruption case even though it is being handled by the Police or Prosecutor's Office (Article 8 paragraph (2) of the KPK Constitution). However, the acquisition of such corruption cases must be for reasons set out in Article 9 of the KPK Constitution. In addition to that authority, there is another matter which becomes the authority of KPK that is as regulated in Article 11 and Article 50 of KPK Constitution. The conclusion is that there is a mutually agreed arrangement to dispel the assumption of overlapping authority in terms of who is authorized to prosecute corrupt acts, arising after the issuance of Constitution.Keywords: Prosecutor, Corruption.


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