Marine Corps Intelligence Reform: Keeping Pace with an Evolving Intelligence Community

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. J. Torke
Author(s):  
David P. Oakley

The momentum for DoD intelligence reform quickly expanded into the broader Intelligence Community and Congress. The executive and legislative branches worked to improve intelligence support to military operations. Although many recommended reform measures were not initially instituted, the actions of a handful of individuals kept the discussion of intelligence reform and support to military operations alive. Over time, many of the issues that were not initially embraced found increased support as national security conditions changed and the requirement of support to military operations became immediate.


Special Duty ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Richard J. Samuels

This chapter identifies three generic drivers that affect the shape, pace, and direction of intelligence reform. The first consists of shifts in the strategic environment and the second driver of intelligence reform is technological change. Failure is the third, and often the most proximate, driver of intelligence reform. These three drivers forced the pace of intelligence reform in Japan in much the same way that they compelled reform elsewhere. This chapter observes how the drivers converge with the specific activities in which national intelligence communities are engaged—the “elements” of intelligence. It provides the historical and comparative framework for a subsequent analysis of the Japanese intelligence community.


2019 ◽  
pp. 157-179
Author(s):  
Christopher Kojm

Christopher Kojm inherited the continuing challenge of implementing intelligence reform. This time the tension lay between the two mandates given to the new director of national intelligence: to provide strategic intelligence analysis and to coordinate the activities of the far-flung intelligence community. The first mandate was clearly within the NIC’s purview; the second had been at best a collateral duty. To meet this second mandate, the DNI created national intelligence managers, whose charge seemed to erode the NIC’s mandate, causing several national intelligence officers to resign. More positively, unlike some of his predecessors, Kojm dealt with an Obama administration that welcomed dissenting opinions, as evidenced by the reception to the 2013 NIE on Afghanistan that informed a contentions policy debate over whether to draw down our military commitment or to “surge” to a higher level. Kojm’s tenure also saw production of Global Trends 2030.


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