Depoliticizing Policy Reform: Non-Partisan Expert Cues and Public Opinion Change on Financial Regulation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan M. Jensen ◽  
René Lindstädt
1972 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-431
Author(s):  
F. H. Goldner ◽  
R. R. Ritti ◽  
T. P. Ference

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pepper D Culpepper ◽  
Taeku Lee

Abstract The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 is the most comprehensive reform of American finance since the Great Depression and an ideal case to study how public opinion can counter the political power of finance. This article shows how pivotal congressional hearings created a clear story line for American media, one built around the way in which the investment bank Goldman Sachs made money during the crisis. We demonstrate that Goldman and CEO Lloyd Blankfein became the face of finance during these hearings. Results from a 2016 online survey experiment enable us to examine whether media portrayals highlighting the personal attributes of Blankfein and Goldman’s deal-making activate public opinion differently than articles foregrounding conflict of interest regulation and Goldman. Compared to the control condition, focus on Blankfein as the face of banking triggers negative affective response, greater appetite for regulating markets and greater attribution of blame toward banks for the financial crisis.


2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER K. ENNS ◽  
PAUL M. KELLSTEDT

This article presents evidence that both micro (individual level) and macro (aggregate level) theories of public opinion overstate the importance of political sophistication for opinion change. It is argued that even the least politically sophisticated segment of society receives messages about the economy and uses this information to update attitudes about political issues. To test this hypothesis, the authors have used General Social Survey data to construct a 31-item measure of policy mood, disaggregated by political sophistication, that spans from 1972 to 2004. They found that all the subgroups generally changed opinion at the same time, in the same direction, and to about the same extent. Furthermore, they show that groups at different sophistication levels change opinions for predominantly the same reasons.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL GOREN ◽  
CHRISTOPHER CHAPP

Party-driven and religion-driven models of opinion change posit that individuals revise their positions on culture war issues to ensure consonance with political and religious predispositions. By contrast, models of issue-driven change propose that public opinion on cultural controversies lead people to revise their partisan and religious orientations. Using data from four panel studies covering the period 1992–2012, we pit the party- and religion-based theories of opinion change against the issue-based model of change. Consistent with the standard view, party and religion constrain culture war opinion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, but consistent with our novel theory, opinions on culture war issues lead people to revise their partisan affinities and religious orientations. Our results imply that culture war attitudes function as foundational elements in the political and religious belief systems of ordinary citizens that match and sometimes exceed partisan and religious predispositions in terms of motivating power.


Author(s):  
Oleksandr Trukhachov

The article focuses on elements of social engineering (SI) that could be used by the states in their own interests during the COVID-19 pandemic. These elements were used to form negative public opinion, change the political landscape, and reduce citizens’ trust in their own governments. These elements are influence and persuasion. Traditional media and social networks play a major role in the use of these SI elements. SI has a long history of theoretical study as a scientific phenomenon. Practical elements of SI have a large arsenal, from government tools to influencing individuals. The article aims to demonstrate using SI elements, influence, and persuasion by the interested states and governments to obtain certain preferences for both foreign and domestic policies.


Author(s):  
Salil Benegal ◽  
Lyle Scruggs

How do economic conditions affect public opinion about climate change? Since the early days of the modern environmental movement, people have debated three main perspectives on how economic conditions impact environmental attitudes. The post-materialism perspective suggests that social and individual affluence leads to increasing concern and demands for action on climate change through long-run cultural change. A second view suggests that attitudes about climate change are shaped largely independently of economic conditions and reflect the emergence of a new environmental paradigm. A third view, associated with ecological modernization theory, suggests that attitudes about climate change are shaped in important ways by short-term economic factors, such as economic self-interest, and are likely to vary among citizens over time. While all of these perspectives have merit, we emphasize the impact of macroeconomic risk and business cycle fluctuations in shaping public attitudes toward climate change and more general aspects of environmental policy. Rising unemployment rates, for example, tend to be associated with declines in concern about environmental problems. This is a trend that is repeated across more than four decades and multiple recessions and recoveries dating back to the 1970s. Although it is obviously a more recently recognized environmental problem, public attitudes about climate change are also affected considerably by short-run economic conditions. This fact can influence the possibilities for policy reform. Through a process of motivated reasoning, in which immediate concerns and preferences to address economic risk lead individuals to adjust other attitudes about the environment, public concerns about climate change have ebbed and flowed with the business cycle. Other economic factors—such as societal affluence, personal employment status, or income—have more limited effects on attitudes about climate change, at least in most developed countries. The impact of economic risk on public attitudes about climate change has important implications for policy reform in democratic societies, because public support matters. While partisanship and ideology are frequently cited as explanations for fluctuating public opinion about climate change, macroeconomic risk offers a complementary explanation, which suggests that the framing and timing of environmental policy initiatives is as important as ideological acceptability. Positioning environmental actions or initiatives in better economic conditions, emphasizing immediate economic benefits, and countering unwarranted beliefs about personal costs, especially during challenging economic circumstances, should improve the prospects for efforts to address climate change.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 838-850 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Castanho Silva

Previous research has consistently found widespread attitudinal impacts of terrorist attacks. Using data from the European Social Survey, which was conducting interviews in 11 countries when the Charlie Hebdo attacks happened in January 2015, I compare respondents from before and after the shootings to test whether the event shifted public opinion on several topics. There is no evidence of average impacts across a range of issues, from xenophobia to ideological self-placement and immigration policy preferences. Data collected when the Paris November 2015 shootings happened also present no evidence of public opinion change on immigration and refugee policy matters in France, but there appears to be an effect in other countries—which varies according to contextual vulnerability. Results suggest that views on immigration and immigrants have, to a certain extent, stabilized in Europe and are less susceptible to shifts from dramatic events.


2021 ◽  
pp. 161-205
Author(s):  
Deva R. Woodly

Chapter 5 reports on the political impacts of the movement thus far, including the way it has reshaped public discourse and political meanings, transformed public opinion, and influenced public policy. This chapter contains extensive empirical data, including records of public opinion change over time, maps of where progressive prosecutors have been elected across the United States, lists of policies aimed at “defunding the police” or what abolitionist call nonreformist reforms, which emphasize divesting from police and prisons and investing in social support, policies that are under consideration or have been adopted by state and municipal legislatures.


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-130
Author(s):  
Michael J. Rosenfeld

Chapter 8 demonstrates that support for marriage equality is the fastest liberalizing attitude in the history of American public opinion. Abortion rights and gay rights divide the American public along similar lines (by region, religiosity, and party affiliation), but gay rights has undergone a remarkable transformation, while attitudes toward abortion rights are relatively static. One reason for the difference is that gay people have come out of the closet, while abortion histories remain closeted. Chapter 8 also shows that support for marriage equality seems to have made Americans more appreciative of all kinds of queer rights, including transgender rights. Marriage equality reduced the stigmas faced by all queer people and paved the way for more appreciation of all kinds of gay rights, exactly as the proponents of marriage equality said that it would.


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