(Specific Characteristics of Fragmentation of Political Elite System in Post-Soviet Russia)

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadezhda Ponomarenko
wisdom ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 104-115
Author(s):  
Alexander KHUDOBORODOV ◽  
Nadezhda KORSHUNOVA ◽  
Anna SAMOKHINA

In this article, the authors investigate the party–political elite of the Chelyabinsk region in the 1960s – 1980s. At the expense of the most qualified and competent representatives of the political elite of the Southern Urals, the leading cadres of the authorities of the USSR and the RSFSR were formed. This gives particular importance to this region in the field of management training. In 2020, in the light of the latest events related to the pandemic of the new coronavirus infection COVID-19, political scientists and journalists in many democratic countries predict a return to the socialist model of government with a fairly strong role of the state. As a result, it becomes especially relevant to study the general laws and regional specifics of the socialist model of the formation of the ruling elite, its composition, the laws of its functioning, coming to power, its role in the social process, the reasons for its degradation and leaving the historical arena.


1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. H. RIGBY

Previous research on elite change in Russia, the main findings of which are summarized here, has shown that well over half of post-Soviet Russia's political elite were drawn from the late-Soviet era elite. After a caveat against loose use of the nomenklatura concept, this article focuses on a far narrower sub-group, defined as the ‘top’ political elite, comprising 135 individuals in late 1988 and ninety-eight in 1996. Many of the old top elite found lower elite roles in post-Soviet Russia and most of the new top elite came from fairly senior jobs, but hardly any passed directly from the old top elite to the new. Only a minority of the top elite in 1996 were ‘natural heirs’ to their positions while others owed them primarily to connections or to their success in the new open competitive politics. In this respect (as in others) there are substantial differences between the three components of the new top elite, namely members of the government, senior office holders in the State Duma, and leading officials of the presidential administration. The Russian top elite today remains overwhelmingly male. Far more grew up in large cities than did their Soviet-era equivalents. Non-Russians are now relatively less under-represented. All are tertiary graduates, and nearly a half have postgraduate qualifications. Members of the presidential elite are far more likely than government members to be city-born and educated in the social sciences or humanities, and they average almost a decade younger. The Duma elite lies in between in all these respects.


2021 ◽  
pp. 405-417
Author(s):  
Olga N. Senyutkina ◽  
◽  
Vasily S. Khristoforov ◽  

The article analyzes a documents complex of the GPU-OGPU deposited in the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of Russia (TsA FSB Rossii) that have been recently declassified. Selected materials from the Eastern Department of the GPU-OGPU relate to the early Soviet period of the 1920s and the events that took place in Siberia and the Far East. The goals and objectives of the study include, first of all, assessment of the significance of the source material chosen by the authors for enriching our knowledge of the historical phenomena and processes that took place in the emerging Soviet state. In addition, the authors identify the mechanisms of creating “Surveys of the situation on the eastern outskirts of the USSR and in the neighboring countries,” which characterize the cause-and-effect relationships in the development of events in Siberia and the Far East. The materials of the sources demonstrate the level of knowledge about the ethno-confessional specifics of the aborigines and about the replenishment of the population in the region with new ethnic groups as a result of the change of government and the Civil War. The novelty of the research lies in identifying criteria for assessing the population groups of the region, primarily from the point of view of their possible actions against the Soviet regime. Integrated approach to assessing the source material of special services allows a comprehensive approach to their activities and rejects the stereotype persisting since the 1990s that everything done by the GPU-OGPU was aimed at terror against local residents. Since the article also deals with the factor of external influence (USA, Japan, France) on the mood of the aborigines, it can be argued that information about anti-Soviet efforts of other states, as analyzed by intelligence analysts, justifies in the eyes of modern reader the GPU-OGPU activities in order to stabilize the situation in Soviet Russia and the USSR beyond the Urals. The authors come to the conclusion that materials of the Eastern Department of the GPU-OGPU are a valuable source of information on the role of the Russian special services in ensuring stability in the Far East and Siberia in the first half of the 1920s. The point is that this information not only complements the available information on what was happening in the region, but also confirms the importance of collecting and analyzing data for making more effective decisions by the Soviet political elite.


1964 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-417
Author(s):  
Leon M. Herman

Official economic doctrine in the Soviet Union continues to hold fast to the view that growth conquers everything. A rapid rise in the level of economic output remains the magic key to the solution of all problems facing the Soviet Union, large and small alike. First of all, of course, economic growth at the highest possible rate remains an indispensable goal, in the official viewpoint, if the USSR is to be assured a firm position in the forefront of major world powers. There was surely no doubt in Stalin's mind that only a forced pace of growth in the economic capabilities of the Soviet state could prevent a dangerous backward drift in the international power position of Soviet Russia. This theme, as we know, was utilized by the former dictator to the hilt in his fierce drive to mobilize the physical and human resources of his country, and to motivate the political elite, for an all-out campaign against the strategic threat to the survival of the state that he considered to be inherent in economic backwardness.


2021 ◽  
pp. 340-356
Author(s):  
Yu. M. Galkina

Based on the materials of the National Archives of France, the activity of graduates-Slavists of the School of Oriental Languages (Paris) in 1918 in Russia is considered. The article focuses on philologists and dip-lomats: A. Mazon, H. Gauquié, J. Sichel-Dulong, P. Blay. Their activity in Soviet Russia and their view of the events taking place in the country are reconstructed on the basis of letters sent to the director of the School of Oriental Languages — P. Boyer. It is shown that many of the ideas declared by specialists in Russian studies are a reflection of the mentality prevailing in the French political elite: the idea of the imminent fall of the Bolshevik power, confidence in the German trace of the Russian revolution, the desire to view the political transformations of Soviet Russia through the prism of French historical and parliamentary experience. It is noted that H. Gauquié, took the most critical position in understanding the events in Russia, placing the needs of the Russian person at the center of his analytical work. The novelty of the research lies in the consideration of the role of France in the escalation of the Civil War in Russia, which for a long time was in the “blind spot” of research interest. The author of the article reconstructs the contacts of the School’s alumni with the anti-Bolshevik underground. The role and importance of scientists in supporting the intelligence activities of France in Soviet Russia are revealed.


Author(s):  
Ilya Yablokov

Throughout the post-Soviet period various conspiracy theories, most of which have been anti-Western, have moved from the margins of intellectual life to the mainstream of Russian politics. The trauma of the Soviet collapse enabled political elites to offer a conspiratorial reading of the event, and use this both for the purpose of nation-building and for suppressing democratic opposition by accusing its proponents of having destroyed the Soviet Union from within. Russian political elites use conspiracy theories to tackle emerging challenges by dividing Russian society into a majority loyal to the Kremlin, and a minority which is supposedly out to destroy Russia. The state authorities, including top-ranking politicians, seem to be the main producers of this conspiracy discourse; however, they use it with great care, with much reliance on the support of intellectuals who take part both in the production and dissemination of these theories to the general public. Studying conspiracy theories in Russia provides us with a means to comprehend domestic politics and to explain the strategies of the Russian political elite on both the domestic and international levels.


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