Tax Enforcement (De)Centralization: Tax Compliance Versus Competitiveness

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse van der Geest ◽  
Martin Jacob
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-38
Author(s):  
Rotimi Oladele ◽  
Foluso Olugbenga Aribaba ◽  
Abdul-Lateef Olamide Ahmodu ◽  
Saliu Adeshina Yusuff ◽  
Muyiwa Alade

Abstract This study assessed the effectiveness of tax enforcement tools as panacea for improving tax compliance and overall tax income in the Ondo State, Nigeria. Survey research design was adopted using primary data sourced through administration of structured questionnaire on 150 selected respondents from among staff of Federal Inland Revenue Service and State Board of Internal Revenue Service within the state. The Taro Yamane formula and judgment sampling technique were used to arrive at the sampled respondents. Outcome of Ordinary Least Square regression analysis showed regression coefficient and p-value of tax-audit (0.278; p=0.03<0.05) and tax penalty (0.463; p=0.000<0.05) respectively, indicating a positive and significant relationship of the two explanatory variables with tax compliance at .05 level of significance. The Implication is that a marginal increase in tax audit and tax penalty will lead to increase in tax compliance in Ondo State. No meaningful association exists between tax amnesty and tax compliance based on the finding of this study perhaps tax amnesty is a new policy that was just launched to encourage voluntary tax compliance. As such, it is imperative that tax audit and imposition of tax penalties be encouraged and sustained. These are envisaged to further improve the degree of tax compliance, consequently enhancing government tax revenue generation to augment dwindling oil revenue in Nigeria. As regards relatively new and still under watch tax amnesty, it may turn out to be a veritable tool for voluntary compliance in future if properly nursed.


Author(s):  
Brendan Walker-Munro

The black economy—also called the hidden, covert, underground, grey, illicit, or cash economy—is used to describe the aspect of a country's economy that is not visibly subject to taxation. However, it is also a useful measure of behavioral disruption to the taxation system, as the scale and tactics of black economy participants vary over time. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that existing tax policy (where legal constraints alone are used) is insufficient to affect black economy behaviour. It suggests that by adopting responses that are “more than law,” revenue administrations can deploy a more advanced and effective approach to improve tax compliance and can decrease the negative impacts of the black economy.


Author(s):  
Stephen J. Baluch

The development of the FHWA fuel tax compliance program is described, and estimates of additional motor fuel tax revenues generated by enforcement programs are presented. Substantial revenue losses caused by motor fuel tax evasion schemes were discovered in the mid-1980s. Since 1986, the Internal Revenue Service and FHWA have worked cooperatively to reduce fuel tax evasion by supporting changes in tax collection procedures and additional enforcement resources. Since fiscal year 1990, FHWA has provided funding to supplement state and IRS fuel tax enforcement resources under the auspices of the Joint Federal/State Motor Fuel Tax Compliance Project (joint project). The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 provided $5 million annually through 1997 for the joint project. Enforcement activities directly contribute hundreds of millions of dollars to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) and state transportation funds, a yield estimated at $10 to $18 per dollar spent on these programs. Furthermore, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 moved the incidence of the federal excise tax on diesel fuel to the point of removal from bulk storage at the terminal and required tax-exempt diesel fuel to be dyed. The HTF revenue from the diesel fuel tax has increased more than $1 billion in the year since these changes went into effect on January 1, 1994, net of the tax rate increases also enacted in 1993. Some $600 million to $700 million of this increase has been estimated to be the result of improved compliance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Almunia ◽  
David Lopez-Rodriguez

This paper analyzes the effects of size-dependent tax enforcement on firms’ tax compliance. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in Spain, which monitors firms with more than €6 million in reported revenue. Firms strategically bunch below the eligibility threshold in order to avoid stricter tax enforcement. The response is stronger in sectors where transactions leave more paper trail, suggesting that monitoring effort and the traceability of information reported by firms are complements. We estimate that there would be substantial welfare gains from extending stricter tax monitoring to smaller businesses. (JEL H25, H26, H32, L25)


ACCRUALS ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-204
Author(s):  
Fauzan Misra

Tax compliance is still a serious problem in various countries. This is indicated by the low level of tax compliance and tax ratio. This paper aims to discuss tax compliance from three main perspectives, namely theories about tax compliance, research variables derived from the theory put forward, and models of tax compliance enforcement. Broadly speaking, this theory is divided into two, namely the economic-deterrence model and the fiscal and social psychology model. For a discussion of the research variables that have been tested before, this article follows the classification proposed by Devos (2014). Devos divides these variables into three classifications, namely tax / moral ethics variables, equity and fairness variables and deterrence measures variables. This writing also discusses tax compliance as a behavioral phenomenon. Next, the models of tax law enforcement are explained as proposed by Alm and Torgler (2011) and several other proposed models. Alm and Torgler classified the models into three paradigms, that is, traditional deterrence paradigm, services paradigm, and trust paradigm. These models are proposed to build a mutually beneficial enforcement model for tax authorities and taxpayers.


Author(s):  
Chrisina Tri Setyorini

The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of understanding on tax accounting, tax justice toward tax compliance on SMEs tax. The research method applied in this study is quantitative deductive method. The population taken were SMEs registered in Department of Cooperatives SMEs, Trade and Industry in Banyumas, Purbalingga and Cilacap. The data were collected by using convenience sampling. They were collected through questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with 115 SMEs. The finding shows that the SMEs tax compliance is influenced by understanding on tax accounting and tax justice. In addition, this study also reveals that the majority of SMEs have lack of understanding about tax accounting and most respondents still doubt about tax justice. Thus, the recommendation of this research is to conduct a judicial review of Government Regulation No. 46 Year 2013 to conform to the principle of tax fairness, transparency in the field of taxation should be improved, and the bottom-up approach must be conducted prior to issuing regulations by the government, especially given the economic capacity of SMEs.


2008 ◽  
pp. 13-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim M. Bloomquist

This chapter describes the development of a prototype multi-agent based model – the Tax Compliance Simulator (TCS) – designed to help tax administrators think about ways to reduce tax evasion. TCS allows the user to define unique behavioral, income, and tax enforcement characteristics for one or two distinctive taxpayer populations. The capabilities of the model are demonstrated in a simulation of the deterrent effects of taxpayer audits. The simulation finds that a significant portion of audit-based deterrence may depend on the influence of taxpayers’ social networks rather than the probability of detection or penalty for underreporting as indicated by economic theory (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972).


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