Financial Misconduct Spillover: Institutional Investors with Disciplinary History and Aggressive Financial Reporting

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blerina Bela Zykaj ◽  
Avishek Bhandari ◽  
Babak Mammadov
2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Peter C. Kipp ◽  
Mary B. Curtis ◽  
Ziyin Li

SYNOPSIS Advances in IT suggest that computerized intelligent agents (IAs) may soon occupy many roles that presently employ human agents. A significant concern is the ethical conduct of those who use IAs, including their possible utilization by managers to engage in earnings management. We investigate how financial reporting decisions are affected when they are supported by the work of an IA versus a human agent, with varying autonomy. In an experiment with experienced managers, we vary agent type (human versus IA) and autonomy (more versus less), finding that managers engage in less aggressive financial reporting decisions with IAs than with human agents, and engage in less aggressive reporting decisions with less autonomous agents than with more autonomous agents. Managers' perception of control over their agent and ability to diffuse their own responsibility for financial reporting decisions explain the effect of agent type and autonomy on managers' financial reporting decisions.


Company Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 339-374
Author(s):  
Lee Roach

This chapter examines the role and importance of general meetings, the significant body of procedural rules by which general meetings are run, and the extent to which a company's members actually engage with general meetings. Members make decisions in one of two ways: through a resolution or by unanimous assent. A resolution is simply a vote that requires a specified majority vote in its favour in order to be passed. The resolutions of public companies must be passed at meetings, whereas resolutions of private companies can be passed at meetings or via a written resolution. Two forms of general meeting existed: the annual general meeting and extraordinary general meetings. In some cases, however, companies are required to hold a class meeting in which only one class of member is entitled to attend. To encourage institutional investors to engage more, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has published the UK Stewardship Code.


2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Frank ◽  
Luann J. Lynch ◽  
Sonja Olhoft Rego

ABSTRACT: We investigate the association between aggressive tax and financial reporting and find a strong, positive relation. Our results suggest that insufficient costs exist to offset financial and tax reporting incentives, such that nonconformity between financial accounting standards and tax law allows firms to manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same reporting period. To examine the relation between these aggressive reporting behaviors, we develop a measure of tax reporting aggressiveness that statistically detects tax shelter activity at least as well as, and often better than, other measures. In supplemental stock returns analyses, we confirm that the market overprices financial reporting aggressiveness. We also find that the market overprices tax reporting aggressiveness, but only for firms with the most aggressive financial reporting.


2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 969-999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan J. Wilson

ABSTRACT: Recent evidence suggests that corporate tax shelters have become important corporate instruments for reducing tax burden. Based on a sample of identified tax shelter participants, I develop a profile of the type of firm that likely engages in tax sheltering. The model detects tax shelter participants through the use of variables predicted to be either affected by or associated with tax sheltering. I find that firms actively engaged in tax sheltering exhibit larger ex post book-tax differences and more aggressive financial reporting practices. Using this model of tax shelter firm characteristics, I identify a broad sample of predicted tax shelter firms from the population of firms. I then examine whether tax sheltering is associated with wealth creation for shareholders or with managerial opportunism. I find that active tax shelter firms with strong corporate governance exhibit positive abnormal returns. This finding is consistent with tax sheltering being a tool for wealth creation in well-governed firms.


2019 ◽  
Vol IV (II) ◽  
pp. 126-133
Author(s):  
Sohail Rizwan

Corporate financial frauds have shaken the investors’ trust in the credibility of financial reports. Given the significance of the association between the quality of governance structure and reliability of financial reporting mechanism, the study evaluates this relation to evidence whether firms accused of financial misconduct improve their credibility. Applying a sample of 63 firms involved in violations of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) rules, the study affirms a positive relation between fraud disclosure and successive improvements in governance structure. The study further notices a positive relation between the buy-and-hold abnormal returns and the intensity of increase in outside director percentage after three years of fraud detection. These empirical assertions extend the understanding of the aftereffects of manipulating financial reports. They would be handful to the regulators debating corporate governance rules, to the management when crafting policies to reinstate investors’ trust after fraud revelation, and to the investors while deciding on future investments in these securities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 90-101
Author(s):  
Andyan Zakiy Pradhana ◽  
Arif Nugrahanto

Identification of tax avoidance is one of the substantial issues for tax authorities. Success in this stage ensure optimal tax compliance. To do that, financial statements become the object of critical analysis. This study seeks to identify the effect of financial statements (aggressive) on tax avoidance. The mineral and coal mining sector is chosen as the sample because it is one of the business sectors with a fairly high level of tax avoidance. There are 26 companies on the IDX that are the samples of this study. By regressing fixed effect panel data in the form of financial reports for 2012-2018, the results show that aggressive financial reporting has a positive effect on tax avoidance. With a confidence level of 99%, every 1% increase in the level of aggressiveness of financial reporting equivalent to an increase in tax avoidance efforts of 4.6%. For tax authorities, these findings can be used to assess the risk of non-compliance by taxpayers.


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