scholarly journals The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence

Author(s):  
Steve Sheppard
Author(s):  
Anthony Davidson Gray

This Article documents the increasing range of instances in which the presumption of innocence has been abrogated by legislation. Legislatures are responding to fears around terrorism and general community anxiety about law and order issues by increasing resort to reverse onus provisions. While the right of the legislature to enact laws thought to further public safety is acknowledged, the presumption of innocence is a long-standing, fundamental due process right. This Article specifically considers the extent to which reverse onus provisions are constitutionally valid in a range of jurisdictions considered comparable. It finds that the approach in use in some jurisdictions studied, testing the constitutionality of reverse onus provisions on the basis of whether they practically permit an accused to be found guilty although there is reasonable doubt about their guilt, has much to commend it. However, this is part-solution only, since legislatures may then be driven to redefine crimes to seek to effectively cast the burden of proof onto an accused by redefining what is in substance an element of a defense. Thus, it favors a substantive approach to determining what the prosecutor must show to obtain a conviction, utilizing concepts such as moral blameworthiness and actus reus/mens rea.


2021 ◽  
pp. 017084062110532
Author(s):  
Christian Frankel

This essay argues for reinforcing the empirical stance within organization studies by more systematically presuming non-organization. The empirical stance within organization studies thereby comes to revolve around organization as a claim made in empirical inquiries. The presumption of non-organization takes the legal principle of presumption of innocence as its paradigm. It works by placing the burden of proof on the empirical inquiries to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that what is inquired into is an instance of organization (where organization may be understood in terms of organizing, organization of something, formal organization etc.). Organization scholars may assume organization — and often for good reasons— when making a restaurant, a market, or something else object of inquiry. However, adopting the presumption of non-organization requires organization studies to make explicit what is understood by organization as well as what findings are mobilized to establish the claim that organization, in the sense subscribed to, is found. Hereby the presumption of non-organization reinforces the empirical stance as ‘a recurrent rebellion against the metaphysicians’ (van Fraassen). Metaphysics is not cancelled out by empirical inquiry, but it may be part and parcel of assumptions that inform empirical inquiry, and the presumption of non-organization calls for a recurrent test of such assumptions.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samah Al Agha

Purpose This paper aims to explore the offense of illicit enrichment by public officials. It examines whether “reconciliation” could be a preventive measure from corruption or a vehicle for corruption. Design/methodology/approach To obtain the data on identifying the illicit enrichment offense and on examining “reconciliation” as a legal tool that combats corruption, this study uses a combination of primary and secondary resources such as the assigned laws, precedents by the Egyptian Cassation Court, academic books, journal articles and reliable websites. Using the same resources, the study explores the adverse aspects associated with “reconciliation.” Findings The paper concludes that the Egyptian Illicit Gains Authority Law No.62 of 1975 jeopardizes the “presumption of innocence” because it shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant, but the Egyptian Cassation Court decides differently in many cases, whereby it puts emphasis on the prosecution to present enough evidence on illicit enrichment. If the accused is unable to prove the legitimate source of the increased wealth, then there will not be any conviction of illicit enrichment offense due to the presumption of innocence.


Author(s):  
Clooney Amal ◽  
Webb Philippa

This chapter focuses on the right to be presumed innocent, one of the most ancient and important principles of criminal justice, and a prerequisite for any system based on the rule of law. The right is absolute and non-derogable and, at its core, prohibits convictions that are predetermined or based on flimsy grounds. International human rights bodies have therefore found that where a conviction is based on non-existent, insufficient, or unreliable evidence, the presumption has been violated and a miscarriage of justice has occurred. More frequently, international human rights bodies have applied the presumption to require specific procedural protections during a trial. These include guarantees that the prosecution bears the burden of proving a defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that the defendant should not be presented or described as a criminal before he has been proved to be one. The chapter concludes that the presumption is protected in similar terms in international human rights treaties, but also highlights divergences in international jurisprudence relating to the standard for finding that a court’s assessment of evidence violates the presumption, the permissibility of reversing the burden of proof, and the extent to which the presumption applies after a trial has been completed.


2019 ◽  
pp. 10-36
Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

This chapter focuses on the burden of proof and presumption of innocence in criminal and civil cases under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It considers the influence of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 on the allocation of the burden of proof and compares legal/persuasive burden of proof with the evidential burden. It contains a detailed examination of the case law under this Act and the criteria developed to assess where reverse burdens should apply. It draws on academic commentary in making this analysis. It also looks at situations where the legal and the evidential burden may be split. It concludes with an overview of the law on presumptions.


Legal Studies ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-158
Author(s):  
G. Maher

In recent years various developments in the system of trial by jury in England and Wales have given rise to comment and concern. One such development was the abolition by s. 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 of the rule, said to have existed for over 600 years, that a jury must be unanimous in order to reach a verdict. These provisions are now contained in s. 17 of the Juries Act 1974 which allows for majority verdicts where there are no more than two dissentient voices to be returned under certain circumstances. The change in the unanimity rule has been criticised as striking at the root of the principle of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and has been interpreted by some as being the first step on the slippery slope to jury verdicts by simple majority, a development which would do even more to undermine the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt and might also lead to the complete abolition of trial by jury.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce P. Smith

When it is said that a defendant to a criminal charge is presumed to be innocent, what is really meant is that the burden of proving his guilt is upon the prosecution. This golden thread…runs through the web of the English criminal law. Unhappily Parliament regards the principle with indifference—one might almost say with contempt. The statute book contains many offences in which the burden of proving his innocence is cast on the accused.No principle in Anglo-American criminal law is more vaunted than the so-called “presumption of innocence”: the doctrine that the prosecution must bothproduceevidence of guilt andpersuadethe fact-finder “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The claim that “every man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty” has been described as “dear to the hearts of Englishmen” and as an omnipresent feature of English criminal law. In 1895, the United States Supreme Court declared the “presumption of innocence in favor of the accused” to be “the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary”—a protection that “lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Befitting its lofty stature in Anglo-American legal culture, the presumption has become associated, over time, with that most famous of Blackstonean maxims: “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Carstens

In any given context, negligence means that the defendant or the accused failed to foresee the possibility of harm (bodily/mental injury or death) occurring to another in circumstances where the reasonable person (diligens paterfamilias) in the defendant’s or accused position would have foreseen the possibility of harm occurring to another and would have taken steps to avoid or prevent it. The generic test for negligence is thus one of foreseeability and preventability. Although the test for negligence is fundamentally objective, it does contain subjective elements when the negligence of an expert is assessed. Where the defendant or accused is an expert, the standard of negligence is upgraded from the reasonable layperson to the reasonable expert. Where the expert is a medical practitioner, the standard is that of the reasonable medical practitioner in the same circumstances. It is to be noted that the standard of care and skill, in context of medical negligence, required of a general practitioner is to be distinguished from the standard and care and skill required of a medical specialist. Simply stated, if the physician is a general medical practitioner, the test is that of the reasonable general practitioner. If the physician is a specialist, the test is that of the reasonable specialist with reference to the specific field of medical specialisation. This principle is of particular significance as it has definite implications for the practice of medicine in a developing country as South Africa. Due to the shortages of medical services and qualified health care practitioners and/or compromised medical services, particularly in rural areas, health care practitioners (inclusive of doctors, nurses and paramedics) are often called upon to perform medical services for which they are, strictly speaking, not qualified to undertake – for example, a general practitioner in a small rural hospital may be required to administer anaesthesia to a patient despite not being a qualified anaesthetist; a nurse might be required to assist with the extraction of a tooth without being a dentist. The question arises, according to which yardstick they should be judged in instances of alleged negligence? The locality of practice and the imperitia culpae adnumeratur – rule are clearly also relevant factors in answering this question.In view of the aforesaid, it is the aim of this note to revisit the meaning and application of the maxim imperitia culpae adnumeratur and its possible link with conscious negligence (luxuria) in context of medical negligence. It is to be noted, for purposes of this discussion, that the test for medical negligence is exactly the same in civil law as it is in the criminal law – it makes no difference whether a medical practitioner is sued civilly for damages or by a patient who alleges that he has been negligently treated or is prosecuted by the state. The burden of proof in criminal cases though, is heavier than in civil cases since in the latter the plaintiff must only prove his case on a balance of probability, whereas in the former negligence must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.


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