Crowding-Out of Intrinsic Motivation - Opening the Black Box

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoinette A. Weibel ◽  
Katja Rost ◽  
Margit Osterloh
Keyword(s):  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Black Box ◽  
Crowding Out

scholarly journals Demotivating incentives and motivation crowding out in charitable giving

2017 ◽  
Vol 114 (28) ◽  
pp. 7301-7306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Chao
Keyword(s):  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Direct Mail ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Mediating Role ◽  
Multiattribute Choice ◽  
The Gift ◽  
Motivation Crowding

Research has shown that extrinsic incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation in many contexts. Despite this, many nonprofits offer conditional thank-you gifts, such as mugs or tote bags, in exchange for donations. In collaboration with a nonprofit, this study implements a direct mail field experiment and demonstrates that thank-you gifts reduced donation rates in a fundraising campaign. Attention-based multiattribute choice models suggest that this is because prospective donors shift attention to the salient gift offer, causing them to underweight less salient intrinsic motives. Attention to the gift may also cause individuals to adopt a more cost–benefit mindset, further de-emphasizing intrinsic motives. Consistent with these hypotheses, crowding out was driven by those who donated higher amounts in the previous year (i.e., those who likely had higher intrinsic motivation). In a complementary online experiment, thank-you gifts also reduced donation rates but only when the gift was visually salient. This corroborates the mediating role of attention in crowding out. Taken together, the laboratory and field results demonstrate that this fundraising technique can be demotivating in some contexts and that this may occur through an attention-based mechanism.

scholarly journals Experimental test of the effects of punishment probability and size on the decision to take a bribe

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Štěpán Bahník ◽  
Marek Albert Vranka
Keyword(s):  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Experimental Test ◽  
Personality Characteristics ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Task Modeling ◽  
Laboratory Task

Punishment is one of the main methods for preventing corruption. However, studies on the effect of size and probability of punishment on bribe-taking have not yielded conclusive results. We introduce a punishment by a fine or termination of the task, both with varying probabilities, in a laboratory task modeling the decision to take a bribe. The punishment decreased the probability of taking higher bribes, even though the probability of taking lower bribes was unaffected. Participants took fewer bribes when the fine was larger and more probable. We did not observe any clear negative effects of small punishment crowding out intrinsic motivation to behave honestly. However, we found that effects of punishment differ based on emotionality and honesty-humility of participants. The study shows that the prospect of punishment may deter dishonest behavior; however, personality characteristics should be taken into account when devising an effective deterrence policy.

Reciprocity and Social Norms: Short- and Long-Run Crowding Out Effects of Financial Incentives

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-213
Author(s):  
Jinhua Zhao ◽  
◽  
John M. Kerr ◽  
Maria Knight Lapinski ◽  
Robert Shupp ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Using Data

We link the reciprocity model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) with the theory of normative social behavior to study how financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation in both the short and long runs. Using data from a lab-based repeated public goods game, we find strong evidence in support of the reciprocity model and crowding out effects both when the payment is in place and after it stops. When the payment program is in place, subjects become less sensitive to reciprocity, perceive less kindness in others’ contributions, and care less about others’ welfare. The overall decrease in motivation to reciprocate reduces the effectiveness of the payment program by almost 50%. About 20% of the crowding out effect persists after the payment stops, and the reciprocity mechanism explains over three quarters of the long-run crowding out effect.

Honours as Signals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno S. Frey ◽  
Jana Gallus
Keyword(s):  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
The Future

Awards are non-material and symbolic rewards, and do not necessarily have to go with money. Award givers may emit signals of quality, of intent, and of their beliefs. Managers can use the signalling functions of awards to subtly steer the behaviour of (present and future) employees, without having to recur to control through explicit, conditional incentives. Awards can also give rise to signalling failures. They have to be used with moderation, and they can rarely be substituted for money where money is already in place. If well designed, awards can raise intrinsic motivation, as the recipients are explicitly lauded when they receive the award. In comparison to money, awards tend to raise loyalty to the giver and avoid crowding out intrinsic motivation; moreover, they have a more sustainable effect on behaviour. They also remain visible in the future, creating a trophy value that maintains the awards’ salience and their signalling functions even over the medium and long term.

scholarly journals Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y. Georgellis ◽  
E. Iossa ◽  
V. Tabvuma
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
The Public

scholarly journals Punishment and corruption

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Štěpán Bahník ◽  
Marek Albert Vranka
Keyword(s):  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Personality Characteristics ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Task Modeling ◽  
Laboratory Task

Punishment is one of the main methods for preventing corruption. However, studies on the effect of size and probability of punishment on bribe-taking have not yielded conclusive results. We introduce a punishment by a fine or termination of the task, both with varying probabilities, in a laboratory task modeling the decision to take a bribe. The punishment decreased the probability of taking higher bribes, even though the probability of taking lower bribes was unaffected. Participants took fewer bribes when the fine was larger and more probable. We did not observe any clear negative effects of small punishment crowding out intrinsic motivation to behave honestly. However, we found that effects of punishment differ based on emotionality and honesty-humility of participants. The study shows that the prospect of punishment may deter dishonest behavior; however, personality characteristics should be taken into account when devising an effective deterrence policy.

scholarly journals Call to Action: Intrinsic Motives and Material Interests

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 92
Author(s):  
Vasileios Kotsidis
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Cultural Transmission ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Call To Action ◽  
Material Interests ◽  
Game Theoretic

We provide a game-theoretic account of endogenous intrinsic motivation within a principal–agent framework. We explore the incentives of an altruistic principal who, by exerting costly effort, can intrinsically motivate a present-biased agent to exhibit a direct preference for more far-sighted behaviour. We characterize the conditions under which this happens. We show that allowing for endogenous intrinsic motivation generates interesting interplays between exogenous economic incentives and endogenous motivation, including the possibility of crowding out. Our model can be applied in a wide variety of contexts, including public policy, self-control, and cultural transmission.

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