scholarly journals Does Internet Censorship Reduce Crime Rate?

Author(s):  
Erwin Bramana Karnadi
Author(s):  
Erwin Bramana Karnadi

The study examines the relationship between Internet censorship and crime rate. Classical  views  of censorship  suggest that filtering contents  that are per- ceived as negative such as violence and pornography  can have a negative impact on crime rate. However,  there is no evidence to suggest  any causal relationship  between censorship  and crime rate. The Internet has  made it easier for individuals  to access  any information  they want, and hence Internet Censorship  is applied  to filter contents that are deemed negative. We discussed several approaches that may be used to estimate the relationship between  Internet Censorship  and Crime Rate, and we decided  to use  OLS. We  found that Conflict Internet Censorship  is the only type of Internet censorship that has a significant negative impact on Crime Rate. Furthermore, it only significantly affects Crime Rate for highly educated countries.


Author(s):  
Abdulla Almazrouei ◽  
◽  
Azlina Md Yassin ◽  

Strategic management have gained popularity in the public institutions to foster good delivery service to the public. The strategic planning enables organizations to establish a strategic match between the internal competency, resources and external environment. Majority of the successful organizations across the world use strategic management and planning as a tool that enables to optimize the operations and achieve maximum productivity with the resources. This paper reviewed on strategic management for organisations in Abu Dhabi especially for Abu Dhabi Police (ADP) force. It presents three strategic management theories which can be adopted by an organisation. This would help the organisation such as police department to reduce the increasing crime rate and mortality rate in UAE.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136248062098423
Author(s):  
Aaron Roussell ◽  
Lori Sexton ◽  
Paul Deppen ◽  
Marisa Omori ◽  
Esther Scheibler

This project combines the conversation on the national crime rate with emerging discussions on the violence that the state perpetrates against civilians. To measure US lethal violence holistically, we reconceptualize the traditional definitional boundaries of violence to erase arbitrary distinctions between state- and civilian-caused crime and violence. Discussions of the “crime decline” focus specifically on civilian crime, positioning civilians as the sole danger to the health, wealth, and safety of individuals. Violence committed by the state—from police homicide to deaths in custody to in-prison sexual assault—is not found in the traditionally reported crime rate. These absences belie real dangers posed to individuals which are historical and contemporary, nonnegligible, and possibly rising. We present Uniform Crime Report data side-by-side with data on police killings, deaths in custody, and executions from sources such as Fatal Encounters, the Washington Post, the Guardian, and the Center for Disease Control to produce a robust discussion of deaths produced through the criminal legal system. We ground this empirical analysis in a broader conceptual framework that situates state violence squarely within the realm of US crime, and explore the implications of this more holistic view of crime for future analyses.


2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Folorunsho M. Ajide

2021 ◽  
pp. 016555152110141
Author(s):  
Nikolai Topornin ◽  
Darya Pyatkina ◽  
Yuri Bokov

The research is devoted to the study of digital protectionism technologies, in particular, Internet censorship as a non-tariff barrier to digital trade and the determination of the strategic motives of states to use them. The reports ‘Freedom on the Net’ and ‘The network readiness index 2020’ acted as a basic data source for the study of modern instruments of government regulation of interactions in the digital environment. Internet censorship technologies have been considered in six countries with varying levels of Internet freedom: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia and Estonia. The key instruments of digital protectionism as a non-tariff barrier of the digital economy have been identified, such as: localisation requirements; restrictions on cross-border data flow; system of national protection of intellectual property rights; discriminatory, unique standards or burdensome testing; filtering or blocking; restrictions on electronic payment systems or the use of encryption; cybersecurity threats and forced technology transfer. Internet censorship technologies have been demonstrated and their influence on the strategic development of trade relations between economies in cyberspace has been determined. The scientific value of the article lies in substantiating the understanding of Internet censorship as a natural tool for regulating the development of a digital society and international trade relations. Each state at one time goes through a technological stage of development, which leads to the emergence of different levels of digital isolation and integration; and Internet censorship is a natural element in the system of building a national platform economy and consolidating the country’s internal technological and innovative advantages in digital realities.


2002 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Savage ◽  
Bryan Vila
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Meserve ◽  
Daniel Pemstein

The expansion of digital interconnectivity has simultaneously increased individuals’ access to media and presented governments with new opportunities to regulate information flows. As a result, even highly democratic countries now issue frequent censorship and user data requests to digital content providers. We argue that government internet censorship occurs, in part, for political reasons, and seek to identify the conditions under which states censor. We leverage new, cross-nationally comparable, censorship request data, provided by Google, to examine how country characteristics co-vary with governments’ digital censorship activity. Within democracies, we show that governments engage in more digital censorship when internal dissent is present and when their economies produce substantial intellectual property. But these demand mechanisms are modulated by the relative influence that democratic institutions provide to narrow and diffuse interests; in particular, states with proportional electoral institutions censor less.


IEEE Spectrum ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 44 (11) ◽  
pp. 20-22
Author(s):  
Mark Anderson
Keyword(s):  

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