Par Pharmaceutical Companies has commenced shipping generic extended-release (ER) metoprolol succinate 25mg in the US.

2006 ◽  
Vol &NA; (1567) ◽  
pp. 22
Author(s):  
&NA;
Keyword(s):  
Extended Release ◽  
Pharmaceutical Companies ◽  
Metoprolol Succinate ◽  
The Us

The Eleventh Circuit Holds that Agreements in which Pharmaceutical Companies Pay Generic Companies Not to Compete May be Valid

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues
Keyword(s):  
Pharmaceutical Companies ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Patent Holder ◽  
Trial Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Us ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Appeals Court ◽  
Two Sides

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.

Formulation and In vitro Release Characterization of Metoprolol Succinate Extended Release Tablets

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 1537-1543
Author(s):  
Sakthikumar T ◽  
Rajendran N N ◽  
Natarajan R
Keyword(s):  
Drug Release ◽  
Extended Release ◽  
In Vitro Release ◽  
Methyl Cellulose ◽  
Wet Granulation ◽  
Direct Compression ◽  
Metoprolol Succinate ◽  
Extended Release Formulations ◽  
Vitro Release

The present study was aimed to develop an extended release tablet of metoprolol Succinate for the treatment of hypertension.  Four extended release formulations F1-F4 were developed using varying proportions of hydroxylpropyl-methylcellulose K100M, sodium carboxy methyl cellulose and Eudragit L30 D55 by wet granulation. Five extended release formulations F5-F9 containing HPMC K100M and HPMC 5 cps in varying concentration were developed by direct compression. The physicochemical and in vitro release characteristics of all the formulations were investigated and compared. Two formulations, F7 and F8 have shown not more 25% drug release  in 1st h, 20%-40% drug release at 4th hour, 40%-60% drug release at 8th hour and not less than 80% at 20th hour and the release pattern conform with USP specification for 24 hours extended release formulation. It can be conclusively stated that optimum concentration of HPMC K100M (58%-65%) by direct compression method can yield an extended release of metoprolol succinate for 24 hours.

Tablet splitting: Product quality assessment of metoprolol succinate extended release tablets

2010 ◽  
Vol 401 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 25-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Zhao ◽  
Ahmed Zidan ◽  
Mobin Tawakkul ◽  
Vilayat A. Sayeed ◽  
Mansoor Khan
Keyword(s):  
Quality Assessment ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Extended Release ◽  
Metoprolol Succinate ◽  
Tablet Splitting

Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons – History, Main Provisions, Significance and Reasons for Not Signing

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-21
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
The United States ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Pharmaceutical Companies ◽  
Special Role ◽  
International Agreement ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Weapons Control

Received 30 January 2021. Accepted for publication 20 March 2021 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) does not have a legally binding verification regime. An attempt by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, created by the UN Committee on Disarmament, to strengthen the BTWC by developing a legally binding document – the Protocol, was blocked by the United States in July 2001. The purpose of this work is to study the history, main provisions, significance and reasons for not signing the Protocol to the BTWC. The attention is paid to the events in biological weapons control, which have led a number of countries to the understanding of the necessity to develop the Protocol. The background of the US actions to block this document is the subject of special consideration. During the Second Review Conference on the Implementation of the Convention (8–25 September 1986, Geneva) the USSR, the German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic proposed to develop and adopt the Protocol as an addition to the BTWC. This document was supposed to establish general provisions, definitions of terms, lists of agents and toxins, lists of equipment that was present or used at production facilities, threshold quantities of biological agents designed to assess means and methods of protection. The proposed verification mechanism was based on three «pillars»: initial declarations with the basic information about the capabilities of each State Party; inspections to assess the reliability of the declarations; investigations to verify and confirm or not confirm the alleged non-compliance with the Convention. The verification regime was to be under the control of an international organization – the Organization for the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons. However, the US military and pharmaceutical companies opposed the idea of international inspections. The then US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Robert Bolton II, played a special role in blocking the Protocol. During the Fifth Review Conference in December 2001, he demanded the termination of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts mandate for negotiations under the pretext that any international agreement would constrain US actions. The current situation with biological weapons control should not be left to chance. Measures to strengthen the BTWC should be developed, taking into account the new fundamental changes in dual-use biotechnology. It should be borne in mind, that the Protocol, developed in the 1990s, is outdated nowadays.

Shareholder Value, Management Culture and Production Regimes in the Transformation of the German Chemical-Pharmaceutical Industry

2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sigurt Vitols
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Shareholder Value ◽  
Value Management ◽  
Pharmaceutical Companies ◽  
Drivers Of Change ◽  
Management Culture ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Us ◽  
Production Regime ◽  
National Systems

One of the greatest points of controversy in the recent literature in political economy is the extent to which “shareholder value” oriented institutional investors are drivers of change in national systems of corporate governance. This article argues that the key question is how management cultures shape managerial responses to pressures for change from capital markets. Empirical evidence for this argument is provided through an examination of changes since the mid-1990s at the “Big Three” German integrated chemical/pharmaceutical companies: Hoechst, Bayer and BASF. Despite facing similar demands from shareholder-value oriented investors, management at the three companies have pursued quite different strategies. The end result, however, may be the same from a production regime perspective, that is, the long-run withdrawal of “Big Pharma” from Germany as a location for R&D due to a more favorable institutional framework in the US.

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