scholarly journals What are the Ultimate Sources for Privileges and Immunities of the European Union? Comment on the Judgement of the Court of Justice, Case C-502/19 Junqueras Vies

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-153
Author(s):  
Marek Zieliński

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in the case of Mr Junqueras Vies has been significant in many respects. It has split the mandate of Members of the European Parliament from the parliamentary functions fulfilled by them. It has also extended the scope of parliamentary privileges and immunities of MEPs as a result of extensive reading of the provisions of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the EU. The present comment argues that such an extensive interpretation had only been possible because the CJEU found in its judgment that the principle of representative democracy created a ‘context’ in which the Court reread the respective provisions on the immunities of MEPs. As a result of the above, it seems the CJEU has found yet another basis for the EU’simmunities, functioning independently of Article 343 TFEU. Contrary to the EU’s immunities which are based on Article 343 TFEU and operate according to the principle of functional necessity, which is characteristic for traditional international organisations, immunities based on the principle of representative democracy operate according to ‘constitutional’ logic, which is characteristic for states. As the EU is evidently neither a traditional international organisation nor a state, simultaneous operation of these two sources for its privileges and immunities may prove to be difficult. In particular, EU citizens may start to wonder why the EU, the functioning of which is based on the principle of representative democracy, enjoys privileges and immunities characteristic for traditional intergovernmentalorganisations.

Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

The aims of this chapter are threefold. It first briefly considers the events that have led to the creation of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, it introduces the reader to the principal institutions of the Union: the European Council; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of each of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates, where appropriate, the nature of the institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the member states.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter has three aims. It first briefly considers the origins of the what is now the European Union (EU). Secondly, it discusses the institutions of the Union, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates the nature of institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Fathi Hussain ◽  
Mahdi Zahraa

Abstract Dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) are the heart of international organisations without which organisations would be ineffective. The European Union (EU) is probably the most effective regional body whose efficacy is largely due to its powerful judicial organ, the Court of Justice (CJEU). This article also examines the DSM available in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in order to assess its effectiveness. It briefly discusses aspects of the EU and CJEU to help provide suggestions to improve the GCC DSM. This article concludes that the GCC DSM lacks effectiveness due to an inherent defect in its DMS organs. This defect is twofold: first, the GCC has yet to establish an effective judicial organ to deal with its disputes; and, second, there is a lack of political will to establish an organ that is vested with a supranational power that can override the individual will of the Member States.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Tamás Molnár

On June 3, 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), closely following the Advocate General's Opinion, delivered its Grand Chamber judgment in case C-650/18 Hungary v. European Parliament by dismissing Hungary's action. The ruling confirms that the European Parliament (EP) acted within the procedural boundaries of its powers when initiating, by a two-thirds majority vote of its members, proceedings against Hungary for the situation in the country regarding the rule of law, democracy, and other values on which the European Union (EU) is founded. The ruling comes after the Hungarian government decided to challenge the validity of the resolution of the European Parliament of September 12, 2018, which triggered the proceedings foreseen in the event of a clear risk of serious breaches of the foundational values of the EU, including the rule of law, pursuant to Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).


2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.


Author(s):  
Panagiotis Delimatsis

Secrecy and informality rather than transparency traditionally reign trade negotiations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. Yet, transparency ranks among the most basic desiderata in the grammar of global governance and has been regarded as positively related to legitimacy. In the EU’s case, transparent trade diplomacy is quintessential for constitutional—but also for broader political—reasons. First, even if trade matters fall within the EU’s exclusive competence, the EU executive is bound by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to inform the European Parliament, the EU co-legislator, in regular intervals. Second, transparency at an early stage is important to address public reluctance, suspicion, or even opposition regarding a particular trade deal. This chapter chronicles the quest for and turning moments relating to transparency during the EU trade negotiations with Canada (CETA); the US (TTIP), and various WTO members on services (TiSA).


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Daukšienė ◽  
Arvydas Budnikas

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the purpose of the action for failure to act under article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The statements are derived from the analysis of scientific literature, relevant legislation, practice of the European Union Court of Justice (CJEU) and the European Union General Court (EUGC). Useful information has also been obtained from the opinions of general advocates of the CJEU. The article of TFEU 265, which governs the action for failure to act, is very abstract. For this reason, a whole procedure under the article 265 TFEU was developed by the EU courts. The original purpose of the action for failure to act was to constitute whether European Union (EU) institution properly fulfilled its obligations under the EU legislation. However, in the course of case-law, a mere EU institution’s express refusal to fulfill its duties became sufficient to constitute that the EU institution acted and therefore action for failure to act became devoid of purpose. This article analyzes whether the action for failure to act has lost its purpose and become an ineffective legal remedy in the system of judicial review in the EU. Additionally, the action for failure to act is compared to similar national actions.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONIS ANTONIADIS

Ranging from the denial of direct effect to WTO law by the Court of Justice to a WTO-friendly legislative culture currently booming in the EU's political institutions, different approaches towards WTO law have been adopted within the EU. This article classifies the different approaches into reactive, coactive, and proactive by drawing on their common characteristics. The principal aim is to explore the considerations shaping the development of the different approaches and to argue that these stem from the interaction between the judiciary and the legislature. In doing so, this article purports to provide a comprehensive view of the application of WTO law within the Community legal order.


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