scholarly journals Accessible Information and Constitutional Democracy: Who Counts?

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Jennifer Raso

Accessible information is an essential resource for equal, meaningful participation in the public life of a democratic society. Such information is particularly vital for the effective functioning of all three branches of government in our constitutional democracy: the administrative branch, which creates government policy and holds state actors accountable to the public; the legislative branch, which scrutinizes old and creates new legislation; and the judicial branch, which reviews the acts of the legislative and executive branches. For the law-reform processes of each branch to effectively foster the informed creation and critique of public law and policy, we require reliable, accessible data depicting the diversity of individuals who make up the broader Canadian public.Beyond this practical purpose, accessible information plays an expressive role as it constitutes a particular notion of the Canadian public. The data created by national population censuses and assembled in welfare reports has the power to “nominat[e] into existence” certain groups of people and, conversely, to “refus[e] to name” others. Such information not only represents the public, it also creates the public, as it stands in for the public at all levels of government. By communicating who we are as a society and how we are changing, census information and welfare reports shape our understanding of ourselves — our laws, policies, government, and place in the world.

Author(s):  
Pascale Chapdelaine

This chapter proposes two principles that should inform the development of copyright law and policy and of user rights. The first calls for more cohesion between copyright law, private law, and public law, and for less exceptionalism in copyright law. The second requires that the balance in copyright law be adjusted for its future application as a mediation tool between the competing interests of copyright holders, users, intermediaries, and the public. Instituting positive obligations for copyright holders in relation to users and steering freedom of contract toward the objectives of copyright law are necessary regulatory changes to rectify ongoing imbalances. The principle of technological neutrality should guide the judiciary in its application of copyright’s objective of promoting a balance in copyright law. The proposed guiding principles lead to the creation of a taxonomy and hierarchy of copyright user rights that take into account the myriad ways users experience copyright works.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoolo 'Nyane ◽  
Tekane Maqakachane

In Lesotho, standing to litigate is still based on the private law doctrine of locus standi in judicio. This doctrine requires the person who institutes an action in a court of law, regardless of whether it is in the private or public interest, to satisfy the court that he or she is directly and substantially interested in the outcome of the decision. Section 22(1) of the Constitution of Lesotho provides that any person who alleges that the Bill of Rights in the Constitution has been violated 'in relation to him' may approach the court of law for redress. Although the Constitution is silent about the enforcement of the other non-Bill of Rights parts of the Constitution, the courts have readily invoked section 22(1) to exclude litigants who are not 'directly and substantially' interested in the outcome of the case. This restrictive approach notwithstanding, a more liberal approach has been adopted in pockets of public law decisions of the superior courts in Lesotho. The purpose of this article is to amplify this liberal approach. The article argues that constitutional democracy in Lesotho will benefit from a liberal approach as opposed to a restrictive approach to standing. This is supported by a discernible movement in modern-day public law towards a more liberal approach to standing.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (03) ◽  
pp. 689-762 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Gover

In the “self‐governance era” of indigenous‐state relations, there is a growing interest in the first‐order question of tribal governance: who are the members of recognized tribes, and how are they chosen? Tribal constitutions contain formal tribal membership criteria but are not ordinarily in the public domain. This article presents findings from a study of the membership rules used in more than seven hundred current and historical tribal constitutions and codes. It offers a comparative analysis to explain significant differences between North American and Australasian tribal constitutionalism, particularly in the administration of descent, multiple membership, and disenrollment. It advances the argument that tribes self‐constitute in ways that are more relational and less ascriptive than is suggested in current political theory and policy; that existing representations of tribes obscure nontribal expressions of indigeneity, on which tribes depend; and that these expressions should be officially supported in public law and policy.


1877 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-420
Author(s):  
T. E. Colebrooke

The collection of specimens of imperial titles which will be found in this paper was begun during the recent discussions in Parliament, and with reference to India only. When it was proposed to add to the titles hitherto borne by the Sovereigns of the British Isles another, which was supposed to be more expressive of the relation of the Crown of England to the people and princes of India, it seemed to me important to inquire what were the titles borne by the sovereigns of dynasties in the East whose power could alone compare with our own. Many of the titles of honour, and especially sovereign titles, which have been at different times current in the East, bear a different significance to those in Europe; and to apply to an Eastern dominion titles which had their origin in the public law and policy of the Western world seemed an anachronism, and likely to lead to confusion of language and ideas. Popular language has, indeed, long applied the title of Emperor to the sovereigns of extensive dominions in the East. So far is this carried that it is almost universally used in speaking of all the great monarchies in Asia in modern times, and by grave historians. We read of Emperors of China, of India, of Tartary, and of Constantinople.


Author(s):  
Chris Dent ◽  
Yvonne Haigh

AbstractUnderstandings of the public interest underpin many law reform processes. The public interest is not a fully definable term and so reform bodies have to engage with a range of articulations of that interest. The negotiation of the different articulations, however, has not been explored empirically before. This article reports on a study of the claims to the public interest in a public Australian inquiry into potential abuses of the patent system by pharmaceutical companies. More specifically, submissions to the Pharmaceutical Patents Review are analysed and the results show “oligopolistic” tensions between competing views of the public interest—and with these views claiming primacy over more technical understandings of the issues. This lack of a single “public interest” allows dominant players to frame the debate to reflect their interests; and the tension between these players means that the debate, and the underlying problem, has not been subject to a resolution.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Zines

This article originally was published as a Law and Policy Paper. The Law and Policy Papers series was established in 1994 by the Centre for International and Public Law in the Faculty of Law, the Australian National University. The series publishes papers contributing to understanding and discussion on matters relating to law and public policy, especially those that are the subject of contemporary debate. In 1999 the papers were published jointly by the Centre for International and Public Law and The Federation Press. This article is reproduced in the Federal Law Review with the permission of the original publishers.


Author(s):  
Robert Leckey

Through the narrow entry of property disputes between former cohabitants, this chapter aims to clarify thinking on issues crucial to philosophical examination of family law. It refracts big questions—such as what cohabitants should owe one another and the balance between choice and protection—through a legal lens of attention to institutional matters such as the roles of judges and legislatures. Canadian cases on unjust enrichment and English cases quantifying beneficial interests in a jointly owned home are examples. The chapter highlights limits on judicial law reform in the face of social change, both in substance and in the capacity to acknowledge the state's interest in intimate relationships. The chapter relativizes the focus on choice prominent in academic and policy discussions of cohabitation and highlights the character of family law, entwined with the general private law of property and obligations, as a regulatory system.


Author(s):  
Ethan J. Leib ◽  
Stephen R. Galoob

This chapter examines how fiduciary principles apply to public offices, focusing on what it means for officeholders to comport themselves to their respective public roles appropriately. Public law institutions can operate in accordance with fiduciary norms even when they are enforced differently from the remedial mechanisms available in private fiduciary law. In the public sector, fiduciary norms are difficult to enforce directly and the fiduciary norms of public office do not overlap completely with the positive law governing public officials. Nevertheless, core fiduciary principles are at the heart of public officeholding, and public officers need to fulfill their fiduciary role obligations. This chapter first considers three areas of U.S. public law whose fiduciary character reinforces the tenet that public office is a public trust: the U.S. Constitution’s “Emoluments Clauses,” administrative law, and the law of judging. It then explores the fiduciary character of public law by looking at the deeper normative structure of public officeholding, placing emphasis on how public officeholders are constrained by the principles of loyalty, care, deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness. It also compares the policy implications of the fiduciary view of officeholding with those of Dennis Thompson’s view before concluding with an explanation of how the application of fiduciary principles might differ between public and private law settings and how public institutions might be designed or reformed in light of fiduciary norms.


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