scholarly journals The Honour of the Dead – the Moral Right of Integrity Post-Mortem

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-518
Author(s):  
Jani McCutcheon

Can the honour of the dead be prejudiced? There is much philosophical debate about whether the dead can, or should, enjoy legal rights. Australia, like many jurisdictions, has apparently bypassed that debate and confers post-mortem moral rights on authors, which endure for at least 70 years after an author's death. The Australian moral right of integrity protects authors from certain conduct in relation to their copyright works, which is prejudicial to their honour or reputation. This deliberate conferral of a posthumous right ostensibly acknowledges that a deceased author's honour can be harmed. This article examines questions surrounding the apparent conundrum of posthumous prejudice to an author's honour. How can prejudice to the honour of the dead be established in the absence of the author, particularly if honour is interpreted subjectively? Do insuperable evidentiary hurdles render the posthumous honour limb of the moral right of integrity illusory? The article concentrates on Australian law, but engages in relevant comparative treatments, particularly with French, Canadian and United Kingdom law. Judicial consideration of moral rights under the common law is scant, particularly in Australia, and rarer still in a post-mortem context. However, the issues explored in the article are important, will inevitably arise for consideration and merit a comprehensive examination.

2013 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson

Despite the hackneyed expression that ‘judges should interpret the law and not make it’, the fact remains that there is some scope within the separation of powers doctrine for the courts to develop the common law incrementally. To this extent, the courts can effectively legislate, but only to this limited extent if they are to respect the separation of powers doctrine. On occasion, however, the courts have usurped the power entrusted to Parliament, and particularly so in instances where a strict application of the existing law would lead to results that offend their personal notions of what is fair and just. When this occurs, the natural consequence is that lawyers, academics and the public in general lose respect for both the judges involved as well as the adversarial system of criminal justice. In order to illustrate this point, attention will focus on the case of Thabo Meli v United Kingdom in which the Privy Council, mistakenly believing that it could not reach its desired outcome through a strict application of the common law rule of temporal coincidence, emasculated the rule beyond recognition in order to convict the accused. Moreover, the discussion to follow will demonstrate that not only was the court wrong in its belief that the case involved the doctrine of temporal coincidence, but the same result would have been achieved had the Council correctly identified the issue as one of legal causation and correctly applied the principles relating thereto.


1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-564
Author(s):  
Dawn Oliver

First, I want to express my gratitude and sense of honour in being invited to deliver the Lionel Cohen lecture for 1995. The relationship between the Israeli and the British legal systems is a close and mutually beneficial one, and we in Britain in particular owe large debts to the legal community in Israel. This is especially the case in my field, public law, where distinguished academics have enriched our academic literature, notably Justice Zamir, whose work on the declaratory judgment has been so influential. Israeli courts, too, have made major contributions to the development of the common law generally and judicial review very notably.In this lecture I want to discuss the process of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom, and to explore some of the difficulties that lie in the way of reform. Some quite radical reforms to our system of government — the introduction of executive agencies in the British civil service, for instance—have been introduced without resort to legislation. There has been a spate of reform to local government and the National Health Service.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony O. Nwafor

The realization that the directors occupy important position in corporate governance, and as business men and women, cannot be prevented from having dealings with the company, demand a close scrutiny of corporate transactions in which they are directly or indirectly involved or have an interest to ensure that such interest is not placed above their duty to the company. One of the ways in which the law strives to achieve this balance is by imposing a duty on the director to disclose to the board any interest he has in company’s transactions. This requirement which was previously governed by the common law and the company’s articles, is presently increasingly finding a place in companies statutes in different jurisdictions. The paper examines, through a comparative analysis, the provisions on the duty of the director to disclose interest in company’s transactions in South Africa and United Kingdom with the aim of discovering the extent to which the statute in both jurisdictions upholds the common law prescriptions. The paper argues that the need for transparency in corporate governance and the preservation of the distinct legal personality of the company demand that the duty to disclose interest should be upheld even in those cases of companies run by a sole director.


2020 ◽  
pp. 3-32
Author(s):  
Gary Watt

This chapter focuses on the historical and conceptual foundations of trusts and equity, first examining the history of the relationship between law and equity, including the historical origins of the trust. It then explains the idea of equity and how it is intertwined with the common law, and compares the trust with concepts such as gifts and contracts. The chapter shows that the trust arose in response to equity’s special concern to ensure that legal rights are not used in bad conscience, but later developed into a sophisticated institution governed by established rules. It looks at the reform of the Court of Chancery and considers trust property, equitable rights under a trust, separation of legal and equitable title, and the paradox of property and obligation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 208-232
Author(s):  
Caterina Gardiner

The common law that applies to Internet contract formation could be said to exist in a penumbra—a grey area of partial illumination between darkness and light—where it may be possible to lose sight of established contract law principles. Internet contracts raise difficult issues relating to their formation that challenge traditional contract doctrine. Analysis of case law from the United States, United Kingdom and Ireland illustrates that the courts have not applied contract formation doctrine in a principled or consistent way. There is a tendency for decisions to be reached for policy reasons, for example, to facilitate the development of e-commerce, or to achieve a result that is considered fair, rather than on sound principles of contract law. There may also be some uncertainty arising from the relationship between statutory consumer protection rules and common law contract formation doctrine. The enforceability of Internet contracts in the common law courts remains unpredictable. This article argues that although Internet contracting may raise distinctive contract formation issues, it is possible for the judiciary to invoke the inherent flexibility of the common law, to take into account the specific characteristics of Internet contracts, while still adhering to established contract law doctrine and maintaining a principled approach.


1902 ◽  
Vol 36 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 417-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Nicoll

The liability of the employer to compensate his employees, as well as other persons, for injuries sustained through his fault, may be traced from an early period in the world's history in the Common Law of various countries.For example, by the Jewish Law, said to have been promulgated about the year 1500 B.C., if a master were the means of causing the loss, either intentionally or unintentionally, of the eye or of the tooth of his slave, he was bound to let him go free for his eye or his tooth's sake. Again, according to the same law, if an employer allowed his ox to gore either his servant or a stranger, he was required to pay various compensations to the injured if he survived, or to his relatives in the event of the injury being followed by death.


Author(s):  
Don Herzog
Keyword(s):  
Tort Law ◽  
The Dead ◽  
The Law ◽  

If you defame the dead, even someone who recently died, tort law does not think that’s an injury: not to the grieving survivors and not to the dead person. This book argues that defamation is an injury to the recently dead. It explores history, including the shaping of the common law, and offers an account of posthumous harm and wrong. Along the way, it offers a sustained exploration of how we and the law think about corpse desecration.


1999 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-248 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractWithin the common law world, the use of the term informed consent implies the American doctrine. Informed consent as a doctrine is not part of the law in the United Kingdom. However, it is possible to predict a way forward in disclosure cases yet to be heard in the courts of the United Kingdom. These predictions are based on current developments in the common law in the United Kingdom as well as those in Canada and Australia, on the European convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and on trends within the medical profession itself in the light of the Bolam test.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier García Oliva

The enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is the most recent legal mechanism developed to protect believers, beliefs and religious feelings in the United Kingdom. Despite the recognition of a certain degree of overlap between the different categories, this article proposes a broad distinction between legal devices which protect believers and those which safeguard beliefs and religious feelings. The common law offence of blasphemy is analysed, taking into consideration the response of both the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights. The endorsement of the English law of blasphemy by Strasbourg is particularly relevant. Furthermore, this paper focuses on different instruments that, throughout the last few decades, have been articulated to protect the faithful, such as the crimes of religiously aggravated offences and the offence of incitement to religious hatred.


1975 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
Margaret Rogers

It is perhaps desirable to start off by reminding ourselves as to what generally is the law which is applicable to bankers in Kenya. We know that the sources of Kenya law as set out in the Judicature Act, 19671 are:“;(a) the Constitution;(b) subject thereto, all other written laws, including the Acts of Parliament of the United Kingdom, cited in Part I of the Schedule to this Act, modified in accordance with Part II of that Schedule;(c) subject thereto and so far as the same do not extend or apply, the substance of the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application in force in England on the 12th August, 1897, and the procedure and practice observed in courts of justice in England at that date:…”;


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