An Outline of the Law Governing the Relationship between Banker and Customer in Kenya

1975 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
Margaret Rogers

It is perhaps desirable to start off by reminding ourselves as to what generally is the law which is applicable to bankers in Kenya. We know that the sources of Kenya law as set out in the Judicature Act, 19671 are:“;(a) the Constitution;(b) subject thereto, all other written laws, including the Acts of Parliament of the United Kingdom, cited in Part I of the Schedule to this Act, modified in accordance with Part II of that Schedule;(c) subject thereto and so far as the same do not extend or apply, the substance of the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application in force in England on the 12th August, 1897, and the procedure and practice observed in courts of justice in England at that date:…”;

1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-564
Author(s):  
Dawn Oliver

First, I want to express my gratitude and sense of honour in being invited to deliver the Lionel Cohen lecture for 1995. The relationship between the Israeli and the British legal systems is a close and mutually beneficial one, and we in Britain in particular owe large debts to the legal community in Israel. This is especially the case in my field, public law, where distinguished academics have enriched our academic literature, notably Justice Zamir, whose work on the declaratory judgment has been so influential. Israeli courts, too, have made major contributions to the development of the common law generally and judicial review very notably.In this lecture I want to discuss the process of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom, and to explore some of the difficulties that lie in the way of reform. Some quite radical reforms to our system of government — the introduction of executive agencies in the British civil service, for instance—have been introduced without resort to legislation. There has been a spate of reform to local government and the National Health Service.


1999 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-248 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractWithin the common law world, the use of the term informed consent implies the American doctrine. Informed consent as a doctrine is not part of the law in the United Kingdom. However, it is possible to predict a way forward in disclosure cases yet to be heard in the courts of the United Kingdom. These predictions are based on current developments in the common law in the United Kingdom as well as those in Canada and Australia, on the European convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and on trends within the medical profession itself in the light of the Bolam test.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-395
Author(s):  
Paul F. Scott

AbstractThis article, on the basis of a consideration of the development of the law relating to the use of passports as a tool of national security in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, challenges the common law conception of passports, arguing that passports effectively confer rights and so, consequentially, that the refusal or withdrawal of a passport represents a denial of rights. From this conclusion a number of points flow. Though these consequences are most acute for the United Kingdom and Canada, in which passports remain regulated by, and are issued under, prerogative powers, there are also a number of points of significance for Australia and New Zealand, where passports have a statutory basis.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-80
Author(s):  
James Goudkamp ◽  
Lorenz König

AbstractThis article addresses the principles of tort law that govern claims in respect of lost illegal earnings. It focuses on common law jurisdictions (and the law in the United Kingdom in particular) where such claims, despite apparently being commonplace, have been largely ignored by academics. It describes the existing law and calls in aid in this regard a four-fold taxonomy of cases. The article then turns attention to how claims in respect of lost illegal earnings ought to be decided. At this juncture, the article looks to ideas emanating from German tort law, which has developed a highly sophisticated jurisprudence on the subject of illegal earnings. The German approach, stated simply, requires tort law to defer to rules in other departments of private law. If, for example, contract law would not protect an interest that a claimant has in a particular transaction by reason of the transaction being tainted with illegality, tort law will not allow a claimant indirectly to obtain the benefits of that transaction via a claim for lost illegal earnings. It is argued that the German solution holds considerable promise and merits consideration as a serious alternative to the significantly more complicated principles that the common law courts have developed, which principles currently lack any thoroughgoing rationalisation.


2019 ◽  
pp. 278-304
Author(s):  
Adrian Briggs

This chapter discusses English private international law in terms of property. The private international law of property covers immovable and movable property, tangible and intangible property, as well as intellectual and family property. In the United Kingdom, most of the conflicts rules are established by the common law. Although the EU intervened to harmonize private international law in the fields of succession to property and matrimonial property, those Regulations did not extend to the United Kingdom. Where the conflicts rules are found in the common law, a court may be entitled to apply the law selected in its renvoi sense: that is to say, to apply the law (including any conflicts rules) as it would be applied by a judge sitting in the foreign country and hearing the case himself.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-26
Author(s):  
Stephen Frappell

The law of parliamentary privilege in New South Wales is the sum of certain immunities, rights, and powers enjoyed by the individual Houses of the Parliament of New South Wales, together with their members and committees, as constituent parts of the Legislature. The law is complex. It is liberally interspersed with uncertainty and ambiguity. It is also distinctly different from the law of privilege in other Australian jurisdictions, including the Commonwealth, and also from overseas jurisdictions. It is singular in the degree to which it relies on the common law, without recourse to statutory expression or to the historical privileges of the Houses of Parliament in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, in some respects, the Parliament of New South Wales has been remarkably successful through the courts, and through its own procedures, in asserting the powers and rights of members under the banner of parliamentary privilege, notably in relation to orders for the production of State papers.


2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Ian Duncanson

All political societies have peculiarities, and nothing special is to be concluded from the Anglophone focus of the present article. The theme here is that there was a schism between the fi rst and second British empires, not in itself an original thought, as the paper makes clear. The fi rst empire, as conceived by many historians, was an Atlantic empire governed by the British monarch and the Westminster legislature in the United Kingdom, and by the British monarch through his local representative, the colonial governor and the colonial assemblies. It appeared as a kind of confederation to many contemporaries, including Franklin and Washington, until as late as the mid-1770s. In each of the communities, the common law governed according to the customs of the people, subject to amendment by the appropriate legislature. The latter might be at London, Massachusetts or Philadelphia. For reasons outlined in the article, this system broke down when Westminster asserted ultimate sovereignty and the validity to override colonial assemblies and tax the colonies without their consent. The colonies objected and broke with Britain.In Britain itself and in the remaining colonies, Westminster’sassertion represented a new, stronger view of sovereignty, one in whichlaw no longer even notionally refl ected the slowly changing customs, habitsand expectations of the governed. Instead, sovereignty represented thewill of the sovereign. The legitimacy or validity of laws no longer referredto their content, or their conformity with a “balanced” constitution.Instead, the legitimacy rested in the pedigree of a law. To its practicalquestion, ‘is this a valid law?’ the British imperial world was ready forthe Benthamite answer. The latter was to remain culturally dominantfor many decades, and still dominates the dry fi elds of legal positivismand conservative social science. Bentham asked ‘is a law the sign of thevolition of the sovereign?’ Elsewhere, Bentham asserted that the contentof the law bore no relation to its validity. This article examines thischange from the earlier Whig thought which informed the AmericanRevolution and what became of it.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony O. Nwafor

The realization that the directors occupy important position in corporate governance, and as business men and women, cannot be prevented from having dealings with the company, demand a close scrutiny of corporate transactions in which they are directly or indirectly involved or have an interest to ensure that such interest is not placed above their duty to the company. One of the ways in which the law strives to achieve this balance is by imposing a duty on the director to disclose to the board any interest he has in company’s transactions. This requirement which was previously governed by the common law and the company’s articles, is presently increasingly finding a place in companies statutes in different jurisdictions. The paper examines, through a comparative analysis, the provisions on the duty of the director to disclose interest in company’s transactions in South Africa and United Kingdom with the aim of discovering the extent to which the statute in both jurisdictions upholds the common law prescriptions. The paper argues that the need for transparency in corporate governance and the preservation of the distinct legal personality of the company demand that the duty to disclose interest should be upheld even in those cases of companies run by a sole director.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
JE Penner

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter traces the historical roots of the trust. The law of trusts is the offspring of a certain English legal creature known as ‘equity’. Equity arose out of the administrative power of the medieval Chancellor, who was at the time the King’s most powerful minister. The nature of equity’s jurisdiction and its ability to provide remedies unavailable at common law, the relationship between equity and the common law and the ‘fusion’ of law and equity, and equity’s creation of the use, and then the trust, are discussed.


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