scholarly journals Military-Political Peculiarities of Germany’s Participation in Resolute Support Operation, 2015-2021

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-570
Author(s):  
Philipp Olegovich Trunov

The Afghan direction is rather important for German foreign policy, given the scale and duration (nearly two decades) of German military presence in this Central Asian country. It remains to continue one of the directions of Bundeswehrs usage outside the NATO zone of responsibility. The article tries to explore the specifics of the German military and political-diplomatic tools used in the course of Resolute Support operation. The key research methods are comparative and event-analysis. The paper evaluates the characteristics and the results of the German participation in ISAF activity by the mid-2010s. In this regard it is shown that to a large extent the efforts of the Bundeswehr contingent in Resolute Support were aimed at completing unfinished tasks during the ISAF mission. The new (since 2015) tasks of the German military personal, their determinism, and the peculiarities of their implementation are defined. The article traces the ascending dynamics of the German military presence in Afghanistan. In comparison with Syria and Iraq, taking into account the scale of threats projected from their territory to the Euro-Atlantic community in the mid-2010s, the peculiarities of forms and amounts of the Bundeswehrs use in Afghanistan are demonstrated. The author examines Berlins attempts to maintain its military presence in Afghanistan in conditions when US President Trumps administration and the Taliban (banned in Russia) signed an agreement on the withdrawal of US troops on February 29, 2020. The range of factors that could affect the revision of the White Houses position in the second half of 2020 and early 2021 is defined. During this period, Germany has been trying to keep its military presence in Afghanistan. But after the final decision of the Biden administration on the withdrawal of troops, official Berlin was forced to accelerate the evacuation of its contingent (by July 1, 2021), which largely crossed out the previously declared results of the strategy in Afghanistan. The article concludes by presenting the consequences of the military drawdown in Afghanistan for the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany as a whole.

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (12) ◽  
pp. 78-86
Author(s):  
N. Pavlov ◽  
K. Khderi

During the Cold War, the involvement of the Federal Republic of Germany into the settlement of regional conflicts was insignificant. The situation started to change after German reunification which lead to the increase in Germany’s role in the international arena. Political, diplomatic and economic instruments started to belong to the main features of German foreign policy in the region and created a positive image among the Arab countries. Today, at first sight, the Middle East does not belong to the top priorities of German foreign policy. However, in the foreign policy hierar¬chy, the region is among the top three after Europe and the United States, ahead of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Berlin’s increased focus on the Middle East is determined by a number of factors. Among them are German historical responsibility towards Jewish people and obligation to ensure Israel’s right to existence and security; dependence of the German economy on energy resources from the Arab countries; region’s proximity to Europe, and such arising threats as terrorism, illegal migration and regional conflicts. In its turn, regional conflicts are a unique opportunity for the Federal Republic of Germany to declare itself as an international mediator and to participate in peace processes on an equal footing with such world powers as the United States of America, Russian Federation or the People’s Republic of China. Maneuvering between the Arab countries and Israel, the United States and the European partners as well as explosive situation in the region lead to decreased efficiency of German policy towards the Arab countries. In such circumstances, is Berlin ready to assume the role of international mediator in this constantly sensitive region, or would it prefer to remain a passive observer? The analysis of Germany’s policy in the region in the context of the Syrian crisis will help to answer the above stated question.


2020 ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
Z. Z. Bahturidze ◽  
D. S. Rachkova

The article is devoted to identifying the current image of Russia in the mirror of the German media after the Ukrainian crisis. The role of the media is noted, the crisis situation in Ukraine is characterized. Analyzed publications in the leading print media of Germany on the topic of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine and the role of the Russian Federation in the political crisis in Ukraine (2013–2014). The authors have identified and identified key approaches in the formation of German society a certain idea of Russia and its foreign policy. As conclusions, it is noted that both for objective reasons, and not least thanks to the German media, which use a lot of negative characteristics when constructing the image of Russia, relations between the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany go through a zone of mutual exclusion. However, relations between the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany can go to a new level, taking into account the possible pragmatic cooperation of the two states, and provided, among other things, a reduction in the degree of anti-Russian rhetoric in the German media.


2021 ◽  
pp. 371-391
Author(s):  
I. D. Popov

The activity and political significance of the conferences of the Minister Presidents of the German states during the years of the institutionalization of the Federal Republic of Germany (1948—1949) are considered. It is concluded that in the absence of a number of significant central authorities, it was the conferences of the heads of state governments that played a coordinating role to fill them up on the German side. It is noted that the Minister Presidents also served as a converging point between the allies, the regional elite, political parties and bizone authorities. It is shown that various formats of work of heads of state governments at the interzonal level allowed them to take part in the discussion of almost all key problems of the western zones of occupation. It is emphasized that the two-zone meetings of the Minister Presidents with the military governors and the three-zone conferences of the Minister Presidents themselves, which in fact became the main instruments for reaching political compromises, had a particular impact. It is pointed out that this was especially clearly manifested during the discussion of the “Frankfurt Documents”. It is concluded that, at the same time, the dependence on the military administrations of the allies, the party elite and bizone authorities at the same time did not allow these conferences to evolve into something more than a platform for building consensus, and thereby pursue a full-fledged independent policy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203-225
Author(s):  
Philipp Trunov ◽  

Since the former Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany has had the closest, the most full-scale and different in the spectrum of tracks relations in the sphere of common strengthening of the defence capabilities with the continental Western European countries. First, these ones are France and the Netherlands. The article tries to explore German relations with these two countries in the military sphere during the modern period. The key research methods are event-analysis and comparative analysis. The paper covers the experience of the creation of the first bilateral and multilateral military groups of NATO member states` armed forces which consist of staffs and military forces of the mixed troop system. The article notes that first military groups of this kind were created on the territory of the united Germany and examines the reasons of this tendency. Special attention is paid to the development of German-Dutch Corpspotential. This one, the 1 st tank division and the division of rapid reaction forces (each of those divisions has one Dutch brigade) of the Bundeswehr are explored as military mechanisms of deep integration between the two countries. The article also identifies the features of military-technical German-Dutch cooperation, including their common efforts in the frames of Permanent Structured Cooperation platform. The article compares the scales and quality of German-Dutch and German-French cooperation. In this regard the paper rises the question about real military importance of German-French brigade and cooperation between two countries in military-technical field, including the creation of robotized technics. The paper shows the limits of German-French cooperation potential until the early 2020's.


Author(s):  
N. Pavlov

In terms of Germany's foreign policy the concept of “chancellor democracy” begins to lose its validity. Nonetheless, the head of the government remains, as before, the leading political actor. In accordance with their own styles and characters each of the chancellors left their mark in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. Many German political scientists and historians are right to understand the “chancellor democracy” as historical concentration of power in the Federal chancellery to the detriment of ministerial principle. Indeed, in all turning points of German history the most important decisions had been taken by the Federal chancellery and by the Chancellor alone.


2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kundnani

In this paper I examine the use of the concept of "normality" in debates about German foreign policy since unification. In the early 1990s, left-wing intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas tended to criticize the idea of "normality" in favor of a form of German exceptionalism based on responsibility for the Nazi past. A foreign policy based on the idea of "normality" was associated above all with the greater use of military force, which the right advocated and the left opposed. Thus, "normality" became a synonym for Bündnisfähigkeit. Yet, from the mid 1990s onwards, some Social Democrats such as Egon Bahr began to use the concept of "normality" to refer instead to a foreign policy based on sovereignty and the pursuit of national interests. Although a consensus has now emerged in Germany around this realist definition of foreign-policy "normality," it is inadequate to capture the complex shift in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic since unification.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 666-687
Author(s):  
Adi Livny

The abundant writing on conscientious objection (CO) had kept one significant actor rather neglected—the state. Relatively unexplored is the question of how democracies shape their policies toward CO. This article wishes to address this gap, focusing in particular on states that maintain conscription, and examining what accounts for their different responses to CO. Based on the Israeli case study, while drawing on comparative insights from The Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland during the Cold War, I argue that states’ treatment of CO depends primarily on the military’s status and the type of roles assigned to conscription. States in which these roles are mainly functional, and the military does not enjoy, accordingly, a high symbolic status will be more inclined to formally recognize CO than states in which the military fulfills civilian–social roles and enjoys a high symbolic status. Lack of recognition, however, does not necessarily imply harshness; states of the latter sort might nonetheless accommodate CO through unofficial means. Thus, when discussing the policy towards CO a distinction is ought to be made between accommodation and recognition.


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