The Concept of "Normality" in German Foreign Policy since Unification

2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kundnani

In this paper I examine the use of the concept of "normality" in debates about German foreign policy since unification. In the early 1990s, left-wing intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas tended to criticize the idea of "normality" in favor of a form of German exceptionalism based on responsibility for the Nazi past. A foreign policy based on the idea of "normality" was associated above all with the greater use of military force, which the right advocated and the left opposed. Thus, "normality" became a synonym for Bündnisfähigkeit. Yet, from the mid 1990s onwards, some Social Democrats such as Egon Bahr began to use the concept of "normality" to refer instead to a foreign policy based on sovereignty and the pursuit of national interests. Although a consensus has now emerged in Germany around this realist definition of foreign-policy "normality," it is inadequate to capture the complex shift in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic since unification.

Author(s):  
Aaron Ettinger

Is there a left-wing foreign policy emerging in the United States? The rise of an energized and assertive left wing of the Democratic Party, and a receptive constituency within the electorate, has opened space for new political possibilities at home. In the foreign policy realm, leftist internationalism is making compelling arguments about new directions. However, there are limitations to the possible realization of a left-wing foreign policy in the US. While candidates like Sanders and Warren are distinctive in a left-wing foreign policy worldview, the practical implications of their foreign policies are consistent with post-Cold War practice. There are two important exceptions: in trade policy and in their positions on the use of military force. Here they mark a sharp break from the liberal internationalist mainstream. This paper outlines five broad principles of left internationalism, assesses the foreign policy positions of leading Democratic candidates for the 2020 nomination, and explores the long-term prospects of left-wing foreign policy in the US after 2020.


Author(s):  
Kai Michael Kenkel

Latin American states have become major providers of troops for UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since the early 2000s. MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti), the UN mission in Haiti, 55% of whose troops were from the region, was a major watershed for local security cooperation and PKO contributions. Led by Brazil, these states were able to develop a specific approach to peacebuilding that reflects regional strengths and experiences, rooted in minimizing the use of force and bringing successful domestic development policies to bear abroad. This approach also reflects the common security and intervention culture that underpins policy in the region. Two states in particular have taken on a role as major providers of peacekeeping contingents. Tiny Uruguay, with a population of 3 million people, has maintained over 2,000 troops deployed on UN PKOs (more than 10% of its armed forces) since 2005. While Uruguay’s motivations are mostly economic—UN reimbursements exceed the country’s costs—Brazil’s ascendance as a major peacekeeping provider during MINUSTAH was part of a larger emerging-power foreign policy project. Participating in peacebuilding allowed the country to provide security through actions in the development realm, bridging a key gap in many rising states’ capabilities, and to mount an incipient challenge to the Western-led peacebuilding paradigm. The remaining states of Latin America show considerable diversity in their peacekeeping engagement, with many others sending small or token contributions and some no troops at all. Latin American states’ involvement in PKOs cannot be understood without looking at their interaction with patterns of civil–military relations in the region. In the case of such states, the effect of peacekeeping participation on civil–military relations, while a key point in need of monitoring, has not been decisive, as other factors prevail. Finally, PKOs have served as the locus for a significant increase in policy coordination and cooperation in the defense arena in the region. As the UN moves toward stabilization operations which privilege counterterrorism measures over the peacebuilding paradigm that is a strength of Latin American countries, PKOs may lose attractiveness as a foreign policy avenue in the region. Additionally, the swing to the right in recent elections may serve to reduce the appeal of a practice which came to the fore under previous left-wing governments.


1967 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Bradford Burns

Mounting Anxieties, frustrations, and fears in Brazil effected a change of government by military force at the end of March of 1964. President Joáo Goulart fled to an Uruguayan exile. Congress, urged by the military, conferred supreme executive power on Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco. Many other sweeping changes followed. None was more complete than the about-face taken in foreign policy.Castelo Branco spoke out early and unequivocally in his regime in favor of a return to more traditional policies. The graduation exercise of the foreign service school, the Instituto Rio-Branco, on July 31, 1964, provided the propitious place and moment for him to outline the foreign policy goals of his government. He paid homage to the ideals consecrated by tradition: world peace, disarmament, selfdetermination, non-intervention, and anti-colonialism. Moving into the more pragmatic realm of national interests, the president emphasized that his government's foreign policy aimed to increase national power through social and economic development.


Skhid ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 36-44
Author(s):  
Yaroslav POPENKO ◽  
Ihor SRIBNYAK ◽  
Natalia YAKOVENKO ◽  
Viktor MATVIYENKO

The article covers the course of negotiations between the plenipotentiaries of Romania and the leading states of the Entente and the Quadruple Alliance during the First World War. Facing the dilemma of determining its own foreign policy orientation – by joining one of the mentioned military-political blocs, the Romanian government was hesitating for a long time to come to a final decision. At the same time, largely due to this balancing process, official Bucharest managed to preserve its sovereign right to work out and make the most important decisions, while consistently defending Romania's national interests. By taking the side of the Entente and receiving comprehensive military assistance from Russia, Romania at the same time faced enormous military and political problems due to military superiority of the allied Austrian and German forces at the Balkan theater of hostilities. Their occupation of much of Romania forced official Bucharest to seek an alternative, making it sign a separate agreement with the Central Block states. At the same time, its ratification was being delayed in every possible way, which enabled Romania to return to the camp of war winners at the right time. At the same time, official Bucharest made the most of the decline and liquidation of imperial institutions in Russia and Austria-Hungary at the final stage of the First World War, incorporating vast frontier territories into the Kingdom. Taking advantage of the revolutionary events in Russia, the Romanian government succeeded, in particular, in resolving the “Bessarabian problem” in its favor. In addition, Romania included Transylvania, Bukovina and part of Banat. An important foreign policy achievement of Romanian diplomacy was signing of the 1918 Bucharest Peace Treaty, as well as its participation in the Paris Peace Conference.


1969 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen L. Evans

In descriptions of the political structure of the Weimar Republic, the German Center Party is usually grouped as a party of the “middle,” together with the German Democratic Party and German People's Party, between the left-wing Social Democrats and the right-wing German Nationalists. In the years after 1928, the Center showed an increasing disinclination to work in coalition with the Social Democratic Party and finally, under the leadership of Dr. Ludwig Kaas, the last chairman of the Center Party, broke completely with the Socialists. During the same years Heinrich Brüning, Chancellor of Germany from 1930 to 1932, made persistent, though futile, attempts to find an acceptable coalition partner for the Center on the Right, hoping, among other possibilities, to encourage a secession movement from the Nationalist Party in 1930. Because of the rapid dwindling of electoral support for the other parties of the middle, very little attention has been paid to the Center's relationship with them. It is the purpose of this article to show that the mutual antipathies between these parties and the Center were as great or greater than its antipathy toward Social Democracy on certain matters which were vital to the Center's existence. By 1928, in fact, coalition with the parties of the middle had become as unsatisfactory to the leaders of the Center as coalition with the party of the Left. The turning-point in this development was the breakup of the Marx-Keudell right-wing cabinet of 1927. The failure of that government to attain the party's goals in the realm of Kulturpolitik, i.e., religion and education, confirmed the Center's disillusionment with the workings of the parliamentary system itself.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrii Kudriachenko

Abstract. Summing up the modern course of events regarding political leadership in Germany and on the basis of activities of eight chancellors, the author contends the following: The decisive factor in ascension to the political Olympus is the affiliation with either of the two parties, the SPD or the CDU/CSU union, with the nominee’s leadership qualities and political acumen playing an essential role. Even if these conditions are met, the contender’s choice of situation and time where these qualities would be sought after is quite important. It was the political developments of a certain historical era that became an imperative for some politicians to take the reins of power and use them to the full extent. Indeed, at turning points in the history of the Federal Republic, the most crucial decisions were prepared at the German Chancellery and made unilaterally by the chancellor. The author of the article emphasises that chance cannot be ruled out. To become a successful leader in Germany, the much-needed person must be in the right place at the right time. Proof of that is the example of German federal chancellors. The political landscape, democratic footing, and well-structured state and political set-up have enabled only two political parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, to nominate from their ranks those who could become national leaders of their historical epoch. The basis of ‘chancellor democracy’ as a system of state and political power has never impeded but enabled such ascension for outstanding personalities. Quite a few of them have become some sort of fathers of the nation. Able leadership that has benefited national interests and fitted into the plane of German development prospects has defined the personal success of both political figures and public officials of national scope. Keywords: Federal Republic of Germany, federal chancellor, political landscape, SPD, CDU/CSU.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (21) ◽  
pp. 172-194
Author(s):  
VERÓNICA VALDIVIA ORTIZ DE ZáRATE

Resumen: El artá­culo analiza el debate entre las nacientes izquierdas y derechas chilenas respecto de los dispositivos coercitivos estatales, en el marco de la crisis de dominación oligárquica y la redefinición del Estado. Siguiendo las interpretaciones que cuestionan la tesis democratizadora del paá­s, a partir de la Constitución de 1925, este trabajo evalúa la posición de las orgánicas de trabajadores, ligados al marxismo y al anarquismo, como de liberales y conservadores, respecto de los cambios que sufrió el aparato estatal en materia de derechos ciudadanos y de coerción. Nuestra hipótesis es que el reconocimiento de derechos sociales, económicos y polá­ticos a clases medias y obreros, que abrió paso a la democratización, estuvo sostenido en la redefinición de los dispositivos coercitivos del Estado, influyendo en la definición de izquierdas y derechas.  Palabras clave:  Izquierdas. Derechas. Represión.SUBVERSION AND COERCION:  The Left and the Right in the Dawn of Chile”™s 20th-Century DemocracyAbstract: This paper examines the debate between the emerging right- and left-wing parties in Chile in regard to the State”™s repressive devices, within the context of the crisis of oligarchic domination and its subsequent redefinition of the State. Sharing those interpretations that contest the supposed democratization of the country as a result of the 1925 Constitution, the article assesses the stance adopted by the working-class organizations linked to Marxist and anarchist positions, as well as by liberals and conservatives, in relation to the changes undergone by the State apparatus in the fields of civil rights and coercion. Our hypothesis is that the recognition of social, economic and political rights for the middle and working classes, which paved the way towards a more effective democracy, stood upon the redefinition of the State”™s coercive devices, influencing the definition of Right and Left.Keywords: Left Wing. Right Wing. Repression.  SUBVERSAO E COERCAO:  esquerdas e direitas nos iná­cios da democracia chilena do século XXResumo: O artigo analisa o debate entre as nascentes esquerdas e direitas chilenas nas suas relações com os dispositivos repressivos estatais inseridos no contexto da crise de dominação oligárquica e da renovação do Estado. Compartilhando as interpretações que questionam a tese da suposta democratização do paá­s após a Constituição de 1925, este trabalho avalia a perspectiva das organizações operárias vinculadas ao marxismo e ao anarquismo, bem como as posições dos liberais e conservadores a respeito das mudanças que sofreu o aparelho estatal em matéria de direitos cidadãos e coerção. Partimos da hipótese de que o reconhecimento dos direitos sociais, econômicos e polá­ticos das classes médias e operárias que possibilitou a democratização, sustentou-se na redefinição dos dispositivos coercitivos do Estado e influenciou na definição das organizações como de esquerda ou de direita.Palavras-chave:  Esquerdas. Direitas. Repressão.


Subject German foreign policy. Significance The global economic downturn caused by the escalating COVID-19 pandemic strikes Germany in an already precarious phase. Declining multilateralism, particularly resulting from Brexit and US foreign policy under President Donald Trump, is threatening to undermine the structures that have been responsible for Germany’s modern security and economic successes. It could also accentuate Germany’s power, which would raise concerns across the EU of ‘German dominance’. Impacts Reluctant cooperation among member states in upcoming EU decisions will make Berlin more forceful in asserting its national interests. Due to increasing political fragmentation, German politics will become more domestically focused. The strong likelihood of future coalition governments will ensure that German foreign policy does not undergo a significant reorientation.


1995 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Juricic

With characteristic insight, intelligence, and good humour, the eighteenth-century Scottish poet, Robert Burns, once remarked that ‘the best-laid schemes o'mice an men gang aft agley’. Written primarily as a commonsense observation on success and unintentional failure experienced during life's travails, Burns’ witticism does ironically account for much in the world of politics as it functions both within societies and between nation-states. For in international politics, established patterns of action and reaction are often poor guides to resolving complex disputes, whereas innovative, original, and flexible policies, assisted by a good measure of paradox and luck, can sometimes settle the most intractable of problems. Not surprisingly, therefore, political pundits like to stress: ‘Be careful of asking the wrong question, because you may just get the right answer.’


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