scholarly journals Gribas izpauduma nozīme tiesiska darījuma noslēgšanā

Author(s):  
Laura Kadile ◽  

The expression of will is a crucial aspect of lawful transaction in civil law. The will of the individual and its expression is significant in ensuring for the ability of an individual to enjoy and exercise his or her right to self-determination, as well as for the legal transaction to be recognized as valid. Only the transactions made by a person capable of expressing their free will and being able to be aware of the content and consequences of the legal transaction are in force. Therefore, the observation and assessment of such capacity is particularly important in view of the fact that, in circumstances where a person is unable to express his will freely, he may be denied the right to enter into a legal transaction, or, if the legal transaction has been concluded in circumstances where the individual has not been able to express free will, such transaction may be declared invalid.

2020 ◽  
pp. 160-168
Author(s):  
Olha BORTNYK

Legal relations concerning spontaneous construction are a special construction, which is not a classic example of civil relations, which are characterized by legal equality, free will, property independence of their participants, which are collectively considered the fundamental foundations of civil law. The study identifies and reveals the components of the basis for the acquisition of ownership of unauthorized construction, including: ownership can be recognized as a person for the property, which must have certain characteristics, necessary and integral features (characteristics); such property, by its legal nature, must belong to immovable property; construction must be under construction or already built; illegality (illegality) of such construction; constructed real estate or property that is under construction is located on a land plot that has not been allocated for this purpose, property is built or is being built with significant violations of applicable building codes and regulations, etc. Provisions on the understanding of each of the components of the basis for the acquisition of ownership of unauthorized construction are disclosed. Peculiarities of application of norms on unauthorized construction depending on the will of the owner of the land plot on which the unauthorized construction was carried out are stated, as well as attention is paid to the possibility of acquiring ownership of unauthorized construction by a person who did not carry out construction or the land owner. Opinions were expressed regarding the referral of the issue of acquiring the right of ownership for unauthorized construction to judicial jurisdiction.


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Klaus Vieweg

Abstract Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice (Willkür) – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens.


Aldaba ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 99
Author(s):  
Gloria Álvarez Ramírez

Pese a las importantes transformaciones sufridas en los últimos años sobre la concepción y el tratamiento de las personas con discapacidad que la ubican como sujeto de derechos capaz de decidir por sí mismo, lo cierto es que persisten determinadas barreras físicas, sensoriales, en la comunicación y, especialmente, en la percepción, resultantes de la interacción entre la persona con discapacidad y un entorno social hostil que dificultan el ejercicio del derecho al acceso a la justicia; y esquivar estas situaciones sin tratar de solucionarlas, supone abocar a las personas con discapacidad a un difícil acceso, o lo que es peor, al impedimento en la defensa de sus derechos. El campo de acción de los sistemas de gestión y resolución de conflictos que, por su esencia misma de flexibilidad, agilidad y, principalmente, la exigencia de que quienes acuden a ellos lo hagan desde el ejercicio de la libertad o desde la autonomía de la voluntad, resulta de sumo interés para las personas con discapacidad, en la medida en que procuran la igualdad de oportunidades, la accesibilidad y la potenciación de la libre determinación.In spite of the important changes undergone in recent years in the conception and treatment of people with disabilities who place them as a subject of rights capable of deciding for themselves, certain physical and sensorial barriers persist in communication and, especially in perception, resulting from the interaction between the disabled person and a hostile social environment that hinder the exercise of the right to access to justice; and avoid these situations without trying to solve them, is to give people with disabilities difficult access, or, worse, the impediment in the defense of their rights. The field of action of the systems of management and resolution of conflicts that, by its very essence of flexibility, agility and, mainly, the requirement that those who come to them do it from the exercise of freedom or from the autonomy of the will, Is of great interest to persons with disabilities, insofar as they seek equality of opportunity, accessibility and the enhancement of self-determination.


Author(s):  
Agustín Echavarría

RESUMENEn el presente artículo se analiza la fundamentación leibniziana de la voluntad libre entendida como capacidad de autodeterminación, a partir de sus notas esenciales: espontaneidad, deliberación y contingencia. Al estar la voluntad determinada por la serie de percepciones que brotan de la naturaleza de la sustancia, el dominio de esta sobre sus propios actos es indirecto y diacrónico. Si bien Leibniz elude el necesitarismo mediante la atribución a la voluntad de la posibilidad lógica de obrar de forma que como obra, la imputabilidad moral de las acciones queda seriamente comprometida. El artículo concluye con una valoración crítica de la postura de Leibniz desde una perspectiva de la naturaleza de la voluntad como apertura trascendental al bien en cuanto tal.PALABRAS CLAVELIBERTAD, AUTODETERMINACIÓN, IMPUTABILIDAD, DETERMINISMO, LEIBNIZABSTRACTIn the present article we analyze Leibniz’s foundation of free will, understood as a potency of self-determination, examining it from its essential features: spontaneity, deliberation and contingency. Since will is determined by the series of perceptions which flow from the nature of substance, its dominion over its own acts is indirect and diachronic. Even if Leibniz avoids necessitarianism by attributing the logical possibility of doing otherwise to the will, the actions’ moral imputability is seriously compromised. The article concludes with a critical evaluation of Leibniz’s position, from a perspective in which the nature of will is considered as a transcendental openness towards good as such.KEY WORDSFREE WILL, SELF-DETERMINATION, IMPUTABILITY, DETERMINISM, LEIBNIZ


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-241
Author(s):  
Hemin Majeed Hasan ◽  
Baqir Dawd Hussein ◽  
Kamil Omar Sleman

This research deals with the subject of the Kurdish media in relation to the right of self-determination, which the Kurds prepare for its central cause and struggle for it. The importance of this research comes from the importance of its basic components represented by the Kurdish media and the right to self-determination, where they combine the equation of influence and influence, which is the operator of the formative relations of things and designed in all human groups, including the community of the region, in addition to being one of the few Kurdish studies in this field, To cast its positive on the operators of the terms of reference.The aim of this research is to realize the levels of interest of the Kurdish media in the concept of the right to self-determination and its role in conveying its meanings and implications to the Kurdish individual, as well as to identify the mechanisms used by this media to convince the individual mentioned this right and activate his tendencies toward him.The research depends on the university teachers, in addition to their field dimension, because they are the most appropriate and the right to express opinions about such strategic issues and their details and implications, because of their knowledge, scientific, specialized and other structural participants, as well as their structural representation of various social components in the Kurdistan Region.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-120
Author(s):  
Loredana Terec-Vlad

The concept of autonomy has a long way to go as it is used as a synonym for the terms self-government or self-determination (Crudu, 2007). This concept is placed in the context of debates on morality, bioethics, law or political philosophy, and it also appeals to self-awareness, to the right of the individual to live life freely, in his own way, provided it does not harm other people. In this paper we will bring to the fore the Kantian perspective of the concept of autonomy, while making the connection with the concept of freedom.


2020 ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
David Cabrelli

This chapter examines the current terrain of criminal law as a technique of labour market regulation. It identifies a range of possible interactions between the criminal law and civil law in the legal enforcement of labour standards. Sometimes fundamental labour rights, such as the right not to be unfairly dismissed or the right not to be discriminated against, are protected exclusively through a ‘private’ enforcement model at the initiative of the individual right-holder. Sometimes there will be exclusive enforcement through the criminal law with no private right of civil action, as under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Finally, there may be mixed enforcement regimes where there is a combination of criminal and civil measures linked to specific statutory rights, as with the enforcement of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998.


2020 ◽  
pp. 101-108
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Scotus and Ockham reject the Aristotelian outlook, as Aquinas presents it, and develop a voluntarist account of the will and of morality. In their view, determination by practical reason does not ensure free will; a free will must be wholly undetermined by reason. Nor can it be determined by the desire for one’s ultimate good; the impulse towards the right is separate from the impulse towards happiness. If we apply these principles to the freedom of the divine will, we find that God could not be free if the nature of right and wrong were independent of the divine will. We must infer that moral rightness and wrongness are ultimately constituted by divine commands.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Yuval Shany

In “The Blessing of Departure—Exchange of Populated Territories The Lieberman Plan as an Abstract Exercise in Demographic Transformation,” Prof. Timothy Waters offers a strong endorsement of the right of ethnic majorities within a state to redefine their state's boundaries in ways consistent with the majority's right to self-determination and to opt out of a political union with minority groups, regardless of the latter's' political preferences. Applied to the Israeli context, Waters concludes that parts of the Lieberman Plan—a plan advocating the redrawing of Israel borders, inter alia, in ways which exclude some areas populated by Israeli citizens belonging to the Arab-Palestinian minority (Israeli-Arabs)—does not run afoul of international law (although Waters accepts that the Plan might be politically undesirable).This short response challenges two points that are central to Waters’s analysis. First, that the right to self-determination of peoples—in particular, the right to external self-determination (i.e., the right to create independent or other types of polities that express the will of an identifiable “people”)—is subject to temporal or contextual limitations. The right is fully applicable only in exceptional and formative moments in the life of a nation—e.g., during the formation of a new polity or the collapse of an existing political arrangement (which invites the configuration of new political entities in their lieu), and when states systematically fail to respect the basic interest of some of the groups that comprise its populace—i.e., in response to extraordinary situations of groups exclusion or oppression. Second, even if Waters is correct and an ongoing right to self-determination—including, a right to secede from existing states—is available to ethnic groups comprising diverse national societies, the invocation of such a right must necessarily be limited by other positive rules of international law designed to protect group and individual interests. Specifically, Waters’s concept of self-determination as a right of a preliminary nature, that overrides other human rights (which are themselves often characterized as rights of a pre-political nature), is debatable.


1945 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lord Wright

In preparing the few and elementary observations which I am about to make to you tonight I have wondered if the title I chose was apt or suitable. The Common Law is generally described as the law of liberty, of freedom and of free peoples. It was a home-made product. In the eighteenth century, foreign lawyers called it an insular and barbarous system; they compared it to their own system of law, developed on the basis of Roman and Civil Law. Many centuries before, and long after Bracton's day, when other civilised European nations ‘received’ the Roman Law, England held back and stood aloof from the Reception. It must have been a near thing. It seems there could have been a Reception here if the Judges had been ecclesiastics, steeped in the Civil Law. But as it turned out they were laymen, and were content as they travelled the country, and in London as well, to adopt what we now know as the Case System, instead of the rules and categories of the Civil Law. Hence the method of threshing out problems by debate in Court, and later on the basis of written pleadings which we find in the Year Books. For present purposes, all I need observe is that the Civil Lawyer had a different idea of the relation of the state or the monarch to the individual from that of the Common Lawyer. To the Civil or Roman Lawyer, the dominant maxim was ‘quod placuit principi legis habet vigorem’; law was the will of the princeps. With this may be compared the rule expressed in Magna Carta in 1215: No freeman, it was there said, was to be taken or imprisoned or exiled or in any way destroyed save by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. Whatever the exact application of that phrase in 1215, it became a text for fixing the relations between the subject and the State. Holdsworth quotes from the Year Book of 1441; the law is the highest English inheritance the King hath, for by the law he and all his subjects are ruled. That was the old medieval doctrine that all things are governed by law, either human or divine. That is the old doctrine of the supremacy of the law, which runs through the whole of English history, and which in the seventeenth century won the day against the un-English doctrine of the divine right of Kings and of their autocratic power over the persons and property of their subjects. The more detailed definition of what all that involved took time to work out. I need scarcely refer to the great cases in the eighteenth century in which the Judges asserted the right of subjects to freedom from arbitrary arrest as against the ministers of state and against the validity of a warrant to seize the papers of a person accused of publishing a seditious libel; in particular Leach v. Money (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1001; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029; Wilkes v. Halifax (1769) 19 St. Tr. 1406. In this connexion may be noted Fox's Libel Act, 1792, which dealt with procedure, but fixed a substantive right to a trial by jury of the main issue in the cases it referred to.


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