scholarly journals The relationship between executive compensation and dividend policy, performance, and corporate governance in closely-held firms

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 196-209
Author(s):  
Shmuel Hauser ◽  
Rami Yosef ◽  
Ora Solomon ◽  
Ita Schohat ◽  
Yael Tanhuma
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Policy Performance ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Do So

This paper examines how profitability, dividend policy and the corporate governance of closely-held companies are related to executive compensation. The main finding is that that in spite of the fact that controlling shareholders, and the executives they nominate to represent them, have the ability to exploit firms’ resources at the expense of minority shareholders, their incentive to do so is lower when their ownership exceeds 75% of the voting power. Specifically, in closely-held firms in which the controlling shareholders hold more than 50% and less than 75%, the incentive to prefer higher compensation and avoid paying dividends is greater than that in companies in which major shareholders hold more then 75% of the firm’s equity. For the latter, since they the vast majority of firm’s shares is held by them, the firm is to a large extent more private than public. In such case, the incentive to exploit minority shareholders is small. Indeed, in companies in which the voting power of controlling shareholders exceeds 75%, their profits are higher, the compensation paid to their executive is lower, and they appear to have the tendency to share more dividends in comparison with other companies

scholarly journals Investor Protection and Agency Theory in Corporate Governance in Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-21
Author(s):  
Imtiaz Ahmed Khan ◽  
Altaf Hussain Abro ◽  
Farooque Ahmed Leghari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Global Trend ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Very High

The paper discusses the minority shareholders’ protection under the quantumof agency cost in corporate governance in Pakistan. The agency theory statesthat in most of the cases, the controlling shareholders and the topmanagement are normally involved in expropriating the funds of the company.This phenomenon increases the agency cost. The agency cost is directlyproportional to the cost of functioning of the company. In other words, theagency cost is inversely proportional to the profit of the company. Accordingto the agency theory, if the agency cost is decreased, the profit for investorincreases. The Pakistani corporate sector is dominated by the businessfamilies, the state and an opportunity to get the private benefits at the cost ofother stakeholders. There are the different mechanisms as discussed andapplied around the world to minimize the agency cost so as to make companyfinancially strong and better profit for the investors. In Pakistan, the agencycost is very high. Hence, there is a need to revamp the corporate governancemechanism to reduce the agency cost in order to provide a better protection tominority shareholders in a particular in the context of the global trend keepingin the view of the nature of corporate structure in Pakistan.

Culture and Law in Corporate Governance

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir N. Licht
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Cultural Analysis ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Cultural Dimensions ◽  
Dividend Distribution ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter explores the relationship between culture and law, especially corporate law, and its implications for corporate governance. It begins with an overview of the basic concepts in cultural analysis as well as prevalent theories of cultural dimensions and of social networks as social capital. It then summarizes research findings regarding the consequences of culture for corporate governance on issues ranging from executive compensation to legal transplants and the objectives of the corporation (corporate social responsibility). It also discusses relations with investors and other stakeholders by way of disclosure and dividend distribution, along with the operation, composition, and network structure of the board of directors. Finally, the chapter considers how the relationship between culture and law affects diversity and persistence in corporate governance.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in the Presence of Controlling Shareholders

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 162
Author(s):  
Ricardo Rodrigues ◽  
J. Augusto Felício ◽  
Pedro Verga Matos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms

Based on agency theory, we focused on the influence of corporate governance in the dividend policy of large listed firms with headquarters in continental Europe countries. Previous research focused on the influence of corporate governance on the performance and risk of listed firms, but the influence of corporate governance on the dividend policy has rarely been addressed despite the importance of dividends for shareholders and the implications on the free cash-flow, whose application may be a source of conflicts between managers and shareholders. In this paper, we study the influence of a set of governance mechanisms on the dividend policy over 12 years (2002 to 2013). The results, based on a panel data analysis, support the importance of governance mechanisms toward the protection of shareholders’ interests, and reveal that the decisions on whether to pay dividends and how much to pay are grounded on different antecedents.

scholarly journals The Effect Of Corporate Governance On Corruption In Public Listed Companies In The Context Of Jordan

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 555-566
Author(s):  
Mohamed Fahmi Ghazwi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
The Other ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Number Of Factors ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

The OECD defined corporate governance  as, enforce laws, rules and standards that define the relationship between company management on the one hand, shareholders, stakeholders or parties associated with the company on the other, and urge financial institutions to adopt those laws and standards in their systems to ensure universal classification, such laws and standards are called corporate governance. Some countries have adopted such standards, which are based on integrity and transparency, such as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, but the apply these standards to protect the minority of shareholders in the joint stock companies are in conflict with certain legal provisions laid down by the Jordanian legislature in the companies Act. The Jordanian companies' law and some other financial laws have, of course, included a number of factors that encourage corporate governance, but on the other hand, we find texts that still impede the application of these standards and provide indicators that do not encourage the application of their standards and affect the rights of minority shareholders. The study will refer to the most important corporate governance criteria that balance the rights of the minority and majority shareholders with those that still need to be modified.

scholarly journals Corporate Disclosure, Ownership Structure And Earnings Management: The Case Of French-Listed Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 1493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Lakhal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Management Measures ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance devices on earnings management for French-listed firms. Particularly, it examines the relationship between corporate disclosure practices, ownership structure features and earnings management by French managers. Results show that the relationship between earnings management measures and disclosure scores is negative suggesting that less transparent firms are likely to engage in earnings management practices. The findings also show that families, institutional investors and multiple large shareholders negatively influence earnings management, and hence, act as good corporate governance devices to limit managerial discretion. This paper shed light on the monitoring role of corporate disclosures and ownership structure in the French context where minority shareholders interests are less protected than in common law countries.

Dividend Policy with Controlling Shareholders

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maribel Sáez ◽  
María Gutiérrez
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Concentrated Ownership

AbstractThis Article investigates the determinants of dividend policy in firms with concentrated ownership structures. A review of the empirical literature shows that dividend payout ratios are lower in firms with controlling shareholders. We explain this finding as a consequence of the legal rules governing cash distributions, which leave the dividend decision in the hands of the firm insiders, and the lack of monitoring mechanisms for checking the power of controlling shareholders. The analysis of the empirical evidence on dividend policy points to the existence of an unresolved agency conflict between controlling shareholders and outside investors. We conclude that controlling shareholders are currently using the dividend policy to expropriate minority shareholders.

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