scholarly journals The limits of conjecture: Political liberalism, counter-radicalisation and unreasonable religious views

Ethnicities ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriele Badano ◽  
Alasia Nuti
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Theory Reasoning ◽  
The Stability

Originally proposed by John Rawls, the idea of reasoning from conjecture is popular among the proponents of political liberalism in normative political theory. Reasoning from conjecture consists in discussing with fellow citizens who are attracted to illiberal and antidemocratic ideas by focusing on their religious or otherwise comprehensive doctrines, attempting to convince them that such doctrines actually call for loyalty to liberal democracy. Our goal is to criticise reasoning from conjecture as a tool aimed at persuasion and, in turn, at improving the stability of liberal democratic institutions. To pursue this goal, we use as case study real-world efforts to counter-radicalise at-risk Muslim citizens, which, at first glance, reasoning from conjecture seems well-placed to contribute to. This case study helps us to argue that the supporters of reasoning from conjecture over-intellectualise opposition to liberal democracy and what societies can do to counter it. Specifically, they (i) underestimate how few members of society can effectively perform reasoning from conjecture; (ii) overlook that the burdens of judgement, a key notion for political liberals, highlight how dim the prospects of reasoning from conjecture are and (iii) do not pay attention to the causes of religious persons’ opposition to liberal democracy. However, not everything is lost for political liberals, provided that they redirect attention to different and under-researched resources contained in Rawls’s theory. In closing, we briefly explain how such resources are much better placed than reasoning from conjecture to provide guidance relative to counter-radicalisation in societies (i) populated by persons who do not generally hold anything close to a fully worked out and internally consistent comprehensive doctrine and (ii) where political institutions should take responsibility for at least part of the existing alienation from liberal democratic values.

Does Liberal Democracy Require a Gandhian Approach to Religion?

Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Unity In Diversity

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.

Toleration, Political Liberalism, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Muslim World

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Regimes

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.

C. B. Macpherson's Critique of Liberal Democracy and Capitalism

1994 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Morrice
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Socialist Society ◽  
Economic Liberalism ◽  
Liberal Tradition ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Theory Of Human Nature ◽  
Market Relations

C. B. Macpherson's project was to revise liberal-democratic theory in the light of Marxism, to rescue the valuable part of the liberal tradition from the dangers of capitalist market relations, and to democratize socialism. I identify Macpherson's concept of political theory, which informs his project; reconstruct his criticisms of liberal democratic theory and capitalist market relations; and note his prescriptions for a better political theory and practice. The project remains significant and valuable in a world in which political and economic liberalism is said to be triumphant and socialism dead or in retreat. It is not without its problems, however, which include an inadequate theory of human nature and a lack of detail on the nature of a democratic socialist society.

Philosophical foundations for Indigenous economic and political rights

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (11) ◽  
pp. 1264-1276
Author(s):  
Paul Robert Patton
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Indigenous Rights ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Normative Foundations ◽  
Conceptual Work

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine some influential accounts of the basis for Indigenous rights, consider their strengths and weaknesses, and ascertain whether and in what degree they support effective self-government and self-determination for Indigenous people. Design/methodology/approach The paper begins with a brief discussion of the emergence of specifically Indigenous rights, the significance of self-determination as a means of improving the economic and social conditions of communities, and the problem such rights pose for late 20th versions of egalitarian liberalism. It then examines the liberal culturalist argument for minority rights developed by Will Kymlicka, before turning to James Tully’s elaboration of the historical approach to the justification of Indigenous rights that draws on the tradition of treaty relations in North American colonialism. Finally, it outlines a third approach based on the political liberalism of John Rawls. Findings The conditions of legitimate government set out in Rawls’ political liberalism are a better way to provide normative foundations for Indigenous rights in contemporary postcolonial democracies. Research limitations/implications The discussion of Indigenous rights is confined to those countries established by colonization with largely British political institutions and populations. The arguments for Indigenous rights are confined to those advanced within the liberal tradition of political thought. Originality/value Some of the criticisms of the liberal culturalist argument and of Tully’s approach are original. The case for Indigenous rights based in the legitimacy requirements of political liberalism is original and based on conceptual work by the author.

Rawls's Practical Conception of Justice: Opinion, Tradition and Objectivity in Political Liberalism

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-43
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
The Political ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
The Stability

AbstractIn Political Liberalism, Rawls emphasizes the practical character and aims of his conception of justice. Justice as fairness is to provide the basis of a reasoned, informed and willing political agreement by locating grounds for consensus in the fundamental ideas and values of the political culture. Critics urge, however, that such a politically liberal conception of justice will be designed merely to ensure the stability of political institutions by appealing to the currently-held opinions of actual citizens. In order to evaluate this concern, I suggest, it is necessary to focus on the normative character of Rawls's analysis. Rawls argues that justice as fairness is the conception of justice that citizens of modern democratic cultures should choose in reflective equilibrium, after reflecting fully upon their considered judgments regarding justice. Since judgments in reflective equilibrium are grounded in considered judgment, rather than situated opinions, I argue that the criticism fails.

Alexis de Tocqueville

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Alexis De Tocqueville ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Cultural Life ◽  
Egalitarian Society ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Simple Narrative

This chapter offers a reading of Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, arguing that the book was not a philosophical analysis of the concept of democracy, nor a simple narrative of the origins of American political institutions, but a form of political theory that used historical evidence to teach general lessons about the prospects for politics in the present. The chapter first places Tocqueville in his times and among his family before discussing his journey to America in 1831. It then considers the three major themes that might be extracted from the second volume of Democracy: the quality of intellectual and cultural life in an egalitarian society; the stability or proneness to revolutionary upheaval of such societies; and Tocqueville's final and most distinctive thoughts on democratic despotism, or what one might term quiet totalitarianism.

THE INFLUENCE OF POPULISM ON DEMOCRACY IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 46-52
Author(s):  
Mirilias Azad ogly Agaev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Silent Majority ◽  
Political Sphere ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The Impact

The article is devoted to the impact of populism on democracy. To investigate the impact of populism on democracy, the author explores key approaches to the populism notion: political, socio-cultural and ideological. The article notes that populism studies lack a single definition and emphasizes there are negative, positive and neutral evaluations of the nature of this phenomenon. These conclusions are used for further assumptions about the impact on liberal democratic institutions. After analyzing the works on the populism of such scholars as B. Arditi, H.-G. Betz, M. Canovan, E. Laclau, K. Mudde, S. Mouffe, K. Rovira Kaltwasser, N. Urbinati, and others, the article draws conclusions about the multidimensionality of influence on liberal democracy and, in particular, about the fallacy of solely negative assessments of this impact. The author underlines the presence of both positive aspects (providing the interests of the “silent majority”, mobilizing excluded groups and integrating them into the political sphere), and negative aspects (rejection of representative democracy and parliamentarism) of populism.

Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Stability

Since its publication in 1993, John Rawls’s Political Liberalism has been central to debates concerning political legitimacy, democratic theory, toleration, and multiculturalism in contemporary political theory. Yet, despite the immense body of literature which has been produced since Rawls’s work was published, very little has been said or written regarding the place of political parties and partisanship within political liberalism. This book aims to fill this gap in the literature. Its central argument is that political liberalism needs and nourishes political parties, and that political parties are therefore not hostile but vital to it. First, partisanship generates its own distinctive kind of political obligations, additional to any political obligations people may have qua ordinary citizens. Second, contrary to what many critics argue, and despite its admittedly restrictive features, Rawls’s conception of public reason allows significant scope for partisan advocacy and partisan pluralism, and in fact the very normative demands of partisanship are in syntony with those of public reason. Third, parties contribute to the overlapping consensus that for Rawls guarantees stability in diverse societies. Fourth, political liberalism nourishes political parties, by leaving many issues, including religious and socio-economic ones, open to democratic contestation. In summary, parties contribute both to the legitimacy and to the stability of political liberalism.

Anti-Perfectionism and Rawlsian Liberalism

1995 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Caney
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Unity ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Major Argument

This article examines the justifications of anti-perfectionism given by John Rawls in his recent work Political Liberalism. Rawls, I argue, gives one major argument in defence of anti-perfectionism (what I shall call the ‘reasonableness among free and equal persons' argument) and two subsidiary arguments (what I shall call the ‘social unity’ argument and the ‘stability’ argument). None of these arguments, I claim, are persuasive. Rawls's most recent justification of anti-perfectionism is therefore unsuccessful.

Rawlsian Reasonableness: A Problematic Presumption?

2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun P. Young
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Primary Task ◽  
Prominent Feature ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Stated Goal ◽  
Core Value ◽  
Philosophical Project

Abstract.The notion of “reasonableness” has been a prominent feature of liberalism since the latter first emerged as a coherent philosophical project. Indeed, arguably, reasonableness is the core value animating the liberal outlook. Such a claim is especially true with respect to the conception of political liberalism promoted by John Rawls. In essence, the viability of Rawlsian political liberalism is dependent upon the “reasonableness” of both the public conception of justice and the individuals who must live under its constraints. However, this reliance on reasonableness poses a number of potential difficulties for Rawls's argument, particularly insofar as his belief in the ability of his conception to secure the conditions essential to establishing and sustaining a just and stable liberal democracy is premised upon a number of questionable claims and expectations regarding the reasonableness of individual attitudes and behaviour. The primary task of this essay is to identify and explain a number of concerns that render suspect the plausibility of Rawls's conclusions regarding the extent to which it is realistic to presume the reasonableness of individuals and, by extension, the ability of his conception to achieve its stated goal.Résumé.La notion du “ raisonnable ” constitue un aspect important du libéralisme depuis l'émergence de ce dernier en tant que projet philosophique cohérent. En fait, le raisonnable est sans doute la valeur principale qui anime le point de vue libéral. Ceci est particulièrement vrai de la conception du libéralisme politique défendue par John Rawls. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls dépend essentiellement du caractère raisonnable de la conception publique de la justice, ainsi que des individus qui doivent vivre selon ses contraintes. Toutefois, l'importance du raisonnable dans ce concept soulève un certain nombre de problèmes dans le raisonnement de Rawls. Il est persuadé que ses idées garantissent les conditions essentielles pour établir et maintenir une démocratie libérale, mais ce postulat s'appuie sur de nombreuses affirmations et espérances discutables quant au caractère raisonnable des attitudes et comportements individuels. Cette dissertation s'efforcera principalement d'identifier et d'expliquer un certain nombre de problèmes remettant en cause la plausibilité des conclusions de Rawls. On étudiera tout particulièrement dans quelle mesure il est réaliste de présumer du caractère raisonnable des individus et, par extension, de la capacité de la conception de Rawls à atteindre ses objectifs.

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