scholarly journals Reviewing Public Reason: A Critique of Rawls’ Political Liberalism and the Idea of Public Reason

2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 715-729
Author(s):  
Rachael Patterson
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Liberal Neutrality ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism

This article provides a critical review of Rawls’ effort in Political Liberalism to construct a political theory of justice compatible with the fact of reasonable pluralism. Particular attention is given to the ‘idea of public reason’ and political liberalism’s liberal neutrality. It is argued that because of its liberal neutrality, political liberalism would preclude people from endorsing at least some reasonable comprehensive views and, therefore, as a theory it lacks the necessary stability required to be as successful as Rawls claims.

La Idea de “Razón Publica” (y su Revisión) en el Último Rawls

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Public Good ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Political Philosopher

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.

Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Stability

Since its publication in 1993, John Rawls’s Political Liberalism has been central to debates concerning political legitimacy, democratic theory, toleration, and multiculturalism in contemporary political theory. Yet, despite the immense body of literature which has been produced since Rawls’s work was published, very little has been said or written regarding the place of political parties and partisanship within political liberalism. This book aims to fill this gap in the literature. Its central argument is that political liberalism needs and nourishes political parties, and that political parties are therefore not hostile but vital to it. First, partisanship generates its own distinctive kind of political obligations, additional to any political obligations people may have qua ordinary citizens. Second, contrary to what many critics argue, and despite its admittedly restrictive features, Rawls’s conception of public reason allows significant scope for partisan advocacy and partisan pluralism, and in fact the very normative demands of partisanship are in syntony with those of public reason. Third, parties contribute to the overlapping consensus that for Rawls guarantees stability in diverse societies. Fourth, political liberalism nourishes political parties, by leaving many issues, including religious and socio-economic ones, open to democratic contestation. In summary, parties contribute both to the legitimacy and to the stability of political liberalism.

G. A. Cohen, Constructivism, and the Fact of Reasonable Pluralism

2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Culp
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Discourse Theory ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Critical Engagement ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism ◽  
Political Constructivism

AbstractIn this article I argue that G.A. Cohen is mistaken in his belief that the concept of justice needs to be rescued from constructivist theorists of justice. In doing so, I rely on insights of John Rawls’ later work Political Liberalism and Rainer Forst’s discourse theory of justice. Such critical engagement with Cohen’s critique of constructivism is needed, because Cohen bases his critique of constructivism almost exclusively on Rawls’s arguments and positions in A Theory of Justice. He thus neglects - at least by and large - that Rawls had further developed his constructivist method of justification in his later work Political Liberalism, as well as that Forst’s discourse-theoretical works offer elaborate versions of constructivism. These refined versions of constructivism recognize a plurality of reasonable conceptions of ideal justice and draw an important distinction between moral and political constructivism. Because of these features these advanced constructivist theories are not in need of Cohen’s rescue.

scholarly journals La justicia como imparcialidad, progreso y perfección

2020 ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Diego Alejandro Otero Angelini
Keyword(s):  
John Dewey ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Private Sphere ◽  
Liberal Society ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism ◽  
Liberal Justice

In this article I analyze the justification of rawlsian anti-perfectionism, present in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. My aim is to show how justice as fairness, Rawls's conception of justice, lacks stability because of it. As an alternative to his anti-perfectionism, I propose, in the second part, the idea of progress as practical perfectionism by John Dewey. I argue that a perfectionist liberalism of this kind does not undermine reasonable pluralism as Rawls argued. Also I argue that it is indispensable to establish a liberal society that is stable. In the end, I briefly show how the private sphere could be affected once the idea of progress is part of a conception of liberal justice.

Must Liberal Citizens Be Reasonable?

1996 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Strike
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Political Socialization ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Habits Of Mind ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Free Standing ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Liberal Culture

Political Liberalism was motivated by Rawls's belief that A Theory of Justice inadequately treated the problem of stability. Theory of Justice grounded justice in a comprehensive doctrine, ethical liberalism. In a society wherein citizens hold a variety of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, such a theory of justice is unstable. Political Liberalism seeks a free-standing political theory compatible with many reasonable comprehensive doctrines.Reasonableness involves reciprocity which in turn requires the acceptance of the burdens of judgment. We cannot respect other citizens if we regard them or their comprehensive doctrines as pernicious or stupid. While we may continue to accept our own comprehensive doctrine, reciprocity and tolerance require that we recognize that other doctrines and those who hold them are reasonable.Callan claims that Rawls's project fails. Ethical liberalism views autonomy as essential to a good life. However, if the burdens of judgment are a prerequisite for reciprocity, political liberalism must also value autonomy, if not as an essential part of a good life, then as a public good. Any view of political socialization robust enough to secure a recognition of the burdens of judgment must also produce habits of mind tantamount to autonomy. If so, political liberalism collapses into ethical liberalism. Their implications for political socialization are indistinguishable. Many comprehensive doctrines, paradigmatically religious ones, will be weakened by these requirements for political socialization.Callan's argument points to a tension in liberal views of education. A liberalism that promotes a thick liberal culture will appear intolerant to many with religious commitments.

Toward a Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism

Episteme ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B. Talisse
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Liberal Political Theory

ABSTRACTFor well over a decade, much of liberal political theory has accepted the founding premise of Rawls's political liberalism, according to which the fact of reasonable pluralism renders comprehensive versions of liberalism incoherent. However, the founding premise presumes that all comprehensive doctrines are moral doctrines. In this essay, the author builds upon recent work by Allen Buchanan and develops a comprehensive version of liberalism based in a partially comprehensive social epistemic doctrine. The author then argues that this version of liberalism is sufficiently accommodating of the fact of reasonable pluralism. The conclusion is that the founding premise of political liberalism admits of a counterexample; there is a version of comprehensive liberalism that is sufficiently pluralistic.

Marriage as a Violation of Liberty

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clare Chambers
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The State ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
Liberal Neutrality ◽  
State Action ◽  
Political Liberal

This chapter considers liberal objections to marriage. Perfectionist or comprehensive liberals should reject state-recognized marriage as limiting autonomy in the service of an unappealing and restrictive model of human perfection. But political liberals should go further, and reject state-recognized marriage as prima facie incompatible with neutrality. The chapter clarifies the nature of political liberal neutrality. Political liberalism is ambiguous between two forms of neutrality: strict and lax. Strict neutrality allows state action only if sufficiently weighty public reasons can be adduced in favour of a policy; lax neutrality permits the state to act just as long as some public reason can be given. If political liberalism is to be an interesting philosophical approach it will defend strict neutrality, so any public reasons offered in support of state-recognized marriage must be weighty enough to overcome the non-neutrality of that institution.

Justification of Political Liberalism and the Catholic Paradox

1998 ◽  
pp. 95-104
Author(s):  
Roger Magyar
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
Ideal Convergence ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Subject

Rawls' justification of political liberalism has been the subject of recent discussion in socio-political philosophy. In Political Liberalism, he has adjusted his original notion of ideal convergence, found in A Theory of Justice, to one of overlapping consensus. I argue that Catholics would find themselves excluded from being good citizens as Rawls defines proper citizenship. This follows from his statements concerning fairness in participating in the democratic process in that it would lead to, what I term, the Catholic paradox. This perspective from within the Catholic point of view indicates that there are similar problems to be found in other traditionally informed conceptions of what the good life is. In this way, the Catholic paradox draws attention to the empirical implausibility that competing conceptions of what the good life is, as understood from within their traditions, will not endorse Rawls' political theory. I then relate how easily it can be inferred that other traditions will face the same paradox and that they will not accept Rawls' political theory as being justified from their perspectives.

scholarly journals Justiça, Equidade e Liberalismo em Rawls

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Mateus Salvadori
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Political Justice ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Interests ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
The Relationship

A teoria da justiça proposta por John Rawls investiga a estrutura básica da sociedade, tendo como base a justiça política, a justiça pública e a justiça distributiva. Rawls propõe uma teoria que representa uma alternativa ao utilitarismo, pois para o autor os direitos não deverão estar sujeitos à negociações políticas ou sujeitos ao cálculo de interesses sociais. É através do contrato social que Rawls busca apresentar a relação entre justiça, equidade e liberalismo político.Abstract: The theory of justice proposed by John Rawls investigates the basic structure of society, based on political justice, public justice and distributive justice. Rawls proposed a theory that is an alternative to utilitarianism, in which rights should not be subject to political negotiations or subject to calculation of social interests. It is through the social contract that Rawls seeks to present the relationship between justice, equity and political liberalism. Keywords: Rawls, liberty, equality, reasonable pluralism, comprehensive doctrines.

scholarly journals Is there a need for political liberalism to have an account of pre-overlapping consensus reasoning?

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-74
Author(s):  
Nebojsa Zelic
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Values ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Further Development

In his Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong argues for internal conception of political liberalism which goal is to show that a liberal well-ordered society is internally coherent ideal and that citizens who would be raised in such society could endorse and support their own liberal institutions and principles if those institutions and principles are justified in particular way These institutions should be justified by particular conception of public reason which main feature is that overlapping consensus is the first stage of its justificatory structure. So, public reasoning of citizens in well-ordered society should be based solely on values and ideas inherent to liberal conception of justice - freedom, equality, fair system of cooperation and burdens of judgment. Another important feature of Quong?s conception of public reason concerns its scope. Quong argues for a wide scope of public reason which demands that all coercive or binding laws or public policies should be justified (whenever possible) on basis of these values alone. Thus, reasonable citizens in well-ordered society by definition accord deliberative priority to public reasons over their other comprehensive or nonpublic beliefs whenever they exercise their collective political power over one another. The problem I raise in this paper is that it is very likely that in well-ordered society there will be a group of citizens that will not accord full deliberative priority to political values, especially not at all levels of political deliberation. On certain issues they will like to see their particular values being realized through common political institutions. If our political theory excludes this group from justificatory constituency on this particular issue or categorize them as unreasonable it can easily undermine their general adherence to liberal conception of justice and endanger stability of well-ordered society. Thus, my point is that we need a further development of political liberalism to solve such problems not as a part of non-ideal theory but as a part of its ideal of well-ordered society.

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