scholarly journals Association, property, territory: What is at stake in immigration?

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Zoltán Miklósi
Keyword(s):  
Private Property ◽  
The State ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
The Third ◽  
Territorial Jurisdiction ◽  
Territorial Rights ◽  
Immigration Debate ◽  
The Right ◽  
Association Property

It is often claimed that states have territorial rights, and that these rights include the right to exclude people who seek admission to their territory. In this paper I will examine whether the most defensible account of territorial rights can provide support to the right to exclude. I will discuss three types of theories of territorial rights. The first account links the right of states to exclude to the prior right of individuals to freedom of association, which is said to include the right not to associate and to dissociate. The second is a Lockean theory that grounds the territorial rights of states, and hence their right to exclude, in the prior right of individuals to private property in the land that constitutes the territory of the state. I argue that these accounts have independently implausible implications, regardless of their implications for the immigration debate. The third account is a Kantian theory that bases the territorial jurisdiction of states on individuals? duty to create, sustain and submit themselves to a shared system of law that is a necessary condition of guaranteeing their rights and of discharging their duties towards one another. I will argue that the Kantian account is superior to its current alternatives. However, I also suggest that it cannot ground a broad right to exclude.

scholarly journals Territorial Rights, Political Association, and Immigration

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 645-670 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sune Lægaard
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
State Legitimacy ◽  
Territorial Jurisdiction ◽  
The People ◽  
Territorial Rights ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Political Association ◽  
The Right

Liberals conceive of territorial rights as dependent on the legitimacy of the state, which is in turn understood in terms of the state’s protection of individual rights and freedoms. Such justifications of territorial rights have difficulties in addressing the right to control immigration, which is therefore in need of additional justification. The paper considers Christopher Heath Wellman’s liberal proposal for justifying the right to control immigration, which understands the right as derivative of a general right to freedom of association held collectively by the people of the state. The paper argues that state legitimacy and freedom of political association fail to connect in the way required to justify a right to control immigration. Wellman’s argument conflates the state as an institution and the people as a political collective and elides the difference between territorial jurisdiction and associational freedom.

scholarly journals Why Does the State Have the Right to Control Immigration?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Song
Keyword(s):  
National Identity ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Public Debate ◽  
The State ◽  
Immigration Law ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Right ◽  
Normative Justification

Public debate about immigration proceeds on the assumption that each country has the right to control its own borders. But what, if anything, justifies the modern state’s power over borders? This chapter provides an answer in three parts. First, it examines the earliest immigration law cases in U.S. history and finds that the leading theorist they rely upon falls short of providing adequate normative justification of the state’s right to control immigration. In the second part, it turns to contemporary political theory and philosophy, critically assessing three leading arguments for the state’s right to control immigration: (1) national identity, (2) freedom of association, and (3) ownership/property. The third and final section offers an alternative argument based on the requirements of democracy.

THE MYSTERY OF TERRITORY

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
The State ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Actual State ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Social ◽  
Territorial Rights ◽  
The Right

Abstract:This essay argues that the territorial rights of states derive from the property rights of the individuals that make up those states. The argument draws from the Lockean tradition of justification of political powers. Persons in the state of nature have natural rights. Those rights are first-order substantive rights (the right to property), and second-order executive rights (the right to enforce the right to property.) In the social contract, individuals transfer to the state their executive rights, not their substantive rights. The state can thus define the boundaries of property rights and adjudicate property disputes, but does not legitimately own land itself. The article discusses and rejects, for deontic and consequentialist reasons, positions that justify collective and state ownership of territory. Some important consequences follow from the argument: First, no actual state has territorial rights, since no actual state wields delegated powers in land. Second, notwithstanding the preceding conclusion, actual states have an obligation to exercise their (putative) territorial powers consistently with the respect for private property.

Is There a Right to Free Movement across Borders?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Song
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Freedom Of Movement ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Right ◽  
Logical Extension

Chapter 6 examines three rights-based arguments for freedom of movement across borders. Three rights-based arguments have been offered in support of freedom of international movement. The first claims that freedom of movement is a fundamental human right in itself. The second adopts a “cantilever” strategy, arguing that freedom of international movement is a logical extension of existing fundamental rights, including the right of domestic free movement and the right to exit one’s country. The third argument is libertarian: international free movement is necessary to respect individual freedom of association and contract. This chapter shows why these arguments fail to justify a general right to free movement across the globe. What is morally required is not a general right of international free movement but an approach that privileges those whose basic human rights are at stake.

The Secularized State

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-236
Author(s):  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ◽  
Mirjam Künkler ◽  
Tine Stein
Keyword(s):  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
The State ◽  
Religious Communities ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Freedom Of Belief ◽  
The Right

In this article Böckenförde contrasts his concept of open encompassing neutrality (found in most Scandinavian countries and in Germany) with that of distancing neutrality, as practised in France. While the latter champions negative religious freedom, open encompassing neutrality aims for a balancing of negative and positive religious freedom. Religious freedom for Böckenförde is multidimensional and includes the right to have (or not) a religious faith (freedom of belief), to affirm (or not) this faith privately and openly (freedom to profess), to exercise (or not) one’s religion publicly (freedom of worship), and to join together (or not) in religious communities (religious freedom of association). The correlate to these individual and group rights is the open and overarching principle of the state’s neutrality towards religion and other worldviews, entailing a prohibition on the state justifying law on religious grounds. Furthermore, it requires the state not to privilege religion over non-religion and one religious faith over another. Siding with the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court (at a time when he was not a sitting judge), Böckenförde underlines that even religious communities who reject the democratic state have the right to be recognized and legally protected. What matters is not whether communities accept or reject the state, but whether they obey or violate its laws. This was the court’s view on the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and it must also be applied, Böckenförde writes, to religious fundamentalists who do not accept the secular order, as long as they do not violate any laws.

scholarly journals On the optical and physical properties of tabasheer. By David Brewster, LL. D. F. R. S. Lond. and Edin. In a letter to the Right Hon. Sir Joseph Banks, Bart. G. C. B. P. R. S. &c

1833 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 115-116
Keyword(s):  
Optical Properties ◽  
Specific Gravity ◽  
Physical Properties ◽  
The State ◽  
Index Of Refraction ◽  
Flint Glass ◽  
The Third ◽  
Refractive Power ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Right

Tabasheer is a substance found in the cavities of the bamboo, existing originally in the state of a transparent fluid, but gradually indurating into a solid of different degrees of hardness: it consists of 70 silica, + 30 potash and lime. One variety has a milky transparency, transmitting a yellowish, and reflecting a bluish light; another is translucent, and a third opake: the two first varieties become transparent, and evolve air when immersed in water: the third evolves air also, but remains opake. If the first varieties be only slightly wetted they become quite opake. The property of acquiring transparency by the evolution of air from, and the absorption of water by its pores, belongs also to the hydrophanous opal; but the faculty of becoming opake by a small quantity, and transparent by a larger, of water, shows a singularity of structure in tabasheer. As the tabasheer disengages more air than hydrophane, its pores must be more numerous; and therefore the transmission of light, so as to form a perfect image, indicates either a very feeble refractive power or some peculiarity in the construction of its pores. To determine this, Dr. Brewster formed a prism of tabasheer with an angle of 34° 15', and upon measuring its refractive power found it very low, though various in different specimens, the index of refraction varying from 1·11 to 1·18, that of water being 1·33, of flint-glass 1·60, of sulphur 2·11, of phosphorus 2·22, and of the diamond 2·47. So that tabasheer has a lower refractive power than any other solid or liquid, and holds an intermediate place between water and the gases. Dr. Brewster then gives a formula for computing the absolute refractive power of bodies, and a table of results, from which it appears that, in this respect, the refractive power of tabasheer is so low as to be separated by a considerable interval from all other bodies. The author next proceeds to detail a variety of experiments upon the absorbent powers of the different kinds of tabasheer, in respect to several liquids, and the corresponding effects upon its optical properties and specific gravity, and concludes with observations on the cause of the paradox exhibited by the transparent tabasheer, in becoming opake by absorbing a small quantity of water, and transparent when the quantity is increased.

scholarly journals General Requirements for Secret Investigative (Search) Actions: Procedural Characteristics

2020 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 212-223
Author(s):  
Я. Ю. Конюшенко
Keyword(s):  
Appellate Court ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
General Requirement ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Criminal Offense ◽  
The Third ◽  
Territorial Jurisdiction ◽  
Procedural Code ◽  
The Right ◽  
Comprehensive Study

A comprehensive study of the provisions of the Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine, which regulate the general requirements for secret investigative (search) actions, has been carried out. A comparative analysis of the legislative provisions on the issue has been carried out, which made it possible to distinguish seven groups of general requirements for the implementation of secret investigative (search) actions. The first general requirement of secret investigative (search) actions includes restrictions on their use in criminal proceedings, as they are carried out only in cases where information about the criminal offense and the person who committed it, cannot be obtained in any other way. The second general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) actions includes restrictions on their use in criminal proceedings, in particular the fact that they are conducted exclusively in criminal proceedings for grave or especially grave offenses. The third general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) actions is that the legal basis for their implementation is a lawful, reasoned and motivated decision of the investigating judge, issued at the request of the prosecutor or investigator, agreed with the prosecutor. The fourth general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) actions is that the investigating judge of the appellate court has the right to make the decision to implement them, where the pre-trial investigation agency is within the territorial jurisdiction of that judge. The fifth general requirement includes rules concerning the content of the application for a permit to conduct secret investigative (search) action, the procedure for its consideration by the investigating judge and the content of the decision of the investigating judge. The sixth general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) actions includes rules that set deadlines for their implementation. The seventh general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) action includes the rule that the investigator, the interrogator conducting the pre-trial investigation, or, on his behalf or on behalf of the prosecutor, authorized operative units have the right to conduct secret investigative (search) actions.

Part III, 11 Religious Group Autonomy

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahdar Rex ◽  
Leigh Ian
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Religious Group ◽  
Religious Communities ◽  
Religious Leaders ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
The Third ◽  
Matters Of Concern ◽  
The Right

This chapter examines religious group autonomy, which comprises the right of religious communities to determine and administer their own internal religious affairs without interference from the state. It begins with a brief survey of the law's recognition of religious group autonomy. It contrasts a liberal understanding of religious autonomy with that of the religious communities themselves. It then focuses upon three illustrative matters of concern in this area. One is the right of religious groups to select their own religious leaders and ministers. The second is the right of groups to assemble for worship in buildings and locations of their choosing. The third concern is the right of religious communities to determine for themselves who they will marry within the rites of their communities.

Aerial Jurisdiction

1911 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-180
Author(s):  
George Grafton Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Concept ◽  
Exclusive Jurisdiction ◽  
Territorial Jurisdiction ◽  
Open Sea ◽  
Marginal Sea ◽  
General Proposition ◽  
State Authority ◽  
The Right

As a legal concept jurisdiction may be considered the right to exercise state authority. Story says that it may be “laid down as a general proposition that all persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction of a sovereign are amenable to the jurisdiction of himself or his courts; and that the exceptions to this rule are such only as by common usage and public policy have been allowed, in order to preserve the peace and harmony of nations, and to regulate their intercourse in a manner best suited to their dignity and rights.” (Santissima Trinidad 7 Wheat. 354) It is fully recognized that all land and the marginal sea, to a distance of a marine league at least, is subject to territorial jurisdiction and that the open sea is not within the jurisdiction of any state though vessels sailing upon such seas are within the jurisdiction of the state whose flag they rightfully fly. As Story says exceptions to this rule of exclusive jurisdiction are such “as by common usage and public policy have been allowed, in order to preserve the peace and harmony of nations, and to regulate their intercourse, in a manner best suited to their dignity and rights.”

The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry

2006 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 390-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPH BUCHHEIM ◽  
JONAS SCHERNER
Keyword(s):  
Private Property ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
The State ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Reich

Private property in the industry of the Third Reich is often considered a mere nominal provision without much substance. However, that is not correct, because firms, despite the rationing and licensing activities of the state, still had ample scope to devise their own production and investment profiles. Even regarding war-related projects, freedom of contract was generally respected; instead of using power, the state offered firms a number of contract options to choose from. There were several motives behind this attitude of the regime, among them the conviction that private property provided important incentives for increasing efficiency.

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